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Abstract 
In this thesis I argue against unrestricted mereological hybridism, the view that there are absolutely 
no constraints on wholes having parts from many different logical or ontological categories, an 
exemplar of which I take to be ‘mixed fusions’. These are composite entities which have parts from 
at least two different categories – the membered (as in classes) and the non-membered (as in 
individuals). As a result, mixed fusions can also be understood to represent a variety of cross-
category summation such as the abstract with the concrete, the physical with the non-physical, and 
the possible with the impossible, just to name a few. 
 Proposed by David Lewis (1991) alongside his defence of classical mereology (the major 
theory of parthood which permits such transcategorial composites through its principle of 
unrestricted composition) it is my contention that mixed fusions are an under-examined 
consequence of indiscriminate mereological fusion which harbour a multitude of complications. In 
my attempt to discern their substantive character, throughout this thesis I make a case study of 
mixed fusions and uncover several problematic consequences which I think follow from their most 
plausible assessment. 
 These include: (1) that mixed fusions’ probable membership relations may lead to dubious 
foundational loops in the mereological Universe, or (2) otherwise that mixed fusions oblige an 
implausible ontological priority of the mereological Universe as a whole; (3) that mixed fusions 
contradict the reductive account of set theory they are proposed within, by plausibly being seen to 
have the same members as their class parts, and (4) that mixed fusions therefore confound a 
mereological thesis of Composition as Identity, which some (including Lewis) use to support 
classical mereology – a consequence which is potentially self-defeating; (5) that mixed fusions as 
sums of abstract and concrete entities both subvert Lewis’s (1986) system of modal realism, while 
(6) also undermining less expansive theories of possible worlds; and finally, (7) that even where 
some of the foregoing is resisted, it remains implausible that mixed fusions are ontologically 
innocent, because their supposed distinction from their parts in this case ensures that they need to be 
counted as additional entities in one’s ontology. 
 To be clear, I do not advance a theory of mereological hybrid nihilism in the sense of 
denying all cases of transcategorial composition. (I only cover a few select instances of 
mereological hybridism via mixed fusions after all.) Rather, I deny that mereological hybridism is 
plausible in full generality, by demonstrating that any cases of it are at least limited by the 
constraints that I identify. This in turn vindicates a call for a restriction on parthood theories and 
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composition principles which allow certain types of categorially mixed entities – including 
restricting classical mereology with its principle of unrestricted composition. 
 Although theories of parthood like the standard classical mereology are not ordinarily 
developed for the sake of mereological hybrids like mixed fusions, these and other transcategorial 
composites are still among the logical consequences of such parthood systems operating with 
sufficient generality. The significance of my thesis, then, comes from showcasing how some of 
these kinds of entities do not conform to the systems in which they are included as required, and 
hence I argue for the rejection of unrestricted mereological hybridism as well as any mereological 
principles which support it. 
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0.0 Introduction to this whole story 
Mereological hybridism is the view that some composite wholes have parts from multiple different 
logical or ontological categories. A mereology – or, a theory of parthood and parthood relations – is 
characterised by a description of relations believed to hold between parts and wholes, and also 
between parts of wholes. Mereologies have been developed in response to long-standing 
philosophical problems concerning the possible part-whole configuration of existents, as well as 
questions and issues surrounding the identity of objects and the structure of physical reality, among 
other things. Some contemporary metaphysics has similarly brought into focus an understanding of 
existents as belonging to special categories, either for the sake of regimenting the conceptualisation 
of existence at large, or because of the belief that such categories identify natural divisions in 
reality, and so facilitate the recognition of entities in their proper place. Mereological hybridism 
occurs when the applications of mereological theories operate in such a manner as to transcend 
category divisions, natural or otherwise, and results in wholes or sums with parts from multiple 
different categories. In this thesis I argue that mereological hybridism fails in a wide variety of 
contexts. 
 Consider the following example. Within the context of the classic Platonic dual ontological 
division into the abstract (such as numbers) and the concrete (such as material beings), a mereology 
may permit the formation of wholes with parts from either side of this divide. One such theory 
which allows for these fusions is classical mereology, the standard and canonical theory of 
parthood, which also goes by the name of General Extensional Mereology (hereafter ‘GEM’). 
Reasonable questions arise when considering such transcategorial sums – are these composites 
themselves abstract or concrete, or something else? If such sums are meant to be either abstract or 
concrete, natural concerns arise over how to justify that something abstract has concrete parts (and 
vice versa). Or, if these sums are neither abstract nor concrete, then what are these different kinds of 
thing, what category do they belong to, and how does this accord with our prior conception of the 
abstract and the concrete as categories? 
 What is at stake in answering these sorts of questions in cases like these is whether the 
alleged frameworks and contexts which engender them are worth supporting, or if these systems 
ought to be reconsidered. For instance, if none of the three options in the above case of abstract and 
concrete hybrid fusions are plausible, then it is reasonable to suspect that there is something wrong 
with cross-category summation on this occasion. Indeed, on my view, the prospects of widespread 
mereological hybridism are dim. For the sake of answering such questions, in this thesis I examine a 
range of instances of mereological hybridism that all arise from a single type of claimed existent – 
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one which is easily recognised as able to encompass a large variety of different categories – a type 
of entity which David Lewis (1991) proposes and defends: ‘mixed fusions’. I argue that these 
instances expose inconsistencies, incompatibilities, and even contradictions with mereological 
hybridism, and claim that the best response to these problems is to restrict composition principles 
which allow them. 
 According to Lewis, mixed fusions are the mereological sum of at least one ‘class’ and one 
‘individual’. The foremost difference between classes and individuals that make mixed fusions 
mereological hybrids on my view concerns the sorts of membership relations that these kinds of 
entities are involved in. Following Lewis’s initial definitions in this regard, classes have one main 
feature, and are simply entities that have members (1991, 4), such as the class {Magpie, Possum} 
with Lewis’s two cats as members. Individuals, however, are said to have two core traits, being 
defined by Lewis as entities which do not have any members but which are yet themselves members 
(1991, 4). Maintaining the usual understanding that all ordinary space-time creatures are 
memberless, the cats Magpie and Possum are expected to be individuals here, insofar as they are 
members of some class, as in the previous example. Mixed fusions, then, would be given in cases 
such as where the individual Magpie and the class {Magpie, Possum} together compose a whole, 
and their mereological hybridism would be given in their being fusions of both membered and non-
membered things. 
 Under Lewis’s system of classes, individuals and part-whole theory, the mereological 
hybridisation which occurs in such cases is universal. Therein Lewis attests that mixed fusions exist 
due to a principle of mereological composition which allows for such distinct types of entity to form 
a composite whole. This is a principle found in GEM – Lewis’s mereology of choice – of 
unrestricted composition. In essence, unrestricted composition asserts that any plurality of entities 
composes a mereological unit, a whole, and they do so regardless of what kinds of entities these 
may be or to what categories they belong. As Lewis puts it, unrestricted composition entails that 
“whenever there are some things, no matter how many or how unrelated or how disparate in 
character they may be, they have a mereological fusion. [...] That means that if I accept individuals 
and I accept classes, I have to accept mereological fusions of individuals and classes.” (1991, 7) 
This universality of composition clearly also indicates the availability of other instances of cross-
category summation. 
 What makes mixed fusions such a good case study in this regard then is that, depending on 
how we understand the nature of classes and of certain kinds of individuals, mixed fusions are also 
able to represent many further examples of mereological hybridism besides their primary case of 
logical division along the lines of membered and non-membered things. For instance, because on 
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the standard view classes are abstracta, and abstracta are usually conceived to be non-physical, non-
extended, non-spatial, as well as being arguably necessary entities, fusions of these with individuals 
which are either concrete (like Magpie on the ordinary conception), or physical, or extended, or 
spatial, or contingent (all of which concreta variously can be on standard accounts) undoubtedly 
leads to instances of mereological hybridism, insofar as it is the case that the assorted contrastive 
divisions mentioned each count as categories in their own right. There is also the example of mixed 
fusions being transcategorial sums of possibilia and impossibilia following Lewis’s (1986) account 
of possible worlds as concrete maximal sums, whereby the mereological whole which any possible 
world comprises only has parts which are possible too. As Lewis too regards classes as abstracta 
(Lewis 1986, 87 and 94, 1991, 142; cf., Nolan 2002, 21 and 155), his position that no possible 
worlds have abstracta for parts entails that classes are thereby impossible entities (merely in the 
sense of not being a part of any possible worlds), which would again lead to mixed fusions being 
mereological hybrids, and in this instance, of possibilia and impossibilia. 
 As there are many complexities and intricacies surrounding this variety of potential 
divisions of reality into categories, in terms of how justifiable each of them are in their own right, or 
for the overall notion of categories altogether, along with the fact that some candidate individuals 
may themselves be abstracta (e.g., propositions, fictional characters, gods), among others, my 
objections to widespread mereological hybridism are somewhat conditional on the circumstances 
holding that the various potential forms of mereological hybridism would require – or at the least, I 
demonstrate inconsistency and incoherency for a variety of mereological pairings based on logical 
and conceptual grounds. Which is to say that even if it is not the case that there really are both 
abstracta and concreta, as one example, I at least show how certain conceptions of these as 
categories logically precludes there being mereological fusions of things from each of them. 
 In this respect, my overarching claim in this thesis is that unrestricted composition is 
incompatible with many standard views of particular logical and ontological category divisions, and 
that, under such conditions, unrestricted composition is to be rejected. In turn, this amounts to my 
rejection of GEM, insofar as it is taken literally to be an absolutely general and topic neutral theory 
and expected to be able to apply to entities from any category whatsoever with certain combinations 
of categories in unison. On my view, the best answers to the questions above work against the 
plausibility of mereological hybridism, and that thereby any sort of theories or principles which 
tend to support the view in specific instances, such as GEM or unrestricted composition, also face 
objections based upon these type of consequences they accrue. Because I think that mereological 
hybridism fails in many cases, and that mixed fusions suitably provide a representative example for 
each of these instances of failure, I make my arguments against mereological hybridism by putting 
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mixed fusions front and centre, although I expect that my criticisms can relevantly generalise. With 
mixed fusions as my main entity under scrutiny, we need a thorough account of them so as to 
provide a basis for their critical examination. 
 I also think that Lewis’s discounting of much attention to mixed fusions means that he has 
overlooked their problematic status and their consequences which I believe undermine his reductive 
project and system of principles – to the point that a reduction of set theory to the theory of 
singleton functions, GEM and plural quantification cannot be achieved. Moreover, I think that 
mixed fusions serve as a good example of why unrestricted composition would fail in domains 
which include sets or classes, and that thereby mixed fusions stand as an exemplary threat to GEM 
being an absolutely general theory. This is also why I think that mixed fusions serve as an 
exemplary instance of the failures of mereological hybridism, in that their potential for instances of 
cross-category fusing overturns the frameworks which they are supposed to inhabit. 
0.1 Chapter overviews 
To support these claims against mereological hybridism and GEM in general, I make several 
arguments across each of my chapters, covering some, but not all, of the categorial divisions already 
mentioned, and using Lewis’s mixed fusions as the main example. 
0.1.1 Chapter 1 
As mixed fusions serve as a case study for all of the problems that I examine with mereological 
hybridism, Chapter 1 is entirely exegetical. There I start with an explanation of mixed fusions 
following their proposed properties and relations, both implicit and explicit, from Lewis’s (1991) 
system. In addition I present much of the conceptual apparatus required to follow the rest of the 
thesis. 
0.1.2 Chapter 2 
In Chapter 2 I argue for the correction of some flaws that I perceive in Lewis’s account of mixed 
fusions, alongside offering some clarifying terminology to also be of assistance. Beyond that I 
discuss a preliminary case of mereological hybridism under the distinction of things being members 
of classes or not – rather than having members or not – and argue that a prohibition Lewis makes on 
mixed fusions themselves being members of classes is unjustifiably strong. I claim that if we follow 
the consequences of Lewis’s framework explicitly, there is no good reason why mixed fusions in 
general cannot be members. 
 However, I also show that this being corrected leads to a highly unfavourable – but not 
necessarily paradoxical – instance of a foundational or grounding loop for the mereological 
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Universe. This is the entity which is supposed to have all other things as its parts, according to 
GEM and other mereologies which have such a Universe. The foundation-looping consequence is a 
result which, while not ultimately thwarting of mereological hybridism in this instance, is still 
indicative of some of its potential, and very unattractive, consequences. This looping result is also 
relevant for the debate in Chapter 4. 
0.1.3 Chapter 3 
In Chapter 3 I examine a somewhat related case of mereological hybridism as that from Chapter 2, 
which this time involves the counterpart to something being a member, that of something having 
members or not, and the categorial divide between those things which have members, and those 
things which do not. Here I argue that, even though mixed fusions are mereological sums of 
something membered and something memberless by definition, mixed fusions should not 
themselves have members – a claim stronger than what Lewis makes (which is just that they do not 
have members), and for weaker reasons than mine. Keeping Lewis’s framework of standard set and 
class theory in mind, I make my case by showing that if mixed fusions are like classes and 
membered that this either leads to contradictions of the standard membership theory, or otherwise 
implausible revisions to what the part-whole structure of sets or classes could even be. 
 In addition to this, I also show that the Composition as Identity (CAI) thesis that Lewis 
(1991) famously defends – which basically asserts that wholes are ‘nothing over and above’ their 
parts – fails in the case of mixed fusions. This is because if mixed fusions are identical to their 
parts, as per CAI, then they have the same members that their parts do, even as they have different 
parts from them for being their fusion, which leads to the same contradictions of the standard 
membership theory as before. I argue that Lewis’s position on mixed fusions having members is 
implicitly inconsistent because he explicitly says mixed fusions don’t have members, although CAI 
implies otherwise, and Lewis endorses both the claim about mixed fusions and the thesis about 
composition. Accordingly, I show that Lewis has to give up CAI on pain of contradiction, which 
means he also loses a thesis he takes to support GEM, which makes my case against GEM in its 
facilitation of mereological hybridism in this instance also enhanced by CAI’s failure. 
0.1.4 Chapter 4 
In Chapter 4 I debate recent work by Trogdon and Cowling (2019), one of the only other works 
which is strictly focussed on the nature of mixed fusions. The debate here is over the grounding 
status of mixed fusions, and specifically over whether mixed fusions are better understood as being 
grounded by their proper parts, or alternatively that they are grounders of their proper parts. Where 
Trogdon and Cowling argue that mixed fusions are grounded by their proper parts, I show that their 
presentation either leads to contradictions or results in their premises better supporting the 
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conclusion that they explicitly argue against, that of mixed fusions grounding their own proper 
parts. 
 Although I am not specifically interested in making a case myself for priority monism – the 
view that there is a unique mereological Universe which is fundamental, and where any entity 
numerically distinct from the mereological Universe is grounded by it – I argue that this is the 
consequence of Trogdon and Cowling’s premises, as the mereological Universe under Lewis’s 
system is a mixed fusion. Therefore, the relation to mereological hybridism in this instance involves 
both the potentially abstracta/concreta fusion instantiated by mixed fusions, as well as how their 
parts’ distinct membership relations operate. 
 Further to this, I show that by recalling the result obtained in Chapter 2, that mixed fusions 
being members leads to grounding loops involving the mereological Universe, that this new 
consequence from Trogdon and Cowling’s premises serves to remove the loops but only at the cost 
of overdetermining the grounding relations. Therefore I argue that instead of facing a problematic 
trilemma of choosing between either unsupported proper part grounding, unfavourable grounding 
loops, or unacceptable grounding overdetermination, that we are better off rejecting GEM and its 
attendant mereological hybridism in such contexts, to avoid mixed fusions and these associated 
problems with their grounding. 
0.1.5 Chapter 5 
In Chapter 5 I examine how the claim to mixed fusions could be affected by the classic categorial 
distinction between abstract and concrete entities (Katz 1998). Most commonly classes are taken to 
be abstract entities (Linnebo 2018), where abstracta are routinely depicted in terms of the features 
they lack (e.g., non-spatiotemporal, non-mental, non-changing, non-causal, inter alia) (Kaufman 
2002). Concrete entities, on the other hand, are commonly taken to have at least some of the 
positive features which abstracta do not have, with ordinary space-time creatures like cats, cars and 
caves being some examples of concreta. A natural question arises in the case of mixed fusions, and 
serves for a key inquiry into the prospects of the plausibility of unrestricted mereological hybridism 
– if mixed fusions have at least one part which is an abstractum (the class) and one which is a 
concretum (which individuals that are ordinary things should be), which of these kinds of entity is 
the mixed fusion? 
 I argue that on one plausible construal of the abstract–concrete distinction that mixed 
fusions can be of neither kind in these instances, and should therefore be rejected – which is a de 
facto rejection of unrestricted composition and GEM. 
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 Throughout the rest of the chapter I consider Lewis’s options for resisting this consequence 
of the abstract–concrete distinction so described, drawing from his (1986) account of making the 
distinction, and also examining how both his system of concrete modal realism and conception of 
classes as entities which exist outside possible worlds (1986; 1991) are impacted. In the end I argue 
that the most credible option in terms of claims that Lewis makes in defence of his systems actually 
still leads to significant problems that justify a restriction on composition after all. Specifically in 
his claims to trans-world fusion which involve parts from different possible worlds, but also in his 
claims to supra-world summation which involve parts from both outside and inside possible worlds. 
 However, I do not end up with a conclusion that shows all abstracta/concreta fusions to be 
objectionable. Instead, my claims to reject mereological hybridism and to restrict composition in the 
case of abstract and concrete sums is when these are meant to also be supra- and trans-world 
fusions, as they can be within systems like Lewis’s. 
0.1.6 Chapter 6 
Chapter 6 has similar themes to Chapter 5, yet covers a debate about the prospects of transcategorial 
sums in general, rather than just the restricted case of only considering abstracta and concreta. More 
specifically, I criticise a debate between Simons (2003) and Varzi (2006) which is over the referent 
of the term ‘the Universe’, as well as investigate the prospects of transcategorial sums in more 
general terms – sums which, of course, exhibit mereological hybridism. I also show how Smid 
(2015) confounds the issue by offering that sums may be of multiple or no categories, options 
which I reject, as do Varzi and Simons, because categories as presented are comprehensive across 
all things, and mutually exclusive. In closing I argue that only some but not all transcategorial 
fusing may be acceptable. 
 Consequently I argue that because we can have cases both where transcategorial fusion fails 
and succeeds that we are unable to assume in advance that it will necessarily fail or succeed, and are 
thereby compelled to refrain from assuming in advance that any case of mereological hybridism is 
acceptable. I therefore argue that we must do the work to show category compatibility, and 
consequently further claim that GEM is an unacceptable system for its imprudent enabling of 
mereological hybridism. In the end I thereby side with Simons in rejecting the mereological 
Universe as a transcategorial sum, but for stronger reasons than he gives specifically on this angle. 
0.1.7 Chapter 7 
In Chapter 7 I examine Lewis’s argument for the ‘ontological innocence’ of GEM, and conclude 
that it cannot be innocent in the case of mixed fusions, as these would in fact be additional entities 
to accept in our ontology. In his defence of GEM Lewis famously argues for its ontological 
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innocence in the sense that when it comes to our ontological commitment to the number of entities 
that there are, that we do not incur numerically more commitments by accepting fusions of things 
which we are already committed to. As Lewis puts it “given a prior commitment to cats, say, a 
commitment to cat-fusions is not a further commitment.” (1991, 81) 
 Recalling, however, that Lewis thinks that mixed fusions are distinctly unlike any of the 
other entities in existence (i.e., they are neither individuals nor classes) makes them a problem. This 
is because, as Varzi explains, the idea that mereology is innocent is based on the assumption that 
there are not irreducible composites which exemplify properties and relations that are not reducible 
to or grounded on the properties and relations exemplified by the things that compose them (2014, 
63). With mixed fusions on Lewis’s account being unable to be reduced to even just their class parts 
qualitatively, then, I argue that each of them would indeed be an additional ontological cost and 
thereby not innocent, as they must therefore altogether be counted as both a separate entity in kind 
and in number. 
 In reaching this conclusion I further argue that a mereological Universe which contains 
mixed fusions, as in Lewis (1991), is decidedly non-innocent ontologically, and should thereby be 
rejected. This, in turn, amounts to another rejection of mereological hybridism in the case of mixed 
fusions. 
0.1.8 Chapter 8 
Finally, in Chapter 8 I review the results of the preceding chapters and establish my multiple 
arguments against mixed fusions as a cumulative result against general mereological hybridism, and 
thereby against GEM due to unrestricted composition. 
 Although GEM serves as a major instigator of mereological hybridism, I further claim that 
the cases I make against mereological hybridism involving mixed fusions should be able to 
generalise. This is to the effect that any claimed instances of composition across categories like the 
ones I discuss should be seen as too problematic to maintain, and that composition is indeed to be 
restricted to avoid such cases, whether or not the mereological system is classical. 
 I also suggest avenues for future work that follow on from the conclusions reached herein. 
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Chapter 1 
What are these things called 
Mixed Fusions? 
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1.0 Introduction 
David Lewis’s (1991) aim in Parts of Classes is to provide a better understanding of the ontology of 
the mathematical theories of sets and classes (1991, 6). There Lewis takes seriously the prospects of 
ontological universality, the idea that we can provide a comprehensive and all inclusive account of 
the things that exist, and regiment them under the conditions of a single system. One of Lewis’s key 
proposals for achieving this better understanding is to defend a reduction of class theory (or set 
theory, depending on how these terms are defined) primarily to the theory of singleton functions, a 
reduction which is meant to clarify the ontological basis of the more general membership theory. 
 Lewis facilitates this reduction by enlisting GEM and the logical resources of plural 
quantification (Lewis 1998, 203; Forrest 1991, 495), two theories which he takes to be absolutely 
general or topic-neutral in the sense that they apply to entities of any kind or from any domain 
whatsoever (1991, 62). In conjunction with these two theories, Lewis also proposes a bespoke 
package of theses for the mereological structure of classes and their parthood involvement with 
other entities, a package which is headed by his work’s Main Thesis, that the parts of a class are all 
and only its subclasses (1991, 7). On Lewis’s overall account it is proposed that the general case of 
membership from standard class theory reduces to the special case of membership in singletons (the 
unit classes which only have one member each) following the mereological framework provided, 
which entails that the key mereological components of classes with multiple members are the 
singletons (1991, 54). 
 The single, comprehensive system which Lewis depicts from this combination of theses and 
theories is one which is also meant to simultaneously encompass both the mereological and 
membership aspects of everything else that exists. This includes the world of ordinary objects, such 
as cats and buildings and sandwiches – things which are usually understood to be strictly different 
from classes in not having members but also usually themselves expected to be members, which 
under these specifications regarding membership are technically termed ‘individuals’ – as well as 
whatever else it is that may exist. With this differentiation in mind, and by following GEM’s 
principle of ‘unrestricted composition’ which in essence asserts that any plurality of entities 
composes a mereological unit, a whole, Lewis very much anticipates the existence of something 
else, and things which are admittedly unfamiliar, namely composite entities which have at least one 
part which is an individual and at least one part which is a class – what Lewis calls ‘mixed fusions’. 
 Lewis’s claim to the existence of mixed fusions exemplifies an acceptance of ‘mereological 
hybridism’, which I have characterised as any view which claims the existence of composite wholes 
with parts from multiple different categories, either logical or ontological. What primarily makes 
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mixed fusions mereological hybrids on my view concerns the sorts of membership relations that 
their parts of classes and individuals are involved in. Following Lewis’s initial definitions that 
classes are entities which have members and that individuals are entities which do not have any 
members but which are yet themselves members, I see the primary mereological hybridism of 
mixed fusions as stemming from their being fusions of both membered and non-membered things. 
Yet it is rather plausible that mixed fusions also exemplify other instances of mereological 
hybridism for the fact that classes are usually understood to be abstract entities, in at least the sense 
of not being in space and time, and that there are many potential individuals which are concrete 
entities, in the sense of being in space and time, provided such things do not have any members and 
are also eligible to be members, classifications which Lewis more or less also adheres to himself. 
 However, Lewis makes no defence specifically of his system’s mereological hybridist 
consequences, even as he admits that unrestricted composition coupled with the full generality of 
GEM leads to plenty of other kinds of unheard-of things which are mereological sums of multiple 
entities that we have heard of, such as his infamous ‘trout-turkeys’, whole creatures said to be 
composed of the front half of a trout plus the back half of a turkey, which altogether exist as 
spatially scattered sums of halves of those two ordinary animals (1991, 7). Instead, we get offered 
strategies for coping with them – strategies such as to restrict our quantifiers so as to avoid their 
discussion, among others (1991, 80) – strategies that do nothing to address any of the natural 
questions which arise when faced with such unfamiliar beings as mixed fusions clearly portend, 
questions such as: what kind or category might these entities belong to? How might these newly 
recognised entities fit within our current scheme or prior beliefs about (certain) categories? Is it 
really plausible that there are such other logical or ontological divisions? These sorts of questions 
take on an extra degree of significance in the context of certain categories which are understood to 
be both exclusive and exhaustive, such as with how the abstract/concrete distinction is traditionally 
understood (cf., Kaufman 2002), and I discuss them considerably in Chapters 5 and 6. 
 On my view, the best answers to these questions work against the plausibility of 
mereological hybridism, and that thereby any sort of theories or principles which tend to support the 
view in specific instances, such as GEM or unrestricted composition, also face objections based 
upon these type of consequences that they accrue. Because I think that mereological hybridism fails 
in many cases, and that mixed fusions suitably provide a representative example for each of these 
instances of failure, I make my arguments against mereological hybridism by putting mixed fusions 
front and centre, although I expect that my criticisms can relevantly generalise. With mixed fusions 
as my main entity under scrutiny, we need a thorough account of them so as to provide a basis for 
their critical examination. 
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 The natural starting point for our account of mixed fusions is to begin with Lewis’s 
introduction of them, to then continue with his overall portrayal of their features and attributes, as 
well as some of the relations that he thinks that they are in, both implicit and explicit for all. 
However, as I have found several problems within Lewis’s account of what mixed fusions are like 
and how they are connected to other entities, I will be following up this initial presentation with a 
critical evaluation of the proposals, and argue for certain clarifications and specifications to be 
adopted instead. Additionally, besides an account of mixed fusions from Lewis’s original 
perspective, we also need the details of the context in which Lewis first introduces them, such as the 
class theory, the mereology, and the package of theses which Lewis advances. Beyond this we also 
need some indication of how mixed fusions are supposed to be representative of mereological 
hybridist entities. Therefore, the extent of this chapter is to provide all of the core details about 
mixed fusions that are relevant for the thesis ahead, starting from the source and going on to their 
clarification, correction and qualification, in effect setting us up for the remainder of the work. 
 Before we start looking at mixed fusions proper we take an overview of the theories 
operating within Lewis’s system, as well as some of the terminology used throughout. 
1.1 Lewis’s selected theories and terminology 
First it should be noted that Lewis uses admittedly idiosyncratic terminology when it comes to set 
and class theory (1991, 4). While Lewis explicitly restricts the term ‘class’ to entities which have 
members, he restricts the term ‘set’ to any class which is itself also a member of a class, as well as 
uses it for the null set, which has no members. This means that for Lewis there is no ‘null class’, 
such that even though the null set is a subset of every class, it is not a subclass of any class, and 
thereby – following his Main Thesis that the parts of a class are all and only its subclasses – is not a 
part of any class. For Lewis the classes which are not members of any classes are the so-called 
proper classes (with the reasons given for them not being members discussed in later chapters). 
Note too that Lewis sometimes uses the terms ‘class’ and ‘set’ interchangeably, with the context in 
which they are deployed providing clarity for their meaning (something which I may do as well). 
 To be explicit, the way Lewis’s system of sets and classes handles proper classes makes it a 
version of what is often known as Morse–Kelley set theory (MK) (Burgess 2015, 460), which is a 
proper extension of the canonical set theory of Zermelo–Fraenkel with the axiom of choice (ZFC). 
MK is a proper extension of ZFC in that MK contains all of ZFC’s theorems, yet can also prove 
more theorems than ZFC (see Mendelson 2015, 396 fn for a formal definition of ‘proper extension’, 
and 2015, 4.6.1 for MK). Furthermore, because Lewis’s system also has resources to quantify over 
proper classes via plural quantification (1991, 62-71, following Boolos 1984), which are resources 
32 
beyond those found in MK itself, it is also arguably a more powerful system than even MK (Nolan 
2002, 193). As both ZFC and MK can also be developed so as to include individuals (or 
‘urelemente’ in the German, thereafter initialising the systems as ZFCU and MKU) Lewis also 
proceeds with this development for the sake of having a system which is anticipated to be able to 
capture all existents and not just ones with members. 
 Because Lewis reserves the term individual for anything that is a member of a class but does 
not itself have members, he also calls the null set an individual, and defines ‘urelement’ as any 
individual other than the null set. The following is a diagram to help show how Lewis uses the 
terms, with the more general higher terms connected to two more specific lower ones each. 
      individuals       sets            classes 
 
urelements      null set       non-empty sets  proper classes 
Figure 1.1 A linking diagram of Lewis’s terminology. 
Besides the class theory and the admittedly idiosyncratic terminology, Lewis’s system also makes 
use of GEM. This is broadly accounted for in the next subsection, alongside a small explanation of 
Lewis’s Main Thesis and some of its consequences. 
1.1.1 Lewis’s Main Thesis and GEM 
In Parts of Classes Lewis’s Main Thesis is that the parts of a class are all and only its subclasses. 
For an example, consider the set of three elements a, b and c, i.e., {a, b, c}. According to the Main 
Thesis the parts of {a, b, c} are seven: the plural class {a, b, c} which is a subclass of itself; its 
proper subclasses {a, b}, {a, c} and {b, c}; and the unit classes, or singletons, {a}, {b} and {c} 
which are also proper subclasses of the classes they share members with. Similarly to the 
subclass/proper subclass distinction, the term ‘part’ here permits two readings, either proper part or 
improper part. 
 While a proper part of an entity E is a part of E that is not E itself, the improper part of an 
entity E is E itself. For instance, of a brick wall under an ordinary conception, a proper part of the 
brick wall is one of its bricks, just as a proper part of one of the bricks is one of its own molecules. 
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However, the improper part of a brick wall here is the brick wall itself, and the improper part of a 
brick is the brick itself, and so on.1 
 One consequence of Lewis’s Main Thesis is that singletons are mereological ‘atoms’ (1991, 
15), a name for entities defined as having no proper parts, and hence singletons such as {a}, {b} and 
{c} are atoms according to Lewis’s system. Using a mereological model we can see an instance of 
the structure of the parthood relations that Lewis claims that classes have, with proper parthood 
relations going from the over elements to the under elements. 
{a, b, c} 
 
{a, b}  {a, c}  {b, c} 
 
{a}    {b}      {c} 
Figure 1.2 A Lewis system model of class parthood. 
This model also reflects the classical theory of parthood that Lewis is committed to. Informally, 
GEM states, among other things, that (1) all things are mereological, in the sense that everything 
has parts, and at the very least, each has itself as a part; (2) any plurality of things mereologically 
combine to form a whole, including the plurality of all things, if there is such a plurality; and (3) 
every whole is mereologically unique, such that any two entities cannot share all of the same parts 
and not be the same thing. In short, GEM asserts that (1) parthood is reflexive; and that 
mereological composition is both (2) unrestricted, and (3) unique.2 
 What GEM makes no claims to, however, is what it is specifically that exists. Instead, it puts 
forth a number of rules and conditions for what the mereological relations any existent is bound to 
or is involved in, such that GEM entails ontological commitments only conditional on what it is that 
exists. Although GEM can be adapted to more limited domains, it can be understood to be topic-
neutral or absolutely general in the sense that it applies to entities from any ontological category 
                                                 
1 For deniers of bricks and brick-walls, under an anti-GEM view called mereological nihilism, see van Inwagen (1990) 
(as an instance of the denial of composition in the case of artefacts), and Rosen and Dorr (2002), and Unger (1979) (for 
denials of composition in general). See Kearns (2011) for a GEM violating example of an extraordinary wall which has 
itself as a proper part, due to time-travel. 
2 There are other rules in the system and many ways to formulate GEM. For extensive overviews see Varzi (2016), 
Simons (1987) and Hovda (2009). 
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whatsoever (cf., Ryle 1958, and Uzquiano 2006). This absolute generality is how Lewis 
understands the scope of GEM (1991, 62 and 75), and goes towards explaining why he seeks to 
apply it to domains which include sets and classes. Because Lewis thinks that both classes and 
individuals exist and that GEM covers the mereological structure of all existents, he applies it to 
each of them and all things together accordingly. 
 That being said, the Main Thesis is not a claim about the parts of classes that Lewis always 
believed. As Lewis admits, in his earlier thinking he did not consider classes to be mereological 
entities at all. “I used to think [that] the part-whole relation applies only to individuals, and not sets. 
[...] I might at least have granted that the part-whole relation applies to classes in a trivial way: even 
if a class has no proper parts, as I then thought, at least it should have itself as an improper part.” 
(1991, 3 and fn 2). Here Lewis is following the consequence of GEM’s claims to absolute 
generality and of the reflexivity of parthood to the effect that any class is at the least single parted, 
i.e., at least a mereological atom. The Main Thesis goes much further than this, however, and says 
that the mereological structure of a domain which consists of only all classes mimics the 
mereological structure of an atomistic version of GEM, a claim which GEM itself takes no stance 
on. To justify the Main Thesis Lewis offers defences of his First and Second theses, of which the 
Main Thesis is a conjunction (1991, 6). We will consider these supporting theses later. 
 For now we start to look at Lewis’s presentation of mixed fusions. 
1.2 Ignored but undenied 
As mentioned, Lewis thinks that mixed fusions and other sorts of heterogeneous fusions like trout-
turkeys exist because he accepts both GEM’s principle of unrestricted composition and the 
existence of things which are their parts. In recognising that the existence of such entities may be 
unpalatable for some, one of Lewis’s strategies for minimising our concern over such unfamiliar 
beings is to advise that if we wish to ignore them we may do so, but only in cases where we are 
restricting the range of our quantifiers, either implicitly or explicitly (1991, 80). In this way, Lewis 
is happy to maintain that these kinds of things exist even as he acknowledges both that we are not 
accustomed to speak or think about such things, and also that mixed fusions and others may be 
different from ordinary, much-heard-of things – such as by their lack of cohesion and causal 
integration (1991, 80). However, Lewis attests that it is in the cases where we may wish to speak 
literally of everything, or otherwise leave our quantifiers sufficiently wide open, in which we must 
affirm the existence of such creatures. 
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 Although Lewis does not cover mixed fusions in that much detail, asserting that they and 
other heterogeneous fusions resist concise classification (1991, 8), over the course of Parts of 
Classes Lewis indeed opts not to ignore mixed fusions absolutely, both referring to and making 
claims about them in roughly ten places throughout the work’s almost 150 pages. There Lewis 
builds up a small, explicit account of what he thinks mixed fusions are like. For instance, we learn 
that, according to Lewis, mixed fusions cannot themselves have members (and are thereby unlike 
classes) (1991, 7-8 and 16-17), yet are also not themselves members of classes (and are thereby 
unlike individuals) (1991, 8, 15, 21, 103 and 118); that an entity of which all others are supposed to 
be part – the mereological Universe – is a mixed fusion (which Lewis calls “Reality”) (1991, 8); 
and that mixed fusions are ‘ontologically innocent’, because a prior commitment to individuals and 
classes is expected to ensure that their recognition as existents does not increase our ontological 
commitments in terms of the number of entities that we accept – something which Lewis argues for 
as being the case with every composite whole (1991, 81-87). 
 Beyond Lewis’s explicit statements about mixed fusions, however, are the implicit 
connotations and consequences for them when framed in the surrounding context of class theory, 
GEM, and Lewis’s package of theses about the parts of classes, as well as some of the evaluative 
claims Lewis puts forth, or his other proclaimed beliefs and assumptions. Here we can see implied 
either from Lewis’s framework or particular statements that mixed fusions are grounded in their 
proper parts and their class parts’ members; that mixed fusions as sums of concreta and abstracta 
are themselves abstracta, and also that Lewis finds no problems with mixed fusions and other 
transcategorial sums in terms of a variety of other instances of mereological hybridism; that mixed 
fusions are peculiarly identical to their parts; and that mixed fusions are, in some cases, irreducible 
composites. Notably, some of these implicit consequences are contradictory, either with each other 
or with some of the explicit ones, and are some of what motivates my criticism in this thesis of the 
prospects of mixed fusions being plausible existents. Overall, although Lewis characterises mixed 
fusions to a degree and does not deny their existence, he does think that they can be left out of the 
domains of all but our most unrestricted quantifying, and thereby be mostly ignored. (1991, 8 and 
80) 
 As both the explicit and implicit characterisations Lewis makes of mixed fusions have 
consequences for the later chapters, some of the more involved details on these fronts will be 
revealed closer to the moment they are needed and addressed properly there, with more of the 
explicit details given to be the focus of this chapter in the presentation ahead. On this note, let’s 
begin to examine Lewis’s account of mixed fusions. 
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1.3 Salt beef sandwiches: The beginning of mixed fusions 
Lewis first introduces mixed fusions in the context of justifying and explaining one from his 
package of theses about the parts of classes and their relation to other entities, namely his Division 
Thesis, that Reality divides exhaustively into individuals and classes. On Lewis’s account, ‘Reality’ 
is the name he gives to the absolute whole or mereological sum of everything that exists. When 
taking GEM as an absolutely general theory, the notion that there is an entity of which all others are 
parts is a theorem (Bohn 2009), and this totality entity is a type that I will refer to in general as a 
‘mereological Universe’. The distinction to keep in mind here is that Lewis’s proposed 
mereological Universe which he calls Reality is one which is explicitly said to consist of individuals 
and classes as well as mereological fusions thereof. However, such an absolute composite as 
Lewis’s Reality is not the only way to conceive of a mereological Universe if, for example, one 
denies the existence of classes, which would preclude there being mixed fusions altogether. To get a 
feel for how Lewis conceives of mixed fusions, and the general attitude he has towards them, it is 
instructive to quote his qualification of the Division Thesis in full. 
Roughly speaking, the Division Thesis says that there is nothing else except 
individuals and classes. But that is not exactly right. If we thought that Reality 
divided exhaustively into animal, vegetable, and mineral, that would not mean 
that there was no such thing as a salt beef sandwich. The sandwich is no 
counterexample, because the sandwich itself divides: the beef is animal, the 
bread is vegetable, and the salt is mineral. Likewise, the Division Thesis 
permits there to be a mixed thing which is neither an individual nor a class, so 
long as it divides exhaustively into individuals and classes. I accept a principle 
of Unrestricted Composition: whenever there are some things, no matter how 
many or how unrelated or how disparate in character they may be, they have a 
mereological fusion. [...] That means that if I accept individuals and I accept 
classes, I have to accept mereological fusions of individuals and classes. Like 
the mereological fusion of the front half of a trout plus the back half of a 
turkey, which is neither fish nor fowl, these things can be mostly ignored. They 
can be left out of the domains of all but our most unrestricted quantifying. 
They resist concise classification: all we can say is that the salt beef sandwich 
is part animal, part vegetable, part mineral; the trout-turkey is part fish and part 
fowl; and the mereological fusion of Possum [one of Lewis’s cats and 
presumably non-membered] plus the class of all cat-whiskers is part individual 
and part class. Likewise Reality itself – the mereological fusion of everything – 
is mixed. It is neither individual nor class, but it divides exhaustively into 
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individuals and classes. Indeed, it divides into one part which is the most 
inclusive individual and another which is the most inclusive class. (1991, 7-8) 
Lewis’s presentation and discussion here is very informative, on several fronts. On one, it 
introduces us to the notion of mereological decomposition which is complementary to that of 
mereological composition, in that if something is composed of parts, it can also be decomposed, or 
‘divided’, into them. For Lewis, then, some of the plausibility of the Division Thesis can be seen to 
rest on the expectation that there are two basic entity types, which together exhaustively “mark the 
line that matters: the line between the membered and the memberless.” (1991, 4) This dividing line 
between classes and non-classes is also meant to suggest that the things which make up Reality, as 
its proper parts, are themselves exhaustively decomposable into either things which are membered, 
or things which are not. (For my take on the best way to mark this division, see section 2.2.1.) 
 On another front, this discussion further introduces us to Lewis’s classical expectation that 
parthood is to be understood as topic-neutral or absolutely general, in that composition relations are 
supposed to hold between things “no matter how many or how unrelated or how disparate in 
character they may be”, as well as the fact that the existence of a mereological fusion of everything, 
a mereological Universe, implies that all things altogether are in a composition relation of 
composing this whole. On a further front, this discussion also introduces us to the fact that there are 
other customarily overlooked creatures which are compatible with unrestricted composition, such as 
the trout-turkey, besides just those which are the mixed fusions. We are also shown that unrestricted 
composition is also compatible with ordinary things like sandwiches too, and is not solely in the 
business of introducing us to ontological exotica. 
 Finally, the discussion shows that Lewis thinks that Reality is a mixed fusion – the biggest 
mixed fusion of them all! – and that he does not expect it to be a member of any classes, because it 
“is neither individual nor class”. In fact, Lewis expects that all mixed fusions are non-members, 
which is something to be elaborated upon below, and also contested in Chapter 2. This also means 
that Lewis expects that Reality does not have any members, in it not being a class either, which is 
something Lewis also expects of all mixed fusions, that these are memberless. This understanding is 
mentioned below and to be discussed further in Chapter 3, where I deny that Lewis is able to 
maintain this claim about mixed fusions while still being consistent with his thesis of CAI. 
1.4 What else does Lewis say about mixed fusions? 
Although Lewis, as quoted earlier, does say that mixed fusions can be mostly ignored, he makes 
several other mentions of them throughout Parts of Classes, each of which helps to build a picture 
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of what he thinks they are like and how they fit into the world amongst everything else. We will 
now go through most of the things Lewis explicitly says about mixed fusions, and the claims he 
makes about them, before we go on to describe his other theses. For starters, when it comes to 
axiomatising set theory with ‘singleton’ as the only set-theoretical primitive – as Lewis proposes in 
his reduction of set theory – we can consider the prospects of what the candidate entities which fall 
under the broad categorisation of classes and individuals are or could be, besides those kinds of 
entities construed via their membership relations. For instance, Lewis says we should include 
certain unofficial axioms, such as those which embody “those of our customary metaphysical 
opinions about classes that deserve credence. [Including] for instance, an axiom stating that 
ordinary things – cats, etc. – are individuals, rather than classes or mixed fusions.” (1991, 46) 
 On the notion of whether mixed fusions can be members Lewis says, “the ‘salt beef 
sandwiches’: the mixed fusions, ignored but undenied ... have no singletons and are not members of 
anything.” (1991, 21) On the prospects of whether mixed fusions can have members, Lewis says “a 
mixed fusion, part individual and part class [does] have singletons as parts, yet probably we would 
not want to say that it has members.” (1991, 16) The last explicit, albeit indirect, claim that Lewis 
makes about mixed fusions is that they are ontologically innocent, in the sense that a commitment 
to their existence is not to count as an additional commitment beyond that already made to classes 
and individuals. As this is a claim that Lewis defends about composite entities in general (1991, 81-
87), it also applies to mixed fusions.3 
 From here we can update from our previous linking diagram of the terminology that Lewis 
uses to an Euler diagram which includes mixed fusions, as well as indicates the various membership 
properties and relations each kind of entity is involved in. 
  
                                                 
3 I challenge Lewis’s claims to the ontological innocence of GEM in Chapter 7. 
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Figure 1.3 An Euler diagram of Lewis’s terminology, with membership relations indicated. 
Alternately, we can show this arrangement in a table. 
Lewis’s terminology individual set class is a member has members 
urelements ✔   ✔  
null set ✔ ✔  ✔  
non-empty sets  ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
proper classes   ✔  ✔ 
mixed fusions      
Table 1.1 Lewis’s terminology, with membership relations indicated. 
As is clearer from the table, mixed fusions are conveyed mostly negatively by Lewis. What we have 
so far that is positive however are some of their direct implications. For example, we know that 
Lewis thinks that mixed fusions are transcategorially valid, in that their existence is not denied even 
as they have parts which at least cut across the logical division of the membered and the non-
membered. We also know that Lewis thinks that mixed fusions are ontologically innocent, as noted 
before. So we can summarise Lewis’s explicit portrayal of mixed fusions in the following table.4 
                                                 
4 With numbers indicated for my thesis chapters where this portrayal is primarily discussed. 
SETS 
Membered 
Non-membered 
INDIVIDUALS 
CLASSES 
Members Non-Members 
urelements null set mixed fusions 
non-empty sets 
proper classes 
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 Mixed fusions Lewis’s direct views 
2 Are members? None of them 
3 Have members? None of them 
6 Are transcategorially valid? Yes 
7 Are ontologically innocent? Yes 
Table 1.2 Lewis’s direct characterisation of mixed fusions. 
With regards to most of these explicit characterisations of mixed fusions, I think Lewis is wrong. 
Additionally, I also think that Lewis’s system of claims around membership, composition, identity 
and possible worlds, among other things, actually serves to indirectly amount to a different 
understanding of mixed fusions altogether. My allegations here are to be uncovered and justified as 
we proceed through the chapters. 
 For now we look towards the rest of Lewis’s theses to complete the overview of his 
reductive system. 
1.5 Completing Lewis’s package of theses 
In support of his Main Thesis Lewis provides five others, one of the most important being the 
First Thesis One class is a part of another iff the first is a subclass of the second. (1991, 4) 
To understand the First Thesis, note that on standard class theory, the notion of a subclass of a class 
refers either to a class itself or to a class which it includes in terms of having all of its members, yet 
is still distinct from it in terms of its other members. This means that subclasses come in two 
varieties, proper and improper, where a proper subclass of a class C is a subclass of C that is not C 
itself and the improper subclass of any class is just that class itself. For an example of a proper 
subclass, consider the three membered class {Leśniewski, Tarski, Goodman}, which has as one of 
its proper subclasses the two membered class {Leśniewski, Goodman}. Outside of Lewis’s 
mereological comparisons and claims, the structure of class and subclass relations are already well 
known as being akin to how the parthood relation is characterised by GEM where the parts of 
anything are either proper or improper, and the proper parts of anything are mereologically distinct 
from that thing while the thing’s improper part is just the thing itself. 
 For our example, then, under the First Thesis, the class {Leśniewski, Goodman} is a proper 
part and subclass of {Leśniewski, Tarski, Goodman}, as are each of the singletons {Leśniewski}, 
{Tarski}, {Goodman}, as well as its other proper subclasses. By following the First Thesis, and 
Lewis’s specification that the null set is not a null class, we get the understanding that any class is 
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both a subclass and part of itself, as an improper subclass and improper part of itself, and that any 
proper subclass of a class is also a proper part of that class.5 
 Lewis offers three reasons to believe in his First Thesis, while also claiming that it is far too 
evident to need an argument (1991, 7). The first reason is that it appears to conform to common 
speech, in that it seems natural to say, for instance, that the class of frogs is part of the class of 
animals (1991, 5). Secondly, there appear to be no formal obstacles to it being true, because of the 
formal analogy between GEM’s part-to-whole relation and the class theory’s (specifically non-
empty) subclass-to-class relation, a formal analogy which has long been understood (Oliver 1994). 
Lewis’s claim here is that for classes their subclasses just are their parts, we know it, and we speak 
accordingly (1991, 5).6 
 Finally, Lewis submits that there is a certain utility that comes from accepting the First 
Thesis which far surpasses any misgivings one could have towards it, with the remainder of Parts of 
Classes supposed to stand testament to its acceptance. Here Lewis sees the accepting of the First 
Thesis as being the principal step towards separating the ontological “innocence” of mereological 
fusion from the ontological “extravagance” of singleton formation, because the making many things 
into one via mereological fusion appears to Lewis to be an ordinary phenomenon – as we seem to 
not really have more than we started with – contrasted with the making many things out of one, via 
singleton formation – as we end up with far more than we may ever have imagined, with the 
infinitude of sets (1991, 6). 
 With regards to the second reason, for Lewis the Main Thesis (with its support in the First 
Thesis) is supposed to demonstrate that the formal similarity between the subclass-to-class relation 
and the part-to-whole relation is sufficient to show that the non empty subclass-to-class relation is, 
in fact, a species of the part-to-whole relation. This formal similarity can be conveyed easily with 
the help of some simple models, one of which we encountered earlier: 
  
                                                 
5 What we don’t get is the reverse, that any proper part of a class is a subclass. That’s what the Second Thesis (to be 
introduced) is for. 
6 For strong criticism of Lewis’s defence of the First Thesis, see Oliver (1994). 
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   ●              {a, b, c} 
 
 ●  ●  ●  {a, b}  {a, c}  {b, c} 
 
 ●  ●  ●  {a}    {b}      {c} 
Figure 1.4 (Left) A generic, atomic, GEM parthood model. (Right) A Lewis system of class parthood model. 
On the left side is a generic model of the GEM part structure which holds in the case of three 
mereological atoms. To read the models, lines go up the page to represent relations of proper 
parthood between elements.7 On the right side as before is a model of the GEM part structure which 
holds among a three membered class and its subclasses, in the case that Lewis’s account of the parts 
of classes is correct. On this account the unit classes, or singletons, of set theory are all 
mereological atoms, following the Main Thesis. 
 A requisite terminological clarification that Lewis makes here involves specifying that the 
null set – which is the only set which has no members – is a set only, and is not at all a class (1991, 
4). This is because the null set, on standard set theory, is a (proper) subset of every set, and thereby 
a (proper) subclass of every class. Yet because there is no parallel null part of every entity under 
GEM, completely following the formal similarity between the theories would lead to severe GEM 
deviations. Where usually the null set would be shown on a model as being below the unit classes 
as the zero-element of a Boolean algebra (see Varzi 2016), this is a model for Lewis specifically of 
non-empty classes, none of which have the null set as a part, even as all of them have it as a proper 
subset. As Lewis insists on the terminological distinction between sets and classes, singletons are 
understood as mereological atoms from having only one non-empty subclass, themselves, by having 
only one member. In light of all of the qualifications given, Lewis also considers the null set to be 
an individual, because it is ordinarily able to be a member of sets and classes in the respective 
theories – although regardless of whether these theories are extended to also include urelements as 
individuals – and by definition it is also memberless as well. 
 What the First Thesis does not tell us, however, is whether or not classes have any other 
parts besides their subclasses, hence Lewis offers his 
                                                 
7 Note that the left can also be a model of a mereological Universe which comprises only three atoms, whereby the 
topmost overlying element is the mereological Universe itself, and everything else is a part of it. 
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Second Thesis  No class has any part that is not a class. (1991, 6) 
In conjunction with the First Thesis, the Second Thesis is stated to serve as the basis for the Main 
Thesis, and is treated to an argument in the form of a reductio proof, mostly because it seems to 
Lewis “far less evident” than the First Thesis (1991, 7). (Due to space limitations I don’t provide 
the proof in this thesis. It can be found in Lewis 1991, 9-10. See Nolan 2002 and Tennant 2013 for 
good discussions and analyses of it.) To defend the Second Thesis Lewis makes use of the First 
Thesis along with the Division Thesis and the remaining two of the 
Priority Thesis No class is part of any individual. (1991, 7) 
Fusion Thesis  Any fusion of individuals is itself an individual. (1991, 7) 
In support of these two auxiliary theses, Lewis says 
The Priority Thesis and the Fusion Thesis reflect our vague notion that 
somehow the individuals are ‘basic’ and ‘self-contained’ and that the classes 
are somehow a ‘superstructure’; ‘first’ we have individuals and the classes 
come ‘later’. (In some sense. But it’s not that God made the individuals on the 
first day and the classes not until the second.) Indeed, these two theses may be 
all the sense that we can extract from that notion. We don’t know what classes 
are made of – that’s what we want to figure out. But we do know what 
individuals are made of: they’re made of various smaller individuals, and 
nothing else. (1991, 9) 
Here we can see that, even as Lewis supplies the theses, he does not provide much of a defence of 
them overall. This is regrettable because these theses are all tendered as supporting the cornerstone 
of an important understanding of the mereology in set theory, the Main Thesis, yet none of them 
receive much justification, which means that it does not either. To be honest, I am surprised that the 
Main Thesis does not receive adequate support from Lewis, who thinks that the supporting theses 
are either self-evident or otherwise only offers them as reflecting vague notions that we may or may 
not have. That the theses which are supposed to justify the Main Thesis either have no argument 
behind them, or when they do have an argument like in the proof of the Second Thesis still rely on 
three other barely supported theses to succeed, makes it very difficult to allow Lewis his premises 
on the grounds he expects alone. This is not to say that they may not be plausible independently of 
Lewis’s presentation, but it does mean that one has to put a bit of work and faith in to go all the way 
with Lewis from the outset. 
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 Despite these misgivings about the lack of support the theses get, we can go along with them 
for the sake of argument and treat them as proposals to be reviewed, especially if other claims are 
said to depend on them. What is most important are the background conditions within which these 
theses are proposed, namely the mereology which infuses the whole project. This is because – on 
the understanding that relations of parthood and composition are indeed completely general and 
operate in the way advised by GEM, and provided that both membered and non-membered things 
exist – it will be the case that there are fusions of classes with non-classes, as well of fusions of 
non-classes with non-classes, and of classes with classes, and any class will at the very least have 
itself as an improper part. It would do us well to know if we can say more than this for the sake of 
our understanding of the mereology, the set theory, and the variety of existents, as Lewis’s proposed 
package of theses tries to do. Which makes Lewis’s system a useful starting point for considering 
the same sorts of questions as he does, and something that we can make the most of in starting us 
off, even if it is more of a suggestive proposal altogether than something which is properly secured. 
1.5.1 Lewis’s implicit theses, and Reality 
In addition to the preceding it may be worth making explicit some of the implicit theses which 
Lewis is committed to alongside those which have been explicitly stated, as the above. The first is 
an implicit commitment of Lewis’s regarding the type of entity formed when it is composed only of 
classes, namely the 
Class Fusion Thesis  Any fusion of classes is itself a class.8 
The Class Fusion Thesis is an implicit commitment for Lewis following the conjunction of the 
Priority Thesis, that no class is part of any individual, and the fact that mixed fusions necessarily 
have both at least one individual and one class as proper parts. In this case, Lewis expects that the 
only things which have class parts are either classes or mixed fusions, and because mixed fusions 
are not classes for Lewis, any fusion of classes is expected to itself be a class. 
 Lewis’s commitment to the Class Fusion Thesis also further clarifies why MKU is his 
adopted set theory. This is because MKU permits proper classes (and also individuals), which 
standard set theory does not allow (although it can also be extended to include individuals.) The 
clarification arrives because Lewis thinks that all proper classes are fusions of a large number of 
singletons – which are, by the Main Thesis, all mereological atoms (as noted earlier) – to the point 
that the fusion of all singletons is a proper class, and a proper class which is the most inclusive class 
(1991, 8). After characterising Reality as a mixed fusion that is the mereological fusion of 
everything, recall that Lewis states that it “divides into one part which is the most inclusive 
                                                 
8 Tennant phrases this as Lewis’s “tacit assumption that the fusion of any class with a class is a class.” (2013, 726) 
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individual and another which is the most inclusive class” (1991, 8). A simplified part model of 
Reality, as such (yet where none of the entities are presumed to be mereological atoms), can be 
given in the following: 
 
 
 
Figure 1.5 A simplified parthood model of Reality. 
Lewis claims that proper classes such as C are in our ontology “willy-nilly, be they useful or be 
they useless. We do not go out of our way to posit them; rather we can’t keep them away, given our 
Main Thesis and Unrestricted Composition.” (1991, 19) I believe it is the implicit commitment to 
the Class Fusion Thesis which also helps to manifest such proper classes on Lewis’s view. 
 The second implicit thesis which Lewis holds is what I call the 
Mixed Fusion Thesis  Any fusion of both a class and an individual is neither of these. 
This thesis is first implied by how Lewis describes the Division Thesis as permitting there to be a 
“mixed thing which is neither an individual nor a class” (1991, 7), as well as in how Lewis 
characterises mixed fusions as being memberless, which excludes them from being classes, as well 
as being non-members, which excludes them from being individuals. 
 I treat these two additional assumptions of Lewis’s like they are theses in their own right 
because of the significant role they play in Lewis’s attitudes towards how he believes fusion 
amongst various entities plays out, which is also something to be revealed in more detail as we 
continue in later chapters. A further point to note with them is that even without their explicit 
statement as theses by Lewis himself, they are employed just as often as, if not more than, the other 
theses which Lewis provides, and also receive just as little support as they do. 
1.5.2 A list of Lewis’s theses 
To close this section, I list Lewis’s implicit and explicit theses as a revised package of eight, as 
advised from the foregoing. Of the original six, five maintain their name, yet I rename the Fusion 
Thesis to the Individual Fusion Thesis to maintain greater clarity in its distinction to the additional 
two of the Class Fusion and Mixed Fusion theses. 
Main Thesis   The parts of a class are all and only its subclasses. 
Reality 
i C 
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First Thesis   One class is a part of another iff the first is a subclass of the second. 
Second Thesis   No class has any part that is not a class. 
Division Thesis  Reality divides exhaustively into individuals and classes. 
Priority Thesis  No class is part of any individual. 
Individual Fusion Thesis Any fusion of individuals is itself an individual. 
*Class Fusion Thesis  Any fusion of classes is itself a class. 
*Mixed Fusion Thesis  Any fusion of both a class and an individual is neither of these. 
1.6 Conclusion, and summary of the task ahead 
So, what are these things called mixed fusions? We have seen that they are posited by Lewis 
because of accepting the existence of classes, via the acceptance of set theory, along with accepting 
the existence of non-classes, via more or less ordinary things, coupled with a composition principle 
which allows for their formation, such as that of unrestricted composition from GEM, which asserts 
that any pluralities form composites. 
 In addition to the motivation for thinking that they exist we have seen that, according to 
Lewis, mixed fusions are neither membered nor members – that they are neither class nor individual 
– and that they are a sort of transcategorial sum at the least in being fusions of both membered and 
non-membered things. In terms of Lewis’s explicit characterisation of mixed fusions, that’s about 
all we have, which leaves us with the implications of his statements and views to characterise them 
further. So, besides the more explicit statements on the nature of mixed fusions which Lewis 
supplies, I myself submit an early statement of several more characterisations which are only 
implied, leaving my fuller accounts of what I think are some of the implications for Lewis’s 
conception of mixed fusions for later chapters, with these characterisations to be examined further 
on. 
 They include that mixed fusions are grounded in their proper parts (relevant for Chapters 2 
and 4), as I will argue is evidenced by Lewis’s Priority Thesis that no class is part of any individual, 
along with his claim that in some sense we have individuals ‘first’ and the classes ‘later’ (1991, 9). 
They also include that mixed fusions can be mereological sums of an abstract part (as classes may 
be abstracta) and a concrete part (as ordinary things are commonly taken to be concreta) (discussed 
in Chapter 5 and 6); as well as that mixed fusions are acceptable transcategorial sums (discussed in 
Chapter 6), being exemplars of such cross-category fusing as that of both abstract and concrete 
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entities, of both membered and non-membered entities, and also of both possible and impossible-
entities (the latter because Lewis does believe in mereological fusions both across possible worlds 
and outside them). Finally, they include that mixed fusions are irreducible to their proper parts 
(discussed in Chapter 7), with this being so in the case of them not being classes – at least (and 
potentially more) depending on their transcategorial instances. 
 As my aim in this thesis is to have convinced you that mixed fusions should be denied it is 
fair to expect that I think Lewis is either wrong with regards to the matters above (and many others 
about mixed fusions), or that I think his presentation leads to problems internally. Indeed, I think 
that Lewis’s discounting of much attention to mixed fusions means that he has overlooked their 
problematic status and their consequences which I believe undermine his reductive project and 
system of principles – to the point that a reduction of set theory to the theory of singleton functions, 
GEM and plural quantification cannot be achieved. Moreover, I think that mixed fusions serve as a 
good example of why unrestricted composition would fail in domains which include sets or classes, 
and that thereby mixed fusions stand as an exemplary threat to GEM being an absolutely general 
theory. In line with this is why I also think that mixed fusions serve as an exemplary instance of the 
failures of mereological hybridism, in that their potential for instances of cross-category fusing 
overturns the frameworks which they are supposed to inhabit. 
 As Lewis’s defence of the acceptability of mixed fusions is weak and also undermined by 
his other express commitments, or so I claim and will later defend, in this chapter I sought first to 
clarify Lewis’s portrayal of mixed fusions, as well as give an account of his system of views, to 
have a basis of detail from which to later show why mixed fusions should be denied, and also 
thereby how mereological hybridism should be rejected. Besides establishing the basis of this 
account, in this chapter we also gained a lot of the concepts and terminology that will be useful for 
the examination of mixed fusions as transcategorial sums ahead. 
 Even though Lewis suggests that we can mostly ignore mixed fusions, in the sense that they 
exist but we don’t pay them any attention, I think that we are compelled to completely ignore them 
in the end, in virtue of their proposed existence bringing troubles which are reason enough for us to 
reject them after all. Besides this, I also think that how Lewis portrays mixed fusions is inconsistent 
with how they should fit his explicit package of theses and principles, to the point that some of the 
things he asserts about them in particular directly contradict some of his other views, such as the 
thesis of CAI, and the ontological innocence of composites. I think it is by thoroughly considering 
how mixed fusions are supposed to fit within the framework that Lewis offers that we are able to 
determine just how problematic a proposed entity type they are. My engagement with each of 
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Lewis’s characterisations of mixed fusions forms the basis of my thesis chapters, and both my 
disputes and agreements with them can be summarised in the following table: 
 Mixed fusions Lewis’s views My views 
2 Would be members? None of them Many, but not all, of them 
3 Would have members? None of them All of them 
4 Would be grounders of or 
grounded by their proper 
parts? 
Grounded by their class 
parts’ members, if not by all 
their proper parts 
Grounders of their proper 
parts, if grounded at all 
5 Would be abstract (A), 
concrete (C), or something 
else? 
Equivocal on whether A if 
A+C fusions or C if A+C 
fusions; presumably A if 
A+A and C if C+C 
C if A+C fusions; A if 
A+A; C if C+C 
6 Would be transcategorially 
valid? 
Yes Not absolutely 
7a Would be irreducible to 
their proper parts? 
Yes Yes (if 3 is resisted) 
7b Would be ontologically 
innocent? 
Yes No (if 3 is resisted) 
Table 1.3 The differences between Lewis’s and my characterisations of mixed fusions. 
Overall, the task of my thesis is to not ignore mixed fusions in Lewis’s manner, i.e., by accepting 
their existence yet forgoing much attention to them. Instead, I put them under great scrutiny for the 
sake of having a clearer understanding of what these entities that Lewis proposes are both supposed 
to be like and would be like, if they existed. From doing so, I go on to demonstrate the 
implausibility of the existence of mixed fusions, and thereby reveal both the futility of unrestricted 
mereological hybridism and the failure of the composition principles and mereological systems 
which allow it. 
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Chapter 2 
Mixed fusions and being a member 
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2.0 Introduction 
In the last chapter we heard of Lewis’s explicit positive presentation of mixed fusions as being 
ontologically innocent, non-membered non-members. Following this characterisation, each mixed 
fusion’s membership status gives us a first pass at explaining the ways in which they can be 
understood to be mereological hybrids, because the primary and guaranteed representations they 
can instantiate are those involving their proper parts having members or not. For instance, because 
mixed fusions are necessarily sums of at least one class, which has members, and at least one 
individual, which does not have members, mixed fusions stand as a clear case of mereological 
hybridism in that they are fusions of entities from the distinct, mutually exclusive categories of the 
membered and the non-membered (consequences of which I will examine in Chapter 3). Yet this 
may not be the only way in which a mixed fusion could be perceived as demonstrating mereological 
hybridism along membership lines, as it is the case that on the other side of anything having 
members is the obvious consequence that some things are being members. While it is the case for 
individuals that each of these are members of classes, as defined, this is not the way things are for 
all classes under the Morse-Kelly class theory which Lewis adopts within his system. Here, some 
classes are ineligible to be members, for certain technical reasons involving their infinite 
membership size, the so-called ‘proper classes’. 
 At first glance the existence of proper classes in this system appears like it could token 
another instance of mereological hybridism worth questioning – e.g., why does a fusion of 
something which is a member (an individual) and something which is not a member (a proper class) 
form an entity which is not a member (a mixed fusion)? Why are mixed fusions like proper classes 
in this regard? Similarly, if we reflect on the situation of mixed fusions which are composed of non-
empty sets, or non-proper classes, and individuals we have a comparable question – why does a 
fusion of multiple things which are all members form an entity which is not a member? Even as this 
latter example does not properly represent a case of mereological hybridism along the lines of the 
fact that the two types of entities are members, and so do not belong to different categories in this 
particular way, the similar issue of why mixed fusions are unlike all of their proper parts in this 
instance does arise. So why can’t mixed fusions be members of classes? 
 The reason Lewis gives for mixed fusions not being members is not related to the parts they 
are said to have, however, but rather because Lewis is unwilling to expand the scope of the 
membership function to include them, reportedly for the sake of avoiding paradox. 
If we accept the mixed fusions of individuals and classes, must we also posit 
some previously ignored classes that have these mixed fusions as members? 
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No; we can hold the mixed fusions to be ineligible for membership. Mixed 
fusions are forced upon us by the principle of Unrestricted Composition. 
Classes containing them are not likewise forced upon us by a corresponding 
principle of unrestricted class-formation. That principle is doomed in any case: 
we dare not say that whenever there are some things, there is a class of them, 
because there can be no class of all non-self-members. Nor are classes 
containing mixed fusions forced upon us in any other way. Let us indulge our 
offhand reluctance to believe in them. (1991, 8) 
Considering that, following the common definitions of individuals or urelements given within a 
standard set theory, it is usually sufficient that if some x has no members that that x is a member, 
can there really be, as Lewis suggests, such things as non-membered non-members – what I term 
anti-members for ease of exposition – within such a system of classes? If there can be, are mixed 
fusions plausibly some of them, as well as the only ones? 
 As it turns out, yes, anti-members are compatible with class theory after all, but, as I will 
argue, not in the way that Lewis attests. As it stands, Lewis’s restriction on membership for all 
mixed fusions is unjustified, for being unnecessarily strong, and there is no good reason for every 
mixed fusion to be a non-member. However, following results from Nolan (2002) and Schwarz 
(2005), there are things which have a claim to be anti-members within Lewis’s system which are 
not themselves mixed fusions, and this result in turn can be used to show that at least not every 
mixed fusion can be a member after all. 
 Besides articulating my disagreements with Lewis on these matters and correcting his 
system to follow his obligations, I propose to do two further things in this chapter. The first is to 
clarify the logical space under consideration, as I do not believe it has received such a treatment 
before. The second is to discuss and show an example of a mixed fusion being a member that, once 
his account is corrected, Lewis is obliged to accept in his system, which, although it is not 
paradoxical, is still a problem for some of his espoused views, and also serves to make his system 
unpalatable overall. The end result is to show that Lewis’s system is not nearly as mathematically 
harmonious as he intends it to be, and that it also has some metaphysical consequences which 
further make it unfavourable, both of which are clearly problems for accepting the combination of 
systems which Lewis advocates. 
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2.1 Being a member 
What does it take for something to be a member of a set or a class? What, if anything, determines 
any given entity’s membership eligibility? Although these questions are simple to ask, they can be 
difficult to answer, because they appear to involve reasons both intrinsic and extrinsic to any 
candidate entities under consideration. For example, whether something is a member or not depends 
to some degree both on the theory of membership in play and how the system in operation is said to 
mandate such belonging, as well as on certain aspects of any candidate entity themselves. This 
much will be made clear. 
 From the outset of this sort of question, what is most apparent is that for anything to be a 
member in the manner of sets or classes there needs to be a system of sets or classes in play. 
Otherwise there are no things which are members, and there are no things with members – i.e., 
everything is an anti-member under such conditions. Provided that there is such a system in play 
though, the question of what it takes for something to be a member becomes whether the 
membership function within the system is such that the prospective member is eligible to be one. So 
what might determine eligibility? 
2.1.1 ZFC 
Within the canonical system of set theory, Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with the axiom of Choice 
(ZFC), there is no restriction on the field of members. Here, everything is eligible to be a member. 
In this case, membership is a system wide affair, where the entities said to be within the scope of 
the set theory ensure that all entities in the domain are eligible to be members – regardless of 
anything to do with the entities in particular. What this means is that all things are members therein. 
However, as ZFC is a so-called ‘pure’ set theory which only considers membership relations for 
sets alone, the notion of “all things” within such a system actually only includes things which are 
sets. This includes the null set as well, which is also known as the empty set and sometimes 
represented with ‘∅’, itself the only thing that has no members yet is a member in this system. We 
can table the membership division in ZFC as follows: 
ZFC member types Is a member 
Has members (i) non-empty sets 
Does not have members (ii) the null set 
Table 2.1 ZFC member types. 
2.1.2 ZFCU 
All is not lost, however, as ZFC can be augmented to include other non-membered members 
beyond the null set. Although these things are recognised to be member-wise identical to the null 
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set, for being empty of members themselves, they are still usually defined in distinction to it. So on 
this augmentation there are the sets and the non-sets – the former consisting of the non-empty sets 
and the empty one; the latter consisting of whatever it is that we are including that is not a set. Such 
an extension is called ZFCU, with the ‘U’ standing for ‘urelemente’,1 a common name for non-
membered members. Other common names for such entities within the mathematical literature are 
‘atom’ and ‘individual’, but here I will stick to using urelement and individual as required, as atom 
already has too many other connotations. 
 Why augment ZFC in this way? As Mendelson explains 
[Certain set and class theories] do not allow for objects that are not sets or 
classes. This is all well and good for mathematicians, since only sets or classes 
seem to be needed for dealing with mathematical concepts and problems. 
However, if set theory is to be a part of a more inclusive theory having to do 
with the natural or social sciences, we must permit reference to things like 
electrons, molecules, people, companies, etc., and to sets and classes that 
contain such things. Things that are not sets or classes are sometimes called 
urelements.” (2015, 303) 
This broader application of set theory is useful for many things in philosophy. It also makes a very 
plausible assumption – that ordinary things, such as people and cats and natural science objects are 
not themselves sets, and therefore do not have members of their own. In one respect these sorts of 
things are permitted to be members by the very intent to include them in the set theory, but in 
another respect they are permitted to be members on similar grounds for why the null set is a 
member – they do not seem to conflict with the set theory by arriving at any paradoxes resulting 
from their having improprietous instances of membership. In essence, as the null set is not known to 
lead to any contradictions within ZFC, the presumption is that an augmentation of ZFC which 
merely enlarges the number of member-wise identical elements is not going to lead to any 
contradictions either. On the face of it, this is quite reasonable. Similarly to before, we can table the 
membership division in ZFCU as follows: 
ZFCU member types Is a member 
Has members (i) non-empty sets 
Does not have members (ii) the null set; urelements 
Table 2.2 ZFCU member types. 
                                                 
1 German for “original elements” (Potter 2004, 24). 
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2.1.3 Proper class theories 
Some limitations of ZFC led set theorists to develop alternative yet closely related versions of 
axiomatic set theories which are still consistent with the core of ZFC, yet which enlarge the domain 
of existents to also include proper classes. For instance, by the inclusion of proper classes the set 
theory of von Neumann-Bernays-Gödel (NBG) was able to be developed to have only finitely many 
axioms, a feature which Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory lacked (Szudzik 2019). The set theory of 
Morse-Kelley (MK) includes proper classes as well, yet cannot be finitely axiomatised (Potter 2004, 
312-3). It further differs from NBG though, mainly by the range it allows for certain bound 
variables, such that these may range over all classes and not just over all sets. This means it is an 
impredicative theory in terms of how it comprehends classes. With the introduction of proper 
classes within these theories, which can be adapted to also include urelements, their membership 
divisions are tabled as follows: 
NBGU/MKU member types Is a member Is not a member 
Has members (i) non-proper classes (i.e., non-empty sets) (iii) proper classes 
Does not have members (ii) the null set; individuals none defined 
Table 2.3 NBGU/MKU member types. 
Some of the motivations for not extending membership to certain classes involve either the kinds of 
members they are expected to have, or otherwise the amount of members they are said to have – 
with the sense that any class’s “size” is related to its number of members. On the former motivation, 
for example, the class of ordinals cannot belong to a class of higher ordinality without contradiction 
(Nolan 2002, 174). On the latter motivation, when it comes to cases of infinite membership, any 
infinitely membered class is always going to have strictly more non-singleton subclasses than 
singleton subclasses, as implied by Cantor’s theorem, which leads to there being infinities of 
continually greater cardinality. As both NBG and MK can include a limiting principle such that 
there are a maximum number of members possible that any given class may have, this entails that 
not everything can be a member, as such classes will strictly have more subclasses than they have 
members. If membership is given iteratively, such as starting at the null set and working through the 
singletons, then rising to two-membered classes, then three, and so on ad infinitum, the 
consequence is that the greatly membered classes will not be able to be members, because the 
available singletons have, as it were, ‘run out’ before reaching the top of that subclass hierarchy. 
 This maximum number of members notion comes from a principle of the ‘limitation of size’ 
which serves to maintain a conception of so-called large classes, classes which Maddy (1983) 
describes as “‘too big’” to be members “in the sense that their members occur arbitrarily high up in 
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the iterative hierarchy, ruling out the possibility of a stage after which they have all been formed.” 
(1983, 121) What the principle provides is literally a size limit on the classes, by stating that some 
things comprise a set if and only if there is no 1-1 map from the entire universe into them 
(Uzquiano 2006). In the case that there is a 1-1 map, this principle conditions the distinction 
between set sized classes and the proper classes uniformly, as “not only does it say that the proper 
classes are larger than all [other classes], also it says that all proper classes are the same size – 
namely, the largest size.” (Lewis 1991, 98) 
 While Lewis’s system accords, mostly, with MKU in how it handles proper classes and 
membership, there are some additional reasons Lewis’s system includes proper classes which are 
different from the motivations just given. As explained in Chapter 1, it is Lewis’s commitment to 
the Class Fusion Thesis, that any fusion of classes is itself a class, which also results in his theory 
being one involving proper classes. This is because this thesis entails that any fusion of only 
singletons is a class, which also clearly includes that the fusion of all and only singletons is a class. 
As all of the singletons account for all of the members, a class containing all of the members must 
be the largest class possible. Let’s call it C. With self-membership prohibited on the standard set 
theory of ZFC, and accordingly its class theoretic extensions, C cannot have a singleton, and 
thereby be a member, without contradicting the rule against self-membership. So the system 
excludes C from being a member while maintaining that C has members, making it a proper class as 
defined. 
 Although C is what Lewis (1991, 8) refers to as “the most inclusive class”, it is not the only 
proper class in his system. This is because C has n many atomic parts in the singletons, following 
Lewis’s Main Thesis, yet strictly has more than n many non-singleton subclasses, by Cantor’s 
Theorem, for the same reasons as indicated above. Therefore, in this case, because there will be a 
strictly greater infinity of non-singleton proper subclasses of C than that of the number of singletons 
altogether it means that a great majority of C’s non-singleton proper subclasses will themselves be 
proper classes (cf., Lewis 1991, 27). 
 Lewis’s incorporation of proper classes into his system is further entailed by his discussion 
of restricting singleton formation for some classes, as a means to avoid a paradox, such as in the 
case of the class of all sets that are non-self-members. As Lewis says “[it] had better not be a set, on 
pain of Russell’s paradox” (1991, 18), which is the case whereby a class is apparently self-
membered only under the condition that it is not self-membered. Lewis’s assessment of the situation 
here is that “we can fuse all the singletons of sets that are non-self-members, thereby obtaining a 
proper class of sets, but this proper class does not in turn have a singleton.” (1991, 19) 
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2.2 Lewis’s membership restriction 
Even though Lewis’s system parallels MKU, and thereby standard set theory with urelements, in 
most of its class-theoretic aspects, it has the unique feature of also including entities previously 
unrecognised by all of the other set or class theories – viz., non-membered non-members, or what I 
have dubbed ‘anti-members’. On Lewis’s view, the only candidate anti-members are the mixed 
fusions, which he explains as existing solely because of their key types of parts and a suitable 
principle of composition. 
Lewis’s member type divisions Is a member Is not a member 
Has members (i) non-proper classes (i.e., non-empty sets) (iii) proper classes 
Does not have members (ii) individuals (includes the null set) (iv) mixed fusions 
Table 2.4 Lewis’s (1991) member types. 
The distinction Lewis’s account of member types brings to the table is its inclusion of things which 
none of the other membership theories account for. However, Lewis is not explicit on this point, 
that he is introducing us to something unfamiliar to all prior theories of sets and classes – something 
which does not sit well with his stated aim of adhering to ordinary mathematical practice (e.g., 
1991, vii and 58-59). Lewis is, however, explicit about why he thinks that mixed fusions are not 
members. As quoted in the introduction to this chapter, he is concerned that a principle of 
unrestricted class-formation, which would permit mixed fusions as members, would result in 
paradox (1991, 8). 
 Looking carefully at what Lewis says about restricting mixed fusion membership, while he 
is correct to say that classes containing mixed fusions are not forced upon us by a principle of 
unrestricted class-formation – as such a principle would lead to paradox – I think he does go too far 
here in suggesting that there is not any other way classes containing mixed fusions could enter into 
our consideration. What about a principle of restricted class-formation which also permits mixed 
fusions to be members so long as none of them are problematic? 
 Amongst discussion of his expansive regimentation of Lewis’s proof for the Second Thesis 
using a natural-deduction framework, Tennant criticises Lewis on this same point, and instead 
endorses a very liberal membership principle which aims only to avoid paradoxes stemming from 
too large classes (2013, 733), which in turn means that he accepts mixed fusions being members in 
general. Eschenbach and Heydrich also comment that Lewis’s absolute restriction does not seem 
necessary, when they say “mixed sums [i.e., our mixed fusions] are, according to Lewis, excluded 
from set membership, hence from the domain of the singleton function. This feature, however, does 
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[not] seem very essential for the account. The singleton function has to be partial anyway, since 
otherwise, Russell’s paradox threatens.” (1995, 735) 
 As we can see, the notion that the singleton function needs to be partial – as in restricted – in 
some ways for the sake of avoiding paradoxes is agreed upon, and the key differences are in the 
claims towards just how much restriction is required. The tension here between Tennant’s more 
liberal view of class formation and Lewis’s highly restrictive one is a tension between what is 
necessary and what is sufficient – with the key target on both accounts to be a view of class 
formation which avoids set-theoretical paradoxes. 
 While I think Lewis is right to restrict class formation to avoid paradox, his restriction of all 
mixed fusions from being members is unnecessary, and thereby unjustified, as it is inappropriately 
strong for the sake of achieving the end of avoiding paradox. Tennant’s view, while not strictly 
explicit about the potential paradoxes which may lurk, is more justified in terms of allowing for 
mixed fusions as members, provided we take it more generally in being flexible to the point of 
permitting mixed fusions as members so long as no paradoxes arise. 
 Furthermore, while it is true that in the class theory adopted there is no principle of 
unrestricted class-formation, the last clause from Lewis above is unnecessarily strong: we may, 
after all, be obliged to accept classes containing mixed fusions, and expressly under a restricted 
version of the membership function. Tennant states, and I agree, that it is “puzzling” that Lewis 
seeks to restrict class-formation to exclude mixed fusions (2013, 733). 
 If I can hazard a guess, I imagine it follows somewhat from Lewis’s notion regarding 
individuals being ‘vaguely prior’ to classes (1991, 9), such that if mixed fusions were also able to 
be members ‘after’ they formed mereologically from the ‘initial’ individuals and classes, and were 
at least members if not also membered, then a new round of class-formation would ensue, 
disrupting this ‘vague’ priority.2 As it stands, this is a very weak reason to exclude mixed fusions 
from being members in general, because it is only a sentiment. 
 After all of these considerations, I don’t believe Lewis is entitled to deny that all mixed 
fusions are members of classes without further argument. 
2.2.1 The line that matters 
When Lewis offers his Division Thesis, that Reality divides exhaustively into individuals and 
classes, he is trying to “mark the line that matters: the line between the membered and the 
                                                 
2 Curiously, Tennant does not follow through on any implications of what mixed fusions being members of classes 
might mean for the rest of Lewis’s program, though, as I do in this chapter. 
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memberless.” (1991, 4) While the idea behind the Division Thesis gets it right that such a division 
as that between the membered and the non-membered is to be jointly exhaustive, the meaning 
which Lewis gives to each of the key terms in the thesis entails that what he says is either not 
correct or is otherwise insufficiently general. Due to some unforeseen, and unintended, 
consequences of how Lewis’s Division Thesis and his surrounding package of theses do not 
adequately capture the full variety of possible entities when it comes to membership relations (as 
discussed in Nolan 2002, Appendix 2 and Tennant 2013, 725-6) I believe it is worth clarifying the 
possible membership distinctions once and for all. 
 To explain where the problems are, we start by recalling that what Lewis means by ‘Reality’ 
is the classical mereological Universe. This is a problem for how the Division Thesis is stated if it is 
to be acceptably general because the existence of a mereological Universe, classical or otherwise, is 
a substantial thesis and its existence under several guises is contested (see my Chapter 6 for 
discussion). So I offer that rather than accepting Lewis’s meaning of the classical mereological 
Universe by ‘Reality’ here that we are better off meaning the totality of beings/entities in a way that 
is suitable to cover either a plurality of things or a singular entity, to avoid the unnecessary 
excluding of restricted and non-compositional views. 
 Next, because what Lewis means by ‘Reality’ is the classical mereological Universe, what 
Lewis mostly intends by ‘division’ is GEM style mereological decomposition. We know this 
because Lewis says “the Division Thesis permits there to be a mixed thing which is neither an 
individual nor a class, so long as it divides exhaustively into individuals and classes.” (1991, 7) 
Here ‘mixed things’ meaning “mixed fusions of individuals and classes.” (1991, 8) 
 With the conditions of GEM the ‘division’ is clearly mereological here. However, as we can 
neither presume that composition takes place (cf., restrictions of composition in e.g., Markosian 
2008, and nihilism about composition in e.g., Rosen and Dorr 2002), nor even that everything is 
mereological (cf., Uzquiano 2006; Cowling 2014), the notion of something mereologically dividing 
exhaustively into individuals and classes is not guaranteed. This is because it may be the case that 
some things either do not mereologically divide (if not everything is mereological) or will not 
properly be composites of two supposedly mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive types of 
things. These are some of the reasons why the Division Thesis looks to be insufficiently general to 
me. 
 So, without the conditions of GEM, I think the best way to look at the type of division 
which takes place is to consider one which is logical rather than mereological – as in the logical 
sorting of entities into kinds or categories. This way of understanding the Division Thesis should 
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still fit Lewis’s intentions following his remark about “the line that matters”, as well as cover his 
own proposed entities appropriately, yet it also looks to be sufficiently general to be able to hold in 
other contexts without making any presumptions about the mereological status of existents. 
 Therefore, without making any prior assumptions as to what kinds of member involved 
entities there are or can be, we can start by simply naming the potential member types in a 
noncommittal manner, both to avoid some of the loaded expectations that may come along from 
doing it in other ways, and for further clarity. Hence we can discern a generic logical member type 
division. 
Generic logical member types Is a member Is not a member 
Has members (i) membered members (iii) membered non-members 
Does not have members (ii) non-membered members (iv) non-membered non-members 
Table 2.5 The four generic logical divisions of the membered and the non-membered. 
Following Lewis’s assessment that mixed fusions are not members (1991, 8, 15, and 21) and his 
avoiding saying that they have members (1991, 16, 17, and 18) what the logical division in the table 
makes explicit is that while Lewis is also more generally committed to anti-members with mixed 
fusions being the only candidate of these he accepts, the logical space neither enforces nor ensures 
mixed fusions to be the only non-membered non-members. 
 From here, as it stands, what is expressed with the Division Thesis is clearly not correct after 
the more general qualification that the division be logical and that the totality involved may be 
plural. This is because by the terms in the thesis it neglects to account for any anti-members at all, 
which neither individuals nor classes are. As for these, although on Lewis’s explicit view the only 
anti-members are mixed fusions, which leads him to later interpret the Division Thesis as saying “in 
other words, everything is an individual, a class, or a mixed fusion of individual and class” (1991, 
99), in an appendix, Nolan shows how following Lewis’s several theses and definitions does not 
strictly preclude there being anti-members which are mereological fusions of only classes and 
which are not themselves classes or individuals (2002, 195-200). 
 Additionally, Nolan (2002, Chapter 7; 2004) shows that there are available modifications to 
Lewis’s system which should be acceptable for the fact that they reduce a significant ontological 
cost of there being impossible objects which have all of their parts outside of possible worlds – the 
singletons and all of their collective fusions. Nolan does this by using structuralist mathematical 
tools which Lewis (1998) himself later fully endorses, and also by asserting proper class many 
individual entities across appropriately infinitely many possible worlds. This is in contrast to how 
earlier Lewis (1991) supplies his ontology with sufficient objects for mathematics in asserting 
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proper class many singleton entities outside of any possible worlds. However, in the process of 
Nolan’s modifications, Lewis’s Individual Fusion Thesis (mentioned earlier in Chapter 1) is 
contravened. 
 This is because what Lewis expects of every fusion of only individuals is that these are 
something which both has no-members yet is a member, i.e., which is another individual, yet under 
the modifications which Nolan makes it becomes the case that there are large fusions of individuals 
which are not themselves individuals (nor classes).3 Although losing the Individual Fusion Thesis in 
this manner seems a fair trade off for eliminating sets as impossibilia, it does introduce another kind 
of anti-member into the picture, this time ones without any class parts at all. 
 From these considerations I believe Nolan is still warranted in avoiding the Division Thesis 
as is, and also because the purpose Lewis takes it to serve, as evidenced by his reinterpretation of it, 
could only be satisfied by bringing in other principles which Nolan takes to have little intuitive 
support (2002, 199), such as the Class Fusion Thesis met in Chapter 1. For our purposes avoiding 
the Division Thesis as is is also beneficial, both because it misses the mark by sorting things into 
only individuals and classes and also by being insufficiently general to include anti-members, as 
there possibly may be. So I propose to try and clear up once and for all how a Division Thesis could 
be formulated which at least satisfies the original sentiment that the line that matters is the line 
between the membered and the memberless. As a first pass we have the 
Logical Division Thesis  Each thing is either membered or non-membered. 
Clearly this at least gives us the logical disjunction we are after – things either have members, or 
they do not – and it makes no commitment to a mereological Universe, any sorts of composites, or 
even if there is more than one thing. Where set and class theorists posit that there are both things 
with members and things without,4 anyone who instead rejects sets and classes (or similarly 
membered things) will posit that there are only things without members, which is still acceptable 
via the logical disjunction. 
 Although the mutual exclusivity and joint exhaustiveness of this Logical Division Thesis is 
sufficient, one thing I find lacking with this definition is that one of the kinds is only offered as the 
contrary to the other. Not that I think negatively defining something is inappropriate, after all 
abstracta are commonly defined negatively in contrast to concreta, by their purported comparative 
                                                 
3 The proof for this is mentioned further in section 2.4 ahead. 
4 Understood in the formal manner that set/class membership works within those theories. A plurality, for instance, can 
be said to have members, as can categories too, without this meaning the same thing as it does for sets and classes. 
(Simons 1982) 
61 
lacks (Rosen 2017; and see Chapter 5), and I have no great problem with that. Rather it is that I 
think the kinds of things which are non-membered are better off with a name to convey their kind, 
rather than just having a descriptor, and especially when there are a multitude of properties which 
such entities may have. And this can’t just be ‘individual’ because that specifically designates 
things which have no members but which can be them. I think we need a term that stands for 
something that doesn’t have any members, yet isn’t meant to specify whether something is a 
member or not. 
 So, while Lewis was reluctant to annoy us by imposing novel coinages of terms (1991, 4), 
I’m optimistically willing to offer another neologism, both because, unlike Lewis, I don’t believe I 
can hijack any words already in common use in this context, and also to help us to avoid spelling 
out each time the properties such entities do or do not have (much how ‘anti-member’ serves to 
condense the notion of a ‘non-membered non-member’). So my proposal here is meant, again, for 
the sake of benefitting our discussions by making our communications, hopefully, clearer. 
 The idea which I want to follow is, I think, somewhat analogous to that with the word 
‘abstracta’. This is because, even though abstracta can be defined in terms of their characteristics 
negatively, and in opposition to concreta, say, they still have a name of their type which is not just a 
negated name. I think this can be done with non-membered things too in a way that, like 
‘individual’, still suggests the individuality and singularity of a non-membered thing as an 
existential unit. One of the problems with Lewis’s Division Thesis, I believe, is that ‘individual’ for 
him means non-membered member, yet, as I will argue in the next section, plenty of mixed fusions 
should also be treated as non-membered members – just not all of them. Besides this, there is the 
implicit tension remaining that there is another aspect beyond just having members or not which 
comes from the introduction of sets and classes into one’s ontology. That is of course whether or 
not something is a member. As the logical division table above shows we have four kinds of things, 
yet all of which still follow from the basic division of whether something is membered or not. 
 So what I propose is that we call anything which is non-membered a singulate. We can also 
describe anything non-membered as ‘singulate’, with the contrary being that anything non-singulate 
is membered. Some of what this name is meant to convey is that, for example, while with any non-
empty set there is always at least two things (the set and its at least 1 member) that with a singulate 
there is always at least one thing (the singulate itself), and maybe at most one thing (again, the 
singulate itself). 
 Depending on the membership theory, some singulates will be members, and some 
singulates may be anti-members. The null set, for instance, is a singulate which is always a member. 
62 
This terminology can also capture Nolan’s large fusions of individuals which are not individuals, 
and the possible class fusions he mentions which are not classes – which are each singulates that are 
anti-members – as well as capture any mixed-fusion (anti-member or not) and any individual (these 
can remain as originally conceived). With classes just being either proper classes or non-empty sets 
following Lewis’s terminological distinction, we get a two-way division across the memberless and 
the membered of: singulates and classes; and when including the additional scope of something 
being a member or not we get a four-way division of: individuals and anti-members (the 
singulates); and sets and proper classes (the classes). 
 Now that we have this terminological addition at hand, the best version of the Division 
Thesis which strictly goes along the lines of the logical division between the membered and the 
memberless, while also giving each entity a specific name identifying (to a degree) their own kind, 
is the 
Membered Division Thesis      Each thing is either a singulate or a class. 
Following this thesis we have it that reality, as one or many things (i.e., not Lewis’s Reality 
necessarily), divides exhaustively into singulates and classes, where singulates are non-membered 
things and classes are membered things. The division is not mereological, but rather logical, in that 
entities are categorised or sorted one way or the other. Whether all singulates are members, or 
whether some are anti-members; and whether there are singulates with class parts, or classes with 
singulate parts is to be determined by the constraints of the different theories of membership. 
 Finally, in addition to whether entities have members or not, it may be useful to bring in 
some terminology to disclose whether they are members or not (hence my ‘to a degree’ 
qualification above). For this purpose I adopt the terms held and free, where anything which is a 
member of any class is ‘held’, and anything which is not a member of any class is ‘free’. This 
allows that if certain ‘large’ entities (such as proper class-sized classes) are still able to be 
accommodated as members of classes for some reason (see Nolan 2002, 173-4),5 we can still 
distinguish between those membered things which are not members, and those membered things 
which are members, without needing to indicate their size, or the amount of members that they 
have. In turn this gives us the 
Members Division Thesis      Each thing is either held or free. 
                                                 
5 Although I acknowledge that this is a strategy which could be taken up, in this thesis I follow Lewis’s usage, leaving 
proper classes unable to be members. 
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Finally, this brings us to a conjoined division thesis applicable in all ways via the four-way logical 
division, the 
Membership Division Thesis      Each thing is either a singulate or a class, and is either held or free. 
Additionally this means we also have: individuals and the null set and held classes and non-empty 
sets (the held); and anti-members and free classes (the free). We can mark this all again in another 
table which includes the names I’ve proposed alongside their logical descriptions. 
Membership Division names Is a member (held) Is not a member (free) 
Has members 
(classes) 
(i) sets (non-empty); 
held classes 
(iii) free classes 
Does not have members 
(singulates) 
(ii) individuals; 
the null set 
(iv) anti-members 
Table 2.6 Different proposed names/descriptors for the four possible kinds of membered and non-membered entities. 
Altogether the Membership Division Thesis satisfies to capture what is needed in terms of marking 
the line that matters, the line between the membered and the memberless, yet also includes how 
things can be divided along another line in virtue of that primary one. 
2.3 Are mixed fusions members? 
Now we can circle back to some questions that are more central to the questions of the chapter – 
what is it that permits or precludes some things from being members? Can mixed fusions be 
members? If not, why not? The notion from Tennant (2013) earlier gives us a hint towards the least 
restrictive direction that we can take, and it is that we ensure that paradox is avoided in the 
formation of sets and classes. While this is an ordinary desideratum on any account, it arises 
forcefully in these contexts because these are the contexts which historically have introduced us to 
the very types of paradox that we aim most to avoid. Lewis’s caution to avoid a paradoxical “class 
of all non-self-members” (1991, 8) by restricting class-formation and his ensuring that “the class of 
all sets that are non-self-members had better not be a set, on pain of Russell’s paradox” (1991, 18) 
are both instances of acting towards this aim. Our key concern here is determining exactly what we 
could let in before it is too much and the system breaks down. 
 Recalling our Tables 2.5 and 2.6, our question is what can fit into which of the logical 
divisions? On standard set theory, and the well known extensions of it that we have seen in NBG 
and MK, it is usually the case that if any non-membered entities are introduced in addition to the 
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null set, when extending these to NBGU or MKU for instance, that all of these non-membered 
entities will also themselves be members of at least some of the sets within the theory. 
2.3.1 Things without members are usually themselves members 
On the textbook definition of including non-membered entities into a class theory, Mendelson 
(2015) explains that, ordinarily, membership systems are 
designed to handle classes, not concrete individuals. The reason for this is that 
mathematics has no need for objects such as cows and molecules; all 
mathematical objects and relations can be formulated in terms of classes alone. 
If nonclasses are required for applications to other sciences, then the 
[membership system] can be modified slightly so as to apply to both classes 
and nonclasses alike. (2015, 233) 
To be clear, what Mendelson means by “concrete individuals” is objects that are not classes (2015, 
233). He also restricts this understanding specifically to be with regards to things of at least the 
“natural or social sciences [like] electrons, molecules, people, companies, etc.” (2015, 303) Yet we 
can clarify this notion further to be more inclusive if we want, to also include potentially abstract 
individuals, or individuals that do not fit well under either division of abstract or concrete, if such 
there be. (In Chapter 5 I consider some of the conceptual background for entities such as these.) As 
Lewis himself reminds us, 
Remember what an individual is: not necessarily a commonplace individual 
like Magpie or Possum, or a quark, or a space-time point, but anything 
whatever that has no members but is a member. If you believe in some 
remarkable non-classes – universals, tropes, abstract simple states of affairs, 
God, or what you will – it makes no difference. They’re still individuals, 
however remarkable, so long as they’re members of classes and not themselves 
classes. (1991, 8-9) 
With mixed fusions being introduced as non-membered non-members by Lewis, something that is 
‘not a class’ as Mendelson describes them now means more than just individuals/urelements, 
however. Clearly the issue of member eligibility comes to the fore here. We can see this especially 
in generalising the following quote, that “If there were [objects that are not classes], then the 
definition of equality would have to be changed, since all such [objects that are not classes] have the 
same members (namely, none at all).” (Mendelson 2015, 233) The equality being expressed here is 
strictly membership equality, as standard class theories all contain an axiom of Extensionality, the 
principle that no two classes have the same members. 
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 Understood more broadly, this notion is usually applied to entities altogether, such that 
when individuals are introduced into membership systems, the definition of equality via members 
needs to be modified so as not to identify the null set with every individual – which would violate 
Extensionality in there being multiple distinct things which are identical along the lines of their lack 
of members. (Mendelson 2015, 304 explains how to define equality in a different way for classes, 
the null set and individuals.) As Mendelson sums it up “the domain of any [standard class theoretic 
membership system] will be divided into two disjoint parts6 consisting of the classes and the 
urelements, and the classes are divided into sets and proper classes.” (2015, 304) 
 This characterisation of the standard domain exposes how unusual Lewis’s proposal is when 
it comes to standard class membership accounts. What the explanations above also show is that it is 
usually sufficient that if some entity does not have members, then it is eligible to be a member. As 
we ourselves are going along with Lewis’s depiction of mixed fusions as non-membered (1991, 16) 
(explained in Chapter 3), we can see that this lack of members for them is the main reason that 
Lewis’s restriction on being members for mixed fusions is unjustified. The differences arise here 
precisely because of GEM revealing other entities being in the domain of all existents, which then 
need to be compared against those already included and considered. So, although it is tempting to 
think that all non-membered things can themselves be members, with the introduction of GEM into 
the framework, it turns out that not all non-membered things can be members after all, for reasons 
similar to the restriction of membership for large classes. As we will see further in the next sub-
section, it is in this way that Lewis’s account properly goes beyond the standard accounts of class 
membership systems in entailing the existence of anti-members, instead of merely stipulating them. 
2.3.2 Justified mixed fusion membership restriction 
Although we answer the question of whether any mixed fusions can be members positively, this 
answer requires nuanced qualification. The further point of interest beyond the absolute question is 
that of which mixed fusions can be members? Could it be all of them? Only some of them? Perhaps 
just the ‘small’ sized ones?7 From all I have said, it is clear that if there are some paradoxically 
problematic instances of mixed fusions being members that these should be able to end up in the 
                                                 
6 Interestingly, Mendelson’s account parallels that of Lewis’s depiction of Reality dividing into the most inclusive class 
and individual as demonstrated earlier, except Mendelson’s makes no mention of mixed fusions, of course. While I cite 
Mendelson (2015), the 1st edition of this work was published in (1966), so could have had some influence on Lewis’s 
(1991) conception, although this work is not cited therein. 
7 What is meant by ‘small’ in this sort of context follows both the relative distinctions of size (1991, 88-91), as well as 
three hypotheses about the size of Reality (1991, 93-4) that Lewis makes. Roughly, all the things which don’t have as 
many members or parts as the most inclusive class in Lewis’s system are small, including many mixed fusions, all of 
the singletons and sets, and, on Lewis’s (1986) view, any given concrete world. Everything else is ‘large’. 
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division (iv) as anti-members, and that this is a justified restriction on membership in these 
instances, even as the standard conception of membership in normal applications of set/class 
theories do not even consider anti-members as an option. 
 The first case to be covered in this second stage of questions involves that of the opposite 
situation to Lewis’s absolute restriction on class-formation. Can there be no restriction on class-
formation for mixed fusions? The short answer is no, especially in the current context of proper 
class inclusion, because of a cardinality argument against it. As Wolfgang Schwarz explains, 
there are strictly more mixed fusions and proper classes than there are 
singletons: by [classical] mereology, there is no one-one correspondence 
between the fusions of any atoms and the atoms themselves. Hence there are 
more fusions of singletons than there are singletons. Since the singleton 
relation is a one-one map from the sets into the singletons, it follows that there 
can be no such map for the remaining fusions of singletons, the proper classes. 
As for every proper class, its fusion with any individual is a mixed fusion, the 
mixed fusions also outnumber the singletons. (2005, 14)8 
The fact that there are more fusions of singletons than there are singletons, and also more proper 
classes than there are singletons, and that each of these fusions of singletons can form a further 
fusion with any memberless non-member understood as one of Lewis’s individuals, say, shows that 
there are more mixed fusions than singletons too. Further to this, the proper classes make up the 
bulk of all of the classes that there are – to the point that there are more proper classes than there are 
sets even (Bremer 2010, 33). This all means that not all mixed fusions can have singletons, as in be 
a member of a singleton, and thereby any other classes, because there are just not enough singletons 
to “go around”, as it were. 
 Now we are at a point somewhere between where some mixed fusions can be, but not all 
mixed fusions can be members of classes. Presumably any small-sized mixed fusion under these 
conditions can be a member of a class (‘small-sized’ here in terms of the number of parts such a 
mixed fusion has), because it has only really ever been that it is the large-sized entities which invite 
trouble in these circumstances. Although we have considered some large-sized mixed fusions 
glancingly, the only large-sized mixed fusion that I expect we might have any specific interest in is 
what Lewis calls Reality, because it is the mereological Universe, the sum of all things. Does 
Reality have a singleton? Is Reality a member of any classes? 
                                                 
8 Nolan (2002, 166-67) also has a cardinality argument against all non-membered things being members in a similar 
context, which leads to him rejecting Lewis’s Fusion Thesis, that all fusions of individuals are themselves individuals. 
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2.4 The mereological Universe as a member? 
Before we answer that specific question, we look at a similar case arising in a smaller domain 
consisting of sets and individuals and their fusions, but no proper classes. In this case Uzquiano 
(2006) derives a paradox from the mereological sum, U, of all there is in a set sized domain having 
a singleton (in this context U is a smaller domain counterpart to Lewis’s Reality, and an 
unacknowledged mixed fusion). In this case, we are introduced to a type of entity which has its own 
singleton as a proper part, viz. U as the fusion of all things (in its domain), which includes its own 
singleton. This leads to there being two different types of singletons – the ones which are parts of 
their members, and the ones which are not. This latter type of singleton is of the type Uzquiano calls 
the Rs: 
1. For every o, o is one of the Rs iff there is some x such that o = {x} and o is 
not part of x (2006, 145) 
Continuing, from the principle of unrestricted composition we have some entity, r, which is the 
mereological sum of the Rs. We also have, as a consequence of a set-based version of Lewis’s Main 
Thesis (the parts of a set are all and only its non-empty subsets) the notion of Unique 
Decomposition, whereby a singleton is part of a sum of singletons if and only if it is one of them. 
The paradox which Uzquiano derives then arises when we ask whether {r}, which exists in 
accordance with unrestricted membership in the original context, is part of r? 
Since r is a mereological sum of some singletons, the Rs, by Unique 
Decomposition, we have: 
2. {r} is part of r iff {r} is one of the Rs. 
3. {r} is part of r iff there is some x such that {r} = {x} and {r} is not part of x, 
By extensionality, we conclude: 
4. {r} is part of r iff {r} is not part of r, 
which leads to a contradiction. (Uzquiano 2006, 145) 
The contradiction is avoided in this smaller domain as one would expect – by denying that every 
entity has a singleton, and viz. by denying an earlier assumption that every entity is a member 
(2006, 141). In Uzquiano’s example this means denying that U specifically is a member, because U 
as a member is the entity which introduces things having their own singleton as a proper part. Can 
we derive the same paradox in the case of proper classes and Lewis’s Reality? 
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 As in the first case, if Reality were to have its own singleton {R} as a proper part there 
would clearly be at least two types of singletons – ones which are “N”s, in not being part of their 
sole member (which {R} is not), and ones which are “B”s, in being part of their sole member 
(which {R} is). Similarly again, following the principle of unrestricted composition under GEM 
there would be a unique fusion of the singletons which are Ns, a fusion which we can call F. As 
understood, F is the fusion of all singletons which are not part of their sole member. If F would 
have a singleton, {F}, the question of whether {F} is a part of F arises and invites the paradox in 
this context. Is {F} a part of F? Is it one of the Ns? If the answer to the question of parthood is no, 
then {F} is supposed to be a part of F, because it is a singleton which is not a part of its member. It 
is one of the Ns. If the answer to the question of parthood is yes, however, then {F} is not supposed 
to be a part of F, because it is a singleton which is a part of its member. It is not one of the Ns. That 
is, for {F} to be a part of the thing which is the fusion of the Fs is for that thing not to be the fusion 
of the Ns. This leads to the contradiction that F is the fusion of the Ns iff F is not the fusion of the 
Ns. 
 To frame this argument slightly more formally, I model it after Uzquiano (2006). The 
problem I am showing is that under the condition where all of the singletons which are not proper 
parts of their members, the Ns, have a fusion F; and F is a member of {F} and: 
 1) {F} is a proper part of F iff {F} is one of the Ns; 
then 
 2) {F} is a proper part of F iff ∃x ({F} = {x} ∧ {F} is not a proper part of x); 
which is to say 
 3) {F} is a proper part of F iff {F} is not a proper part of F; 
which is a contradiction. 
 Although at first this looks like the ultimate mixed fusion of Reality being a member leads 
to contradiction, we need to go back a little and ask, why think that F would have a singleton after 
all? If we have been maintaining that membership for proper classes is generally prohibited, then, in 
fact, membership for F would be prohibited too. This is because – following Lewis’s Class Fusion 
Thesis and the amount of singletons it has as parts – F is a proper class. To see this, notice that if F 
has every singleton that is not a proper part of its sole member as part, and thereby every single 
thing which is a member of such singletons as its members, then it will be a large class. Since 
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singletons are themselves mereological atoms according to Lewis, any singleton of a singleton will 
count as a member of F. 
 So on the ordinary condition that every singleton has a singleton, F then has at least as many 
members as there are singletons altogether. Now, because any proper class has proper class many 
members, for it to be the case that F has that many members it needs to have proper class many 
singletons which are some of its subclasses, which it does. Accordingly, if F has at least as many 
members as there are singletons altogether, then F has at least as many members as any proper 
class. Given the limitation of size rule which Lewis adheres to, F thereby counts as a proper class in 
being the same size as any proper class, which means that it will not itself have a singleton under 
these conditions.9 
 Even if we forego Lewis’s Class Fusion Thesis, however, we get a similar result with the 
fusion of proper class many atoms, of lacking a singleton (and being a member at all) whichever 
kind of atoms these may be, whether individual or class themselves. This is for the same reasons as 
before, where there will be strictly more fusions of the atoms than there are atoms altogether, 
necessitating that there are large fusions which miss out on being members because there are simply 
not enough singletons around to permit them to be. As Nolan (2002) (paraphrased)10 explains 
Most of the fusions of proper-class many [atoms] will need to be denied the 
status of [members] themselves, and once singletons are denied to these 
entities (or most of these entities), the other fusions of [atoms] can all be 
admitted to be [members] without causing any trouble. This seems to be the 
obvious approach to take in the light of this result, and it ought not to be too 
surprising that the counter-intuitive results of this theory happen in connection 
to things having proper-class many parts: the paradoxes of set (and class) 
theory have been known (or suspected) to stem from some postulated things 
being “too big” since the time of Cantor. (2002, 167) 
Although Nolan proves that this result applies to fusions of atomic individuals (2002, 166), I expect 
the result is able to generalise to mixed fusions as well, even with atomic singleton parts. This is 
because the argument is to do with the significant differences between the amount of atoms that 
there are, and their fusions, rather than the types of entities under consideration. 
                                                 
9 My thanks to Gabriel Uzquiano for advice on this point. 
10 This is paraphrased because Nolan is specifically talking about fusions of atoms that are individuals, and whether 
such fusions have the status of individuals themselves, as per Lewis’s Fusion Thesis. 
70 
 This restriction on membership is clearly the sort of restriction that it is justified to assert, in 
the sense that so long as the fusion F of all those singletons is not itself a member, a type of paradox 
will not arise. However, at this point, while it is fair to say that Lewis would undoubtedly endorse a 
restriction on mixed fusions being members to avoid Cantorian paradoxes, his lack of a defence for 
why small-sized mixed fusions could not be members shows why his absolute restriction is too 
strong and unjustified. With this opening into at least some mixed fusions being able to be members 
it becomes clear that any mixed fusion being a member or not is less to do with the thing being a 
mixed fusion, and more to do with its number of parts and the membership system which contains 
it. 
 While the avoided paradox means that Reality having its own singleton does not lead to a 
paradox in this regard (unlike in Uzquiano’s more restricted example system which follows ZFC, 
whereby everything is a member), the understanding that so-called large fusions of parts generally 
are not themselves members due to an insufficient number of singletons also suggests that Reality is 
unable to be a member purely for the fact that it has the most number of parts possible, in literally 
having all the parts. However, as the unfounded contradiction to be derived from Reality having a 
singleton above leaves it open that Reality can have one, and thereby be a member of its singleton 
and other classes, it is worth exploring what else may be seen to happen in the case that Reality is a 
member. This is especially considering Lewis’s own take on properties, whereby for a thing to have 
properties is for it to be a member of a class (Rosen 2015, Nolan 2002, McElhoes 2016). Reality is 
a special mixed fusion because it is the sum of all things in this context, and the notion that it has no 
properties is absurd. (This is especially considering Lewis’s CAI claims, as discussed further in 
section 2.5.3 and also in Chapter 3, which should give Reality – and any mixed fusion really – its 
parts’ properties in at least some manner, for the identity claim to make sense.) 
 To be clear, although most large-parted entities cannot be members due to the lack of 
singletons, this does not mean that all of them cannot be members. In the case of classes, while it 
looks to be reason enough to restrict class-formation when some classes could lead to certain 
paradoxes if they themselves were members, such as in the case of the class of ordinals, or in our 
example of fusion F above, this kind of restriction usually only applies because of the members of 
the classes involved and from what classes they are, and not specifically due to their amount of 
parts as classes. Similarly, although there will be many mixed fusions which are just like Reality in 
being proper class sized, in terms of parts, it is unclear if any one of these in particular cannot be 
members of classes for any other reason. 
 This means that instead of a restriction on membership being in general for all large-parted 
entities, the restriction on membership for large things is here mostly only a totality restriction. This 
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is in the sense that definitely not all large things (and of distinct types) can be members, and more 
because there are strictly not enough singletons for each of them to be members, and less because of 
their contents as entities. This is especially clear in the cases of large things which are not also 
classes, because without members they do not appear to have any kinds of contents as such to make 
their being members lead into paradox. So, while the great majority of large things will be non-
members (cf., Lewis 1991, 27; Nolan 2002, 167) and regardless of their type (as in class or not) we 
are unlikely to know in advance all of which particular entities will lead to paradoxical problems in 
their own way, beyond that which arises due to a collective overload or those involving particular 
instances of contradiction already encountered, like with fusion F. 
 This all seems to leave us with at least two basic ways to go about advancing a restriction on 
membership – fully fledged like Lewis, and denying multiple types of entities from being members, 
with the guarantee that all of the problematic ones should be avoided; or strictly case by case, never 
expecting all or even a majority of cases to go through, but leaving it open that any potential or 
proposed case is worth looking at for the sake of plausible inclusion, rather than adverting to an 
outright ban from the outset. This is what might be considered a genuinely principled restriction on 
membership for certain types of things. I therefore end this section with the conclusion that, 
although not all mixed fusions can be members, many could be, including the mixed fusion which 
is Reality. As such, it is worth considering what being a member might entail for such a specific 
entity. 
2.5 Problems with Reality as a member 
Recall Lewis’s statement, after characterising Reality as a mixed fusion, that it “divides into one 
part which is the most inclusive individual and another which is the most inclusive class” (1991, 8). 
Also recall the simplified part model of Reality in Figure 1.5 with C as the most inclusive class. The 
mixed fusion which is Reality, on that model, has some interesting yet problematic properties when 
it is treated as a member. Yet I don’t think these are paradoxical properties, so let’s examine why. 
As before, let’s call Reality’s singleton {R}. Considering that Reality has a singleton {R} and C is 
both the mereological fusion of all singletons and a proper class with all individuals as its members, 
the singleton {R} is both a part and member of C, as well as a proper part of Reality. 
 Meanwhile Reality is also a member of C, among infinitely many other classes, which are 
all also proper parts of Reality. While a thing having its own singleton as a proper part (and in 
general being a member of any of its proper parts) is highly unusual there is nothing clearly in the 
letter of either the mereological or class theories adopted which prohibits such occurrence. The 
problem we are going to pursue is that it seems like there should be an explicit prohibition in spirit 
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– after all the two theories of GEM and MKU do not exhibit these sorts of loop structures 
independently, so why should we accept their combination leading to such structures? 
2.5.1 Well-founding against loopwholes 
To properly illustrate the issue, we acknowledge a core class theoretical principle of ‘Foundation’,11 
which Lewis follows in his account and supplies as the principle that “No class intersects each of its 
own members.” (1991, 103) As is understood, Foundation prohibits (1) membership loops and (2) 
infinitely descending chains of membership, such as:12 
(1) …∈ y ∈ x ∈ z ∈ y ∈ x  (x has member y has member z has member x has member y...) 
(2) …∈ x3 ∈ x2 ∈ x1 ∈ x0  (x0 has member x1 has member x2 has member x3...) 
In other words, Foundation conditions classes to be well-founded. The importance of the well-
founding of sets (and classes, as they arise) for standard membership theories is a common refrain 
amongst membership theorists. For instance, according to Maddy (1988, 484) supporters of the 
iterative conception of sets (such as Boolos 1971, 498 and Shoenfield 1977, 327) “often see 
[Foundation] as built into the very idea of the stages.” Similarly, Aczel (1988, xvii-xviii) writes that 
“For the iterative conception only well-founded sets exist and [Foundation] and the other axioms of 
ZFC [from which the MKU ones are derived] are true when interpreted in the iterative universe of 
pure sets.” These attitudes towards Foundation and its role in the well-founding of orthodoxically 
membered entities are also reflected in Adrian Mathias’s mature view, that “set theory itself is 
ultimately the study of well-foundedness.” (Kanamori 2016) 
 In a similar vein, one of the core mereological principles from GEM is ‘Antisymmetry’, 
which conditions mereological entities to be well-founded against certain loops by saying that if 
some things x and y are each part of each other, that they are the same thing. Antisymmetry 
prohibits (3) proper part loops, such as:13 
(3) …< j < k < l < j < k  (k has proper part j has proper part l has proper part k...) 
An interesting difference between standard variations of membership theories and GEM is that 
instances of infinitely descending relations of proper parthood are not specifically excluded under 
GEM, even while loops are (Varzi 2016, 3.4). These instances arise in cases where there are things 
whose parts all have further proper parts – what Lewis named ‘gunk’ (1991, 20). While gunk is 
                                                 
11 Although Lewis uses the German term ‘Fundierung’. Across the literature Foundation is also known as ‘Regularity’. 
12 ‘∈’ is a common symbol for the ‘is a member of’ relation. 
13 For the sake of this illustration ‘<’ represents the ‘is a proper part of’ relation. 
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non-well-founded (Cotnoir and Bacon 2012), and its existence is accepted as an epistemic 
possibility by Lewis (1991, 20-21; cf., Hall 2010), the system in Parts of Classes is flexible with 
regards to whether everything is either composed of just mereological atoms, or a mixture of both 
gunk and atoms.14 
 For classical mereologists, Antisymmetry is advanced on the grounds that it and other core 
mereological principles of transitivity and reflexivity15 are “partly constitutive of the meaning of 
‘part’” (Simons 1987, 1.1.1). Although Varzi says that this “simply amounts to regarding identity as 
a limit (improper) case of parthood” (2016, 2.1), which, for some, engenders the “sense in which 
the antisymmetry axiom just is an extensionality principle for improper parthood” (Cotnoir 2010, 
401) it is the case that Weak Supplementation, another GEM principle, entails “Antisymmetry so 
long as parthood is transitive and reflexive” (Varzi 2016, 3.1). While these statements suggest that 
Antisymmetry may merely be classical mereological orthodoxy, it is orthodoxy which Lewis 
subscribes to, and which mereological extensionalist commitments entail. 
 In all, the picture we receive from Reality being an individual, as within Lewis’s system in 
this case, is that Reality itself is ‘double’ non-well-founded via cross systems through an infinite 
series of loops, as in: 
(4) …∈ {R} < Reality ∈ {R} < Reality (Reality has proper part {R} has member Reality...) 
This type of double non-well-founding is also rather widespread in this case because it arises in 
every instance of a class which has {R} as a subset. As far as I know, this phenomenon of double 
non-well-founding in itself has not received any attention in the literature. So what are we to make 
of such a novel yet apparently widespread occurrence wherein the mereological Universe is a 
rampant ‘loopwhole’? 
 Before we set off I reiterate that because neither the frameworks of MKU nor GEM 
explicitly prohibit such an occasion by design, that there is no immediate formal objection to 
Reality having such a structure (as shown in the discussion earlier surrounding the fusion ‘F’ of all 
singletons which are not proper parts of their own members.) Yet clearly the spirit of each theory is 
violated, as both of them have restrictions on their respective relations which prohibit these being in 
loops. The conceptual issue for me here is that if the merging of the two systems brings non-well-
                                                 
14 Recall that as singletons are mereological atoms on Lewis’s view, such atoms must at least exist, even if there is also 
gunk elsewhere. 
15 i.e., the principles “If x is part of some part of y, then x is part of y” (Lewis 1991, 74) and “everything is part of itself” 
(Varzi 2016, 2.1), respectively. 
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founding with it, the phenomena is normalized. So why not go for a genuinely non-well-founded 
system from the outset? 
 It is also worth considering what this looping and double non-well-founding issue could 
entail in the context of certain relations being treated as ‘prior’ to others, and to consider what this 
means for the prospects of combining such general theories as GEM and MKU. 
2.5.2 Member priority and part priority 
The contemporary debate puts two positions on priority relations involving parthood, known as 
priority pluralism and priority monism, in opposition. Roughly, priority pluralism takes the view 
that wholes ontologically depend on their parts, whereas priority monism takes the converse view 
that parts ontologically depend on their wholes. The notion of ontological dependence in use within 
the debates has recently centred mostly around either what is called metaphysical grounding or 
notions of fundamentality, able to be broadly construed as notions of “in virtue of”, or of 
“priority”.16 So it may be said that a priority pluralist takes the view that composite entities exist in 
virtue of their proper parts, which makes these parts prior to, or grounding of, the whole, whereas it 
may be said that a priority monist takes the view that proper parts exist in virtue of composite 
entities which have them, making composites prior to, or grounding of, the proper parts. 
 Pre-theoretical intuitions about how parthood operates may incline one towards a part-to-
whole direction of priority – drawing from such everyday cases as the building of a brick wall, 
perhaps, where the individual bricks as proper parts at least ‘come first’ as entities before the whole 
of the wall is completed. Yet Schaffer, a proponent of priority monism,17 discusses how ‘common 
sense’ may also recognise whole priority in cases of esteemed ‘genuine unity’, even as it designates 
proper part priority in cases of ‘mere heaps’ (2014, 3.2.1). However, such talk of mixed priority 
with some wholes being posterior and some being prior is not reflected in the debate proper, as far 
as I can tell, and it is usually seen as a one or the other affair. To be sure, there is nothing in the 
system of GEM itself which guarantees an overall direction, as Bader (2013) makes clear, “Formal 
mereological systems are neutral regarding questions of priority. They characterise parthood 
structure but are silent on questions of ontological priority. Accordingly the idea that wholes are 
prior to their parts is not in conflict with [GEM].” (2013, 14) Even so, as Cotnoir (2013) explains, it 
is the default view that proper parts are prior to their wholes, which he frames as “Necessarily, the 
existence of parts is metaphysically prior to the existence of the wholes they compose.” (2013, 67) 
                                                 
16 See, for instance, Audi (2012). 
17 Schaffer’s (2010; 2014) preferred view is a priority concrete monism, the view that exactly one fundamental concrete 
object exists, and is characterised as targeting concrete objects and counting by basic tokens, to get the universe as One. 
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 Priority relations involving members are less debated, however, and the usual view is that 
members are prior to their classes, in the sense that the classes depend on their members for their 
existence. Lewis’s commitment to the priority of members to their classes can be found in his 
acceptance of the standard iterative conception of set, which makes a non-membered member (the 
null set) the foundational element of all classes. This is what Lewis calls “the orthodox iterative 
conception of set” (1991, 61), and is expressed using similar language by Boolos, who states that it 
is an “important characteristic [of] sets ... that, in a sense [the] elements of a set are “prior to” it.” 
(1971, 215-216).18 
 This conception is also indirectly expressed in Lewis’s Priority Thesis, that no class is part 
of any individual, a thesis which is to be contravened in the case that any mixed fusions are 
individuals. Similarly, Lewis’s (Individual) Fusion Thesis, that any fusion of individuals is itself an 
individual, does not stand in the case that there are proper class many individuals (Nolan 2002). 
With all small mixed fusions able to be individuals, there will be proper class many of them, 
because one individual which mereologically fuses with each singleton, of which there are proper 
class many, means there are proper class many mixed fusions consisting of one individual and one 
class, let alone greater numbers of singletons. 
 Recall Lewis’s (albeit weak) support of these two theses quoted in my section 1.5, which 
also reveals his priority inclinations for members and proper parts.19 Even with his vague 
expectation there that somehow the individuals “come first” and that classes are a “superstructure” 
Lewis does not really have the option to insist that the Priority Thesis trumps the general sense of 
membership inclusiveness that I have argued is the standard interpretation, which permits all small 
things to be members. What we can do in the Priority Thesis’s stead is to repurpose the sentiment 
behind the asserting of priority for individuals, into an assertion of the priority of members. 
 While, on the surface Lewis’s Priority Thesis looks to be the ontological-priority-of-
individuals-to-classes thesis, going deeper it can easily be understood to be more about the 
ontological-priority-of-members-to-their-classes thesis, as if it is an implied Membership Priority 
Thesis, that the members of classes come before their classes. As noted with the iterative 
conception of set formation, this thesis is not without precedent in the literature. The utility of such 
a refinement for Lewis is found in its maintaining the gist of the reasoning given for asserting the 
                                                 
18 In this regard Lewis specifically cites Pollard (1986) on plural quantification and the iterative conception of set, 
which explicitly builds on the just mentioned Boolos (1971). 
19 Mixed fusions themselves further betray the plausibility of whole priority being Lewis’s position. Consider Lewis’s 
assessment that “Mixed fusions are forced upon us by the principle of Unrestricted Composition” (1991, 8) and not 
‘individuals and classes are forced upon us by the principle of Unrestricted Decomposition.’ 
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Priority Thesis, while also being consistent with the understanding that both individuals and some 
classes are members of classes. Considering what Lewis promotes, the Membership Priority Thesis 
is one he should accept. 
 If we have an ontological priority for members to classes and an ontological priority for 
proper parts, however, we look to be in a terrible bind. With priority relations understood in this 
way how can a member such as Reality be prior to its classes, while those classes are prior proper 
parts of it? The reason that there is a problem here is that the priority relations need to be 
complementary (or at least not in conflict), which is to say that if members are prior to their classes 
as the orthodox iterative conception of sets looks to entail, that the whole which is Reality needs to 
be prior to any of its parts which it is a member of, to avoid contradiction. That is, for such an 
account to avoid some conflict over the direction of priority relations, it looks to at least need to be 
priority monist. 
2.5.3 CAI and priority relations 
One line of response that might be taken here is that, even if Lewis seems to prefer priority 
pluralism, that his other avowed commitments allow some flexibility on this matter. Consider 
Lewis’s view of CAI: “I say that composition – the relation of part to whole, or, better, the many-
one relation of many parts to their fusion – is like identity. The ‘are’ of composition is, so to speak, 
the plural form of the ‘is’ of identity. Call this the Thesis of Composition as Identity. It is in virtue 
of this thesis that mereology is ontologically innocent: it commits us only to things that are 
identical, so to speak, to what we were committed to before.” (1991, 82)20 
 What CAI could mean is that there are no relations of priority between parts and their 
wholes.21 For instance, Bricker writes that 
if composition is a kind of (total) identity, and kinds of (total) identity are all 
symmetric, then the debate [over whether the parts are prior to the whole or the 
whole is prior to the parts] makes no sense; the mereological relations between 
objects, by themselves, are irrelevant to questions of priority. The only way in 
which it could make sense to speak of some objects being prior to others is 
                                                 
20 For a wide-ranging overview of this concept, see the volume of Cotnoir and Baxter (2014). 
21 For a contrary view, see Loss (2016). For some concerns with the combination of CAI, priority pluralism and 
irreflexive grounding, see Bailey (2011). 
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derivatively from the properties and relations that they instantiate, and whether 
those properties and relations are fundamental. (2016, 285)22 
This allows that so long as the properties and relations which Reality instantiates are fundamental, 
that it could be the prior entity. Yet this only seems to further put us in the position that for the 
account of Reality to be at least consistent in this aspect, that it requires a type of priority monism. 
Yet this is no good for Lewis, as it seems from what was cited earlier that he is not inclined towards 
accepting that Reality-the-whole has such fundamental properties. There is one relatively 
underexplored other option here, at least to be acknowledged, which is known as metaphysical 
coherentism, the view that dependence chains can form loops, and which can be contrasted with the 
more familiar metaphysical foundationalism, which asserts a terminal priority base (Tahko 2018). 
 Beside the fact that, as far as I know, the type of double non-well-founding I have described 
for Lewis’s Reality is an unprecedented form of metaphysical coherentism, because Lewis is not 
himself a known proponent of metaphysical coherentism it is not feasible that his account could 
stand for such a view intentionally. Additionally, because no singleton for Reality is postulated by 
Lewis, he clearly does not expect the account in Parts of Classes to endorse such an option. Which 
is all to say, if Lewis’s account ends up being an inadvertent promotion of metaphysical 
coherentism, it is not well defended as such. Accordingly, because it appears unlikely that this type 
of ontology would be acceptable on Lewis’s own expressed grounds anyway, we can also choose to 
reject this and other loopwholes as a plausible option for him to pursue. 
 So we are left with an unjustified priority monism. Is it really so bad? What are some of the 
consequences of this option? The first follows from Bricker’s statement, which is that mereological 
relations are no determinant of ontological priority. As far as I am aware this is actually an unusual 
position for a priority monist to take, in that some of what their priority position is about is 
specifically to do with the whole having priority, not just being a fundamental entity. To avoid this, 
let’s consider what the landscape looks like if, instead of denying mereological priority relations, 
whole-to-part priority is accepted. To help discuss some of the consequences of this option, I 
introduce some formalism. 
                                                 
22 Following a similar line as the first is Varzi, who states, “[The] truth of Composition as Identity does not depend at 
all on one’s specific views about such matters. Whether you give priority to the wholes or to the smaller parts that 
compose them, you are dealing with the same “portions of Reality” and you can talk about those portions either way. 
That’s what the thesis says.” (2014, 65) 
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2.5.4 Over-determining priority relations 
Let x ↦M y represent the relation that x is membership prior to y, where x is a member of y; and let x 
↦P y represent the relation that x is parthood prior to y, whether x is a proper part of y or x is a 
composite for y (such that x’s improper part is prior to y’s improper part). Also let directional 
variations of the arrows represent their respective relational variants. Now to consider a simple 
model of the view which Lewis appears to actually hold: Presume that some mereologically atomic 
individual d has a singleton {d}, such that d ↦M {d}. By unrestricted composition there is a 
mereological fusion of d and {d}, which we can call D. According to what Lewis’s priority 
expectation appears to be we get the following, where d is prior to {d}, as its member, and these are 
both prior to D, as its proper parts 
             D 
      ↥P ↥P 
      d   ↦M {d} 
Figure 2.1 
Our original problem with Lewis’s Reality, or R, was that the account of it being a member which 
still followed Lewis’s preferences resulted in incompatible priority relations, whereby Reality was 
prior to its singleton, which was also prior to it, i.e., R ↦M {R} and {R} ↦P R. What has been 
anticipated is that Lewis needs to commit to Reality being prior to its proper parts, especially 
because it is a member of so many of them, for the system to be at least consistent in this aspect. 
Therefore, we expect that Lewis needs to endorse his account showing that both R ↦M {R} and R 
↦P {R}, among other parts. But what about all of the other mereological composites in Reality? If 
whole-to-part priority is accepted, it is absolute, which means that for any composite whole that 
whole is prior to its proper parts. This beckons two problematic cases. 
 The first case arises if we suppose that there is some mereologically atomic individual z 
which has a singleton {z}, such that z ↦M {z}. By unrestricted composition there is a mereological 
fusion of z and {z}, which we can call Z. According to our newly anticipated priority directions we 
get the following, where z is prior to {z}, as its member, and Z is prior to both of z and {z}, as their 
composite:23 
  
                                                 
23 Here two part-priority arrows for the whole have been given, one for each of its proper parts. This occurs in the next 
case too. 
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      z ↦M {z} 
      ↥P  ↥P  
            Z 
Figure 2.2 
The next case arises if we suppose that there are the unrestricted composition of some singletons 
{p} and {q} of some entities p and q, of a composite we can call Q. In this case we get the 
following, where p and q are each prior to their respective singletons, and Q is prior to both of {p} 
and {q}: 
      p q 
      ↧M ↧M 
               {p}      {q} 
      ↥P ↥P 
           Q 
Figure 2.3 
The problem, which should be made clearer by the visualisation, is that in each case certain entities 
look to be over-determined by things with priority relations to them. Recalling our earlier 
characterisation that the ontological priority of x to y implies that y exists “in virtue of” x, this is a 
severe problem. In the first case the over-determination arises where {z} exists both in virtue of z as 
well as in virtue of Z. In the second case the over-determination arises where {p} exists in virtue of 
both p and Q, and {q} exists in virtue of both q and Q. Note that it is not the case that the problem is 
because of multiple “in virtue of” relations in general. Collective multiple “in virtue of” relations 
are exactly the type of relations expected under a part-to-whole priority ontology, where the proper 
parts of some whole are necessary and sufficient for the whole to exist in virtue of them only 
collectively. 
 The problem here is that several of the “in virtue of” relations in the two cases appear to be 
sufficient for the parts or the singletons to exist, yet in virtue of either the whole or the members 
separately, which makes neither of them necessary, and therefore separately rejectable. For 
instance, we can easily imagine {z} existing without Z, as it would still have z, and thereby still be 
founded on something, just as we can imagine either {p} or {q} existing without Q, as they would 
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still have p and q, respectively, which completely undermines the claim to their dependence on Q. 
This would be the case if there were no unrestricted composition, or there were some other 
composition relation which permitted fusions like those in the two cases. In this way the members 
of the classes appear to be ‘enough’ for the classes to exist, making some priority composite with 
the classes as parts gratuitous. 
 In the second case alone the other option is worse, in that were p and q not to exist, {p} and 
{q} presumably still would, because of Q. Notice that it would be inappropriate to strip the first 
case of z and leave all else as is, as z is supposed to exist in virtue of Z. Otherwise it would be 
apparent that z never genuinely existed in virtue of Z in the first place. If we consider that in the first 
case {z} seems on par with z in terms of priority, in that they both exist in virtue of Z, it is apparent 
that both of these types of possibilities serve to undermine any plausibility that the “in virtue of” 
relations literally pertain to members and their classes. Although it could solve the issue to reverse 
the member-to-class priority relation direction to be that of class-to-member this both has no 
precedent in the literature and is terribly counter-intuitive. 
 I believe the issue is better met by Lewis in this instance by being eliminative of the 
competition between the priority relations, rather than reversing member priority to be class priority 
instead,24 because otherwise everything will at least still be founded on Reality for needing to make 
whole priority universal due to issue with classes. Yet this elimination is not an option for Lewis in 
the main text of Parts of Classes because there he gives precedence to singleton formation as a 
primitive, stating a belief that “The notion of a singleton, or unit set, can serve as the distinctive 
primitive of set theory.” (1991, vii) This ends up providing us with further evidence that Lewis is 
committed to the proper parts of things being prior to their wholes, following his redefinition of a 
class. “If we take the notion of a singleton henceforth as primitive, we have this new definition of a 
class [...] A class is any fusion of singletons.” (1991, 16)25 
 This redefinition runs contrary to the notion of the wholes of plural classes being prior to 
their singleton proper parts, as it is based on the idea of composition leading to the existence of an 
entity. This is especially apparent when we compare it with what Lewis says in a later chapter: 
“begin with singleton rather than membership as the primitive notion of set theory. We can leave it 
to mereology to make many-membered classes by fusing together singletons.” (1991, 61) 
                                                 
24 Obviously if this is the option taken, the predicament of looping vanishes. Elimination is to be examined below. 
25 This redefinition comes after Lewis’s proof for the Second Thesis and replaces the earlier, informal definition of a 
class as a thing which has members (1991, 4). 
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 In the current context, this belief in singleton formation as primitive appears untenable. This 
is because if wholes of plural classes are prior to their singleton proper parts, such that the 
singletons exist in virtue of the plural classes that they are parts of, it would entail that no such 
primitive operation as singleton formation plays a role in their existence. To avoid this issue 
involving singleton formation as primitive it appears that there is at least one other move available 
by turning towards Lewis’s own structuralist re-interpretation of his program, supplied after the 
original ending to Parts of Classes in the joint “Appendix on Pairing” with Burgess and Hazen, and 
which was written after Lewis had finished most of the book proper. 
2.5.5 Eliminating competing priorities? 
On the structuralist interpretation of set theory which is given in the Appendix of Parts of Classes, 
the primitive notion of singleton can be eliminated by Ramsifying it out, so long as there are the 
systems of plural quantification and mereology, and the entities of infinitely (inaccessibly) many 
atoms in Reality (and, if any, not too much atomless gunk).26 Here quantification over relations is 
simulated by constructing a suitable method of pairing entities one with another in an order (cf., 
1991, 53), whereby these pairing relations can stand in for the set-theoretic ones, to the effect that 
“there is no primitive notion [of singleton formation] that needs understanding; [as] all the suitable 
relations are equally ‘the’ member-singleton relation” (1991, 142). 
 In this way, it appears that there is no longer an issue about member priority as discussed, 
because whichever atom stands in for the singleton of Reality under one relation is the singleton of 
something else under another relation. As Lewis, Burgess and Hazen explain “If all suitable 
relations alike are member-singleton relations, then a singleton does not have its member once and 
for all. For anything that can be a member, for anything that can be a singleton, there will be some 
member-singleton relation that pairs the one with the other. The atom that is [e.g., Lewis’s cat] 
Possum’s singleton under one suitable relation is [e.g., Lewis’s other cat] Magpie’s singleton under 
another.” (1991, 143) 
 This looks to settle the problem of member priority, because by the invocation of 
structuralism classes do not ontologically depend in any sense on their members to themselves 
exist. Rather, the entities which exist do so already in their given manner, and merely provide a 
relational basis that can be co-opted by the structuralism for it to manifest an overlaid, virtual 
system of membership across them, as it were. This in turn simply allows certain entities to serve as 
classes by fiat, instead of requiring certain entities to naturally and solely be such creatures. In this 
manner, this structuralism is able to eliminate any bona-fide objects of classes altogether, leaving 
                                                 
26 For all of the details see the full appendix from Lewis with Burgess and Hazen (1991, 121-149). 
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every entity as genuine anti-members, and only having some of these function as classes through 
the prism of the system. While such a move is available to later Lewis especially,27 it is a step he is 
reluctant to take earlier for not wanting to go against mathematical orthodoxy (e.g., 1991, 50, 58, 
61). Perhaps, if I’m not mistaken about the tension in priority relations, the issues I’ve described in 
this regard could prove to be a further motivating factor to make that switch into a form of 
structuralism. 
 Yet the significant ontological infrastructure and outlay that is required to arrive at such an 
alternate system, namely proper class many atoms to serve as the basis for the structuralist system, 
ensures that making this move does not come without its own controversy. For example, such a 
system looks like it would require a significant multitude of possible worlds, and not just a single 
one, as it is the case that large transfinite cardinalities of physical or concrete entities are difficult to 
still regard as (single) concrete or physical systems (Parsons 1990).28 Similarly, “We seem to have 
no reason to believe that there could be physical worlds that contain highly transfinitely many 
entities” (Horsten 2017, 4.4), which appears to leave us compelled to entertain a multitude of 
concrete possible worlds to serve as the basis of the structuralism. (If we were to just have these 
entities as some kind of abstracta, there would be less reason to structuralise classes after all.) 
Fortunately for Lewis, he already has his controversial (1986) system of infinite, concrete possible 
worlds at hand, which could provide the needed infrastructure (as explained in Nolan’s work, as 
mentioned in a recent footnote). 
 For our purposes, and for the rest of this thesis, we do need to note that, besides removing 
the issues of member priority that we have been considering, this strategy does also eliminate 
natural mixed fusions from the equation. What remains of these types of things in this instance is 
that they are only able to be residual, ‘pseudo-entities’, arising only insomuch as that on any given 
member-singleton relation construal some things will serve as classes and some will not, and by 
GEM will form a composite which can be regarded as a mixed fusion under that construal. 
 Gladly, this outcome does not suffice to undermine the rest of the work of this thesis, 
however, because maintaining sets or classes as their own, natural beings is still the norm in 
philosophy. This allows us to continue our analysis of mixed fusions along the lines of the main text 
                                                 
27 See Nolan 2002, Chapter 7 and 2004 for the detailed requirements for Lewis to be able to achieve such a system, 
which also build upon Lewis’s 1998 deeper commitment to structuralism than he approached in the main text of Parts 
of Classes. 
28 Cf., Tallant saying that “if there is gunk, then there is an actual infinity of proper parts that exist. We have some 
reasons to think that actual infinities, though mathematically describable, cannot be realized on pain of contradiction.” 
(2013, 435) 
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of Parts of Classes, for still being an analysis of mixed fusions under that interpretation. In addition 
to this, some of my arguments in Chapter 5 look to challenge GEM and unrestricted composition 
solely on the basis of trans-world fusion anyway, which a structuralist revision of Lewis’s 
mereological class theory (as per Nolan 2002, Chapter 7 and 2004) is still committed to. (I also 
remark upon this situation again directly in Chapter 7.) 
 So, although I accept that this type of structuralist move underpinned by a certain 
ontological system seems like it could be effectively used to avoid my proposed issues over priority 
relations in this chapter, some of my arguments in later chapters show that this move still has its 
own problems involving unrestricted composition, and even if mixed fusions are not necessarily the 
target of concern in that instance. 
2.6 Conclusion 
At the outset of this chapter I asked a question about how mereological hybridism involving fusions 
of member and non-member entities could result in those fusions being either membered or non-
membered. From all that I have said, whether something is a member or not is apparently only 
pseudo-intrinsic to the thing itself, in that the restrictions on membership which a system such as 
MKU entail in the context of Lewis’s theory are justified more on the grounds of the entities within 
the system in its entirety, rather than the specific content of any particular entity in terms of the 
parts it has or even the members (modulo those few specific ones which cannot be members, such 
as the class of ordinals, for example). This makes claims to there being an issue involving 
mereological hybridism here somewhat obscure, as the member types of the components of such 
mereological sums have little to no bearing on the member types that the sums themselves are or 
could be. Instead, the collective problem for large entities is that not all of them can be members 
without paradox ensuing. Yet when regarded on a singular scale, these appear to be mostly 
innocuous, allowing for some of them to be members, especially if they are understood to be 
important entities in their own right. Restrictions on membership look to stem mostly from there not 
being ‘enough’ singletons, rather than from the size of the entities specifically. 
 From here, however, I was able to entertain the prospect that the mereological Universe in 
Lewis’s system, Reality, is a member, primarily because it is an important mixed fusion, and from 
the fact that its being a member does not entail any known set-theoretical paradoxes in a domain 
which includes proper classes. In examining the potential consequences of such an arrangement by 
following the standard views of mereological priority we ended up with the undesirable situation of 
the priority relations either being contradictory or over-determined, or largely unprecedented and 
derivative of an already minority view, making it rather undefended and unwelcome to accept. 
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However, I did acknowledge that there is a structuralist strategy available to avoid my challenges 
involving priority, even though I expect that some arguments in my later chapters will still result in 
significant problems for the view. 
 Although parthood does play a role in the priority issues, by way of something having its 
own singleton as a proper part leading to trouble, I did not arrive at any direct rejections of 
mereological hybridism specifically from these discussions, however. This is because it is not 
clearly a problem stemming from a mixture of categories of entities, but rather a problem stemming 
from how parthood and membership can operate without any regard for the other. As such, what I 
have shown in arguing beyond similar lines as Uzquiano (2006) are some of the consequences able 
to befall such a combination of systems of relations, rather than consequences specifically from a 
mereological combination of entities with incompatible properties. In this way, the situations 
described are not presented as defeating of the overall project of a mereological Universe such as 
Reality in terms of it being a transcategorial sum, per se. However, as it would be baseless to restrict 
membership for the mereological Universe in this case for the reasons I presented alone, as they do 
not lead to set-theoretical paradox, the motivation to restrict composition instead to avoid the 
problems is at least increased, even if not given outright. This is, of course, a consequence which 
leads to a rejection of GEM. 
 If this motivation for rejecting GEM is not compelling, I believe I have still in some 
measure shown that such an object as Reality is one that is more difficult to accept given the costs 
of certain paths and outcomes being made explicit. In this case, this chapter at least stands as an 
exposing of some of the challenges which accepting such a mereological hybridist account as 
Lewis’s might entail, and reveals how his conception and presentation did not adequately account 
for these varied issues that do need to be met when determining whether to accept such a system. 
 In the next chapter we move on to consider a reason to outright reject mereological 
hybridism like that in Parts of Classes, a rejection involving the question of whether mixed fusions 
themselves have members or not. 
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Chapter 3 
How mixed fusions confound 
Composition as Identity 
and unrestricted composition 
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3.0 Introduction 
CAI is a thesis about composition which generally asserts that the parts of a whole are in some 
sense identical to the whole, and vice versa, and it has recently been defended by a number of 
philosophers (cf., Cotnoir and Baxter (eds) 2014, Smid 2015). One influential proponent of CAI is 
David Lewis (1991) who argues for the thesis as supportive of GEM in the context of detailing a 
system of parthood for the mathematical objects of classes. 
 In this context Lewis introduces us to mixed fusions of classes and individuals as a 
consequence of GEM’s principle of unrestricted composition, and in this chapter I demonstrate a 
significant problem for CAI with regards to the prospects of there being mixed fusions. The 
problem is simple – if CAI is true, then mixed fusions are themselves classes, because for mixed 
fusions to be plausibly identical with the classes which are their parts they need to have all of the 
same members as their largest class parts. This is a consequence which I argue violates the standard 
set-theoretic axiom of Extensionality, thereby ruining the project of mereologising set theory as 
Lewis sets out to do. 
 Although I assess that Lewis (and any others who hold both a CAI thesis and some principle 
of composition which permits mixed fusions) is most obliged to drop CAI rather than GEM in this 
case, I show that a further, related, challenge to GEM remains. This next problem is that, under 
widely accepted and non-CAI dependent notions of property inheritance – whereby composite 
wholes are understood to inherit their own properties from those of their parts – some entity having 
parts with members is sufficient for that entity to itself have those members, such that any entity 
with class parts is itself a class, and, as before, the same class as its largest class part. 
 As this too violates Extensionality we are left with a choice between rejecting property 
inheritance or rejecting the composition principle which facilitates this problem (rejecting 
Extensionality is not an option here). I will argue in favour of retaining the far more widely 
accepted notions of property inheritance in this instance, and thereby call for the rejection of any 
composition principles which permit mixed fusions, including GEM’s principle of unrestricted 
composition, so as to avoid mixed fusions and their attendant violations of a standard set-theoretic 
axiom. My conclusion, in turn, represents an instance of rejecting mereological hybridism in the 
case of the fusion of membered and non-membered things. 
3.1 Lewis on whether mixed fusions have members 
In the last chapter I asked whether mixed fusions could themselves be members of classes in the 
context of the merging of set/class theory and GEM à la Lewis’s Parts of Classes. I concluded yes, 
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so long as not all of them are members, as this would lead to set-theoretic paradox. In this chapter I 
ask the complementary question of whether mixed fusions can have members – a question we need 
to consider to properly determine the nature of mixed fusions for the sake of evaluating their 
plausibility as beings. As it turns out, while I do demonstrate that mixed fusions having members 
actually leads to contradicting a set theoretical axiom, I also explain how mixed fusions not having 
members leads to the problem of contravening widely accepted notions of property inheritance from 
part to whole. My solution to avoid these issues is to reject unrestricted composition, and any other 
principles of composition like it which permit mixed fusions. 
 As in Chapter 1, we first look to the originating position which Lewis (1991) provides about 
the nature of mixed fusions with regards to their having members, and consider it to determine what 
to retain or discard. When it comes to the earliest sections of Parts of Classes, we see that for an 
answer to the question, “Can mixed fusions have members?” Lewis’s presentation is more of an 
inclination that they do not have members, rather than any direct argument that they do not. 
 We see this inclination implied in several statements, such as when Lewis says, “the 
Division Thesis1 permits there to be a mixed thing [i.e., composed of individual/s and class/es] 
which is neither an individual nor a class,” (1991, 8), and, “Reality itself – the mereological fusion 
of everything – is mixed. It is neither individual nor class” (1991, 8) (my emphasis in both).2 
Beyond these indirect suggestions that mixed fusions do not have members, Lewis makes some 
more explicit statements further along in the text which are a little more direct, albeit fairly weak. 
This is with his redefinition of a ‘class’ as “any fusion of singletons” (1991, 16), and his 
surrounding statement that “a mixed fusion, part individual and part class ... does have singletons as 
parts, yet probably we would not want to say that it has members.” (1991, 16) 
 Recalling that, by Lewis’s own lights, if something has members it is thereby a class (cf., 
1991, 4), his reluctance to be definitive here is strange, as it stands at odds with several of the other 
things he has said and done by this point in the text. For starters, just prior to this statement Lewis 
gives a redefinition of a class as any fusion of singletons. Now, as a mixed fusion is more than any 
fusion of singletons, we would not want to say that these have members if we have defined classes 
as fusions of singletons. Even more strongly than this, though, is that a few pages earlier Lewis 
provides a proof for his Second Thesis, that no class has any part that is not a class. As mixed 
fusions by definition do have parts that are non-classes (in their individual-type parts), Lewis should 
                                                 
1 That “Reality divides exhaustively into individuals and classes.” (1991, 7) 
2 Although these statements also advise that mixed fusions are not individuals either, this claim has been discounted for 
many mixed fusions in Chapter 2. 
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state that we definitely would not want to say that any mixed fusion has members, as a mixed fusion 
with members would be a class and would thereby contravene his Second Thesis. 
 By reading Lewis’s Second Thesis with the prospects of mixed fusions having members in 
mind, we can see that if the thesis were true then, indeed, mixed fusions could not have members 
and thereby be classes, due to their proper parts which are individuals. So it is apparent that Lewis 
is not clear on the possibility of mixed fusions having members being a point of issue when he says, 
as quoted earlier, “a mixed fusion, part individual and part class [does] have singletons as parts, yet 
probably we would not want to say that it has members.” (1991, 16) I think it should be obvious 
that defenders of the Second Thesis would definitely not want to say that a mixed fusion has 
members, because these would then be classes with non-class parts. My suspicion is that Lewis’s 
too early and too easy dismissal of mixed fusions from his consideration in Parts of Classes, in 
relegating them to only “our most unrestricted quantifying” (1991, 8) ensured that he wrote them 
out of his concerns for the most part, which I think is what unfortunately led to him not properly 
considering whether mixed fusions could have members either. 
 I say this is unfortunate, because, clearly, as one of the consequences of the Second Thesis 
being true is that mixed fusions cannot be classes, it would be interesting to know Lewis’s more 
definite and explicit view on the matter of whether mixed fusions could have members. I also say 
this is unfortunate because what I will mainly be arguing in the next section is that, by following 
Lewis’s other express commitments in Parts of Classes, mixed fusions are more naturally seen as 
having members than not having them. The short version of my argument for this conclusion is as 
follows: mixed fusions are composites which have parts which have members, therefore mixed 
fusions have members. In the coming section I will explain how this conclusion is supported by 
Lewis’s avowed view of CAI. 
3.2 Can mixed fusions have members? What Lewis’s account implies 
In this section I argue that Lewis’s avowed CAI thesis supports the conclusion that mixed fusions 
have members and are thereby classes. This follows from a consequence of the thesis that 
composite wholes are in some sense identical to their proper parts, such that if their proper parts 
have members, the wholes do too, so as to properly retain a suitable sense of identity with them. 
Beyond this I also argue that a widely accepted notion of property inheritance – which entails that 
composites inherit properties from their parts – also implies that mixed fusions have members and 
are thereby classes. As the notion of property inheritance is something which can itself stand apart 
from CAI (although the CAI style views are committed to it), this makes the idea that mixed fusions 
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have members one which should be widely accepted, so as not to contravene a notion of property 
inheritance which “everyone accepts” (Sider 2007, 75). 
 Although I think mixed fusions having members is a view which Lewis is implicitly 
committed to because of his commitment to CAI, and that anyone else who accepts mixed fusions 
otherwise is committed too, my argument later in section 3.3 is to show that mixed fusions having 
members is a consequence which should be rejected, as it leads to contradictions of the set theoretic 
axiom of Extensionality. My strategy in this main section, then, is to show that virtually everyone 
who accepts mixed fusions is obliged to accept that mixed fusions would have members based upon 
either CAI or property inheritance, with my strategy in the next section to then show that mixed 
fusions having members is actually a disastrous consequence for the very theories which provide 
their class parts. With this dilemma in place the solution to the problem which I advocate is to 
withdraw the entities which make trouble – and so I argue to reject any composition principles 
which permit mixed fusions in the first place. As a specific target, I focus on the principle of 
unrestricted composition which Lewis endorses and utilises in Parts of Classes, and argue that it, 
and thereby the classical mereological system in which it is contained, should be rejected. 
3.2.1 CAI 
Lewis introduces the CAI thesis as follows: “I say that composition – the relation of part to whole, 
or, better, the many-one relation of many parts to their fusion – is like identity. The ‘are’ of 
composition is, so to speak, the plural form of the ‘is’ of identity.” (1991, 82) To notice here that 
Lewis is saying that composition is only like identity is to notice the relative strength of Lewis’s 
identity claim. Indeed, Lewis is typically taken to uphold a so-called ‘weak’ form of CAI (e.g., 
Smid 2015, 9 fn 3, Yi 1999, van Inwagen 1994, Sider 2007, 78, Bennett 2015, 256, Cotnoir 2014, 
9), because his position, as he describes it, is one asserting that composition is “strikingly 
analogous” to identity (Lewis 1991, 84), rather than saying that composition is identity, which is 
clearly a much stronger claim.3 
 These differences reflect at least two of the main variations of the CAI thesis which are 
present in the literature. Following Cotnoir (2014, 9) these are, as follows 
 Analogous CAI The relationship between the parts taken collectively and the whole 
    is analogous to identity. 
 Numerical CAI The relationship between the parts taken collectively and the whole 
    is numerical identity. 
                                                 
3 The weakening of the commitment is also expressed in Lewis’s “so to speak” in the quotation’s last sentence. 
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To be clear Cotnoir actually labels these ‘Weak’ and ‘Strong’ CAI respectively. However, due to 
divergences in the literature in applying such labels it is helpful to avoid the ‘strength’-relative 
names of the theses, and make them wear their commitments on their sleeves. Lewis clearly 
endorses at least Analogous CAI, both in his own words and because endorsing CAI at all seems to 
require at least this position at a minimum. Lando (2017) breaks Lewis’s view up into the holding 
of the following four subsidiary views 
 (LA) a fusion is nothing over and above the fused entities. 
 (LB) a fusion and the fused entities are the same portion of reality. 
 (LC) a fusion is not a further ontological commitment over the fused entities. 
 (LD) GEM is ontologically innocent. 
For our purposes in this chapter we will be focussing mainly on the first two, but will return to 
address ontological innocence and commitment in Chapter 7. While other defenders of CAI might 
split this package up in different ways by only endorsing some of the views and not others, Lando 
advises that Lewis avoids holding Numerical CAI by specifically not endorsing 
 (LE) a fusion is identical to the fused entities. 
This is because Lewis says, “What’s true of the many is not exactly what’s true of the one. After all 
they are many while it is one.” (1991, 87) Lando (2017, 205) takes this as an admission that the 
fusion is discernible from the fused entities, in such a manner that treating the fusion as strictly 
identical to the fused entities would not make sense of this discernibility. Lando thinks that this lack 
of indiscernibility is further backed up by Lewis stating that CAI has its limits and does not 
establish “a generalized principle of indiscernibility of identicals.” (1991, 87) 
 Contrast Lando’s understanding of Lewis’s position with that of Bohn (2011), however, 
who argues that composition, for Lewis, is only analogous to identity taken as a one-one relation, as 
in “x=y”, in distinction to when it is taken as a many-one relation, as in “xx=y”, where it is to be 
regarded as literally, and strictly, identity (Bohn 2011, 154). We can see this when Lewis says that 
he remains unconvinced that composition involves this “ordinary one-one kind” of identity (Lewis 
1991, 84 fn 12; cf., Bennett 2015, 256) which he describes as “the special, limiting case of identity 
in the broadened sense.” (1991, 84) Bohn understands Lewis as offering a more general notion of 
identity to which composition belongs here, and takes Lewis’s claim to composition being 
analogous to identity to mean that “composition is analogous to ordinary one-one identity, which is 
not saying that composition isn‘t really identity. Composition is literally and strictly speaking 
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identity in the general sense, but it is not literally and strictly speaking ordinary one-one identity.” 
(Bohn 2011, 154) 
 I believe that for either way of understanding Lewis’s own commitment to CAI that the 
consequence of mixed fusions having members is still obtained. Following Bohn’s understanding of 
Lewis’s view of CAI, the claim that mixed fusions have members appears to be granted 
immediately. We can see this if we treat the property of having members as a cumulative one, 
similar to weight. So, for every part of the mixed fusion which has members, these members add up 
to be the members of the mixed fusion, avoiding any double counting for the members given by any 
other membered parts already. Similarly to how the class part’s members add up to be the members 
of mixed fusions, all of the individual parts of mixed fusion contribute zero members each to this 
total. Now, in terms of membership specifically, the relationship between the parts of the mixed 
fusion taken collectively and the whole mixed fusion is one of numerical identity, as the mixed 
fusion is identical to the fused entities. In this context, by Numerical CAI, mixed fusions have 
members. 
3.2.2 Property Inheritance 
To follow Lando’s way of understanding Lewis’s commitment to CAI, however, more discussion is 
in order. As we encountered in terms of LC and LD, one consequence of CAI which Lewis expects 
is the ontological innocence of GEM. Lewis expects that this is secured by CAI because then 
“[GEM] commits us only to things that are identical, so to speak, to what we were committed to 
before.” (1991, 82) The concept of ‘innocence’ in play here portrays the notion that composite 
entities come at no additional cost to our ontology, and that electing to accept the existence of such 
entities as composite ones is no different from electing to accept the existence of their parts. (In 
Chapter 7 I look more into Lewis’s claims to the ‘ontological innocence’ of GEM and dispute it.) 
 Lewis describes the support for CAI as consisting in five aspects (1991, 85-6) with the most 
important one for our purposes being what Lewis portrays as ‘the ease of describing fusions’, and 
which Bennett (2015) more succinctly calls ‘property inheritance’. It will be instructive to quote 
both Lewis’s4 and Bennett’s presentation in succession. 
The ease of describing fusions is a fourth aspect of the analogy [i.e., of CAI]. 
Describe Possum fully, and thereby you fully describe whatever is identical to 
Possum. Describe Magpie and Possum fully – the character of each, and also 
their interrelation – and thereby you fully describe their fusion. (Lewis 1991, 
85) 
                                                 
4 Recall that ‘Possum’ and ‘Magpie’ are the names of Lewis’s cats. 
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Both composition and identity involve property inheritance. Each x’s 
properties supervene (trivially) on x’s properties, intrinsic and relational. 
Similarly, each x’s properties supervene on the properties of its parts, intrinsic 
and relational. (Bennett 2015, 257) 
Bennett continues on to say that of the five aspects of the analogy of CAI, there are three which 
Lewis “feels at least some obligation to [defend]. In contrast, two of them – aspects 4 [the notion of 
property inheritance we are looking at] and 5 [the blocking of multi-location notion] – are fairly 
uncontroversial and not really in need of argument. They are interesting phenomena that can 
legitimately be taken as data; it is hard to deny that composites inherit their properties and locations 
from those of their parts.”(Bennett 2015, 257) 
 The claim that property inheritance can legitimately be taken as data is a strong one, and 
clearly interesting for our concerns. This expectation that it is hard to deny that composites inherit 
their properties from those of their parts finds expression in other recent works too, to the point that 
no-one asks whether property inheritance occurs, but instead are more concerned with why it does. 
We can see this in a question Cameron (2014) asks: Why do wholes inherit their part’s properties?5 
On the notion that a whole’s intrinsic nature supervenes on its part’s intrinsic natures, Sider (2007) 
even goes so far as to say that “everyone agrees [that] the inheritance principles are true” (2007, 
74), with the understanding that if they are true, then this intimacy of the part-whole connection 
needs to be explained (2007, 75). In addition, Cameron also considers that any question of why 
parts and their wholes are intimately located is “a special case of a more general puzzle” of why 
wholes inherit the properties of their parts – another instance of taking it for granted that property 
inheritance occurs and that it is a feature to be explained, not established. (As one illustration of 
why it might be a common and ordinary assumption that wholes inherit the properties of their parts, 
consider that if a part of you has a bruise, then it appears that you have a bruise too, and it’s the 
same bruise.) 
 As for the question of ‘why’ composites inherit their properties from their parts, Bennett 
says 
we would have an answer if composition literally is identity.6 But, again, we do 
not obviously have an answer given the weaker claim that composition is 
merely like identity. In fact – and this is the important point – we certainly do 
not have an answer in light of the fact that property inheritance and the ban on 
                                                 
5 Cf., Bennett asking “Why do composites inherit their properties [from] their parts?” (2015, 257) 
6 À la Numerical CAI. 
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multi-location are given as part of what it means to say that composition is like 
identity. It would be circular to ‘explain’ those phenomena in terms of 
composition as identity. (2015, 257)7 
Bennett too notes that Lewis disavows the indiscernibility of the whole and its parts, even though in 
his “rough characterization of the fourth analogy [he] makes it sound as though he thinks that both 
identity and composition obey Leibniz’s Law: as though he thinks that the properties of a thing are 
the very same as the properties of its parts.” (Bennett 2015, 257) Her statement of the notion of 
property inheritance is intended to reflect that Lewis does affirm that “What’s true of the many is 
not exactly what’s true of the one.” (1991, 87) 
 If someone thought that Lewis’s retreat into Analogous CAI and not-quite-identity here 
might help him avoid the conclusion that mixed fusions have members, it is time to emphasise that 
with regards to mixed fusions it is unclear what Lewis thinks is true of them that is relevantly 
related to their parts at all, and it has to be at least something for the claim of analogy to even hold. 
Recall that Lewis explicitly doesn’t think that mixed fusions can be members (as seen in Chapter 2), 
so they must be relevantly unlike individuals in some respect, and he does not explicitly go along 
with any notion that they can have members, so they must be relevantly unlike classes in that 
respect. 
 The former is not such a big deal because being a member is more of an external relation 
than an intrinsic property, but the latter is incredible to accept because sets and classes as we usually 
understand them have nothing else about them that is significant in terms of their intrinsic 
properties besides their members. So even if what’s true of the many is not exactly what’s true of 
the one we are left to wonder what else CAI could be doing for Lewis in the instances of any mixed 
fusion’s composition situation being like identity, other than entailing that mixed fusions have 
members. If mixed fusions do not have members in this instance, the claim to any of the forms of 
CAI being the case are severely undermined because there seems to be no other features of 
sets/classes that could be employed to make even the analogy of identity stick. 
 To see a case where what’s true of the many is not exactly what’s true of the one, the easy 
discernibility any mixed fusion has to any purely class parted class, in this context, is that each has 
the property of having individual(s) for part(s), where each of the pure classes do not. Similarly, the 
easy discernibility any mixed fusion has to any purely individual parted individual is that each has 
                                                 
7 To be clear, property inheritance is not necessarily a consequence solely of CAI views, as one could assert property 
inheritance without resorting to CAI type claims, even if they are good candidates for explaining it. They would just 
need an alternate justification, which is the point Bennett makes here. 
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the property of having class parts, where each of the pure individuals do not. This is enough to go 
along with Lando and pare back Lewis’s position to one of Analogous CAI. It also seems to be a 
case where the collective properties of the proper parts are still inherited by the whole. But 
considering that this sort of situation is all that might reasonably be implied by Lewis’s denial of the 
sharing of all of the same truths for a one composed by many, it is not as if any of the significant 
properties of the proper parts are the ones being unmatched in the whole. 
 In this instance, look again at Sider (2007), who says that the property inheritance 
principles, which “everyone accepts”, means that the “intrinsic nature” of the part is “reflected” in 
the whole (2007, 70). The only credible way for the intrinsic natures of the class parts to be 
reflected in mixed fusions is for the mixed fusion to have the members too. To put mixed fusions on 
the memberless side of the division here is to plainly not reflect the intrinsic natures of their class 
parts. Even if their not having members is not the sole intrinsic nature of some individuals, or even 
something of their intrinsic nature at all, having members certainly is the intrinsic nature of classes. 
Classes do not really have any other intrinsic features besides which members are theirs. They will 
be related to many other classes if they are their members, but this is generally understood to be an 
external relation, and not something intrinsic to the things which are the members (and hence why 
any individual’s membered/member status may not be considered intrinsic for it either). Recalling 
our tables of the four logical divisions into the things which have members and are members, to put 
mixed fusions in the fourth division as anti-members is akin to obstructing the natures of their parts 
from ‘shining through’. 
 Besides this, it is the case that how Lewis portrays the plural classes as having their 
members is something that is also applicable to how mixed fusions would be understood to have 
members. First I will show how plural classes have members under Lewis’s system, and then finish 
this main section off explaining how mixed fusions should be said to have them too, so as to be 
consistent with the understanding for how plural classes have their members as put forth by Lewis. 
3.2.3 How Lewis says plural classes have members 
On the idea of plural classes having their members via their singleton parts, Lewis’s discussion of 
one of the consequences of the Main Thesis – that the parts of a class are all and only its subclasses 
– is revealing. 
A class has its singleton subclasses as atomic parts, one for each of its 
members. It usually has other parts that are not singletons, namely subclasses 
with more than one member. However, if x is part of a class y, then x must have 
one or more singletons as parts, else x could have no members, could not be a 
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class, and so could not be a subclass of y. In fact x must consist entirely of 
singletons, else the rest of x would be a part of y with no singletons as parts, so 
a part of a class that is not a subclass. A class is the union, and hence the 
fusion, of the singletons of its members. (1991, 15-6) (my emphasis) 
While the penultimate sentence is a consequence of the Main Thesis, the portion I have emphasised 
is the one which I think suggests that plural classes inherit their members from their singleton parts. 
Here, it is the expectation that some x could have no members unless it has one or more singletons 
as parts which is suggestive that having singletons (which have members) for parts is why plural 
classes have members. Lewis furthers this suggestiveness later on when he characterises the 
singletons “that are the building blocks of all classes” as that which is “distinctively set-theoretical” 
(1991, 31), as opposed to the gathering of ‘many into one’ in the case of plural classes which is 
distinctively mereological. Lewis also expressly treats the formation of plural classes as a result of 
GEM coupled with the existence of their component singletons, saying that “all classes are fusions 
of singletons, and nothing over and above the singletons they’re made of [...] We understand how 
bigger classes are composed of their singleton atoms. That’s the easy part: just mereology.” (1991, 
31) As Lewis even incorporates some of a common CAI slogan here that composites are ‘nothing 
over and above’ their parts when it comes to describing plural classes, we are brought directly to the 
idea that the plural classes inherit the collective members of their singleton parts. 
 Yet if a plural class only has members as a result of a mereological phenomenon involving 
what its parts are, then it is not because it is a class that it has members, but rather it is because it 
has members that it is a class8 – and on Lewis’s account it has members only because some of its 
other parts do too. This notion is also conveyed in Lewis’s supplied (re)definitions for classes and 
membership, which come in the text after the proof given for the Second Thesis, and which are 
meant to be in line with his Main Thesis following the aforementioned proof. While his earlier 
informal definition of a class was as a thing that has members (Lewis 1991, 4), Lewis’s redefinition 
relies on taking the notion of a singleton henceforth as primitive. 
Redefinition A class is any fusion of singletons. (1991, 16) 
Following this redefinition, Lewis then proposes a definition of membership, which has been up to 
this point taken as primitive, and writes in a restriction to classes as just defined. 
Membership x is a member of y iff y is a class and the singleton of x is part of y. (1991, 16) 
                                                 
8 Singletons are a good example of this sentiment. 
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So, reading this via the redefinition of classes, we get x is a member of y iff y is a fusion of 
singletons and the singleton of x is part of y. It is this last clause which I find telling, as it affirms 
that it is the singletons which are a part of some fusion which ‘bring the members’, as it were. It is 
not a mereological phenomenon which supports the singletons having their own members, however. 
While these are said to be mereologically atomic and only have themselves as parts, under Lewis’s 
system, they are seen by Lewis to have their members “mysteriously” (Lewis 1991, Chapter 2), as it 
is notoriously difficult to metaphysically pin down why any singleton has the specific member that 
it does, even as we do somehow understand what it means to speak of singletons (1991, 59).9 This 
notion of mystery fits the idea that plural classes inherit their members from the singletons which 
are their proper parts especially well when Lewis affirms that ‘the trouble with classes’10 is 
something which afflicts the plural classes in virtue of singletons. As Lewis puts it, “Singletons, and 
therefore all classes, are profoundly mysterious.” (1991, 57) 
 Although Lewis has restricted his definition of membership in such a way as to preclude 
mixed fusions from having members, the restriction is unfounded without a good defence of the 
Main Thesis, which Lewis’s proof for the Second Thesis was supposed to secure, as the Main 
Thesis is expected to be a conjunction of the First and the Second Thesis (1991, 6). Putting aside 
Nolan’s (2002) very acceptable explanation of how Lewis’s proof for the Second Thesis fails, my 
issue with Lewis having defined membership by writing in a restriction to classes as fusions of 
singletons is that this restriction is inconsistent with the attitude which Lewis clearly gives for how 
plural classes are said to have their members via a form of CAI, and is thereby inconsistent with 
Lewis’s view of composites and their properties in general. 
3.2.4 How mixed fusions have members 
If we sought to fix this inconsistency we might propose a general principle ‘G’, that if a class is a 
part of something, that any thing(s) which it is a part of has its member(s) as member(s) too. We 
might also give a definition of membership which essentially says that for one thing to have a 
singleton as a part is for that thing to have that singleton’s member as its own. While Lewis’s 
restriction makes sense if, as he asserts, we probably would not want to say that mixed fusions have 
members, the restriction does not make sense with regards to how the plural classes are said to have 
their members. Without the restriction to classes as defined above, a definition of membership 
which is similar to Lewis’s would easily cover mixed fusions having members. For instance: x is a 
member of y iff the singleton of x is part of y. What this definition amounts to is that some x is a 
member of some y iff y has some part that has x as a member. And this is indeed the sentiment 
                                                 
9 This is why singletons have been taken as primitive in the system, after all. 
10 The title of his Chapter 2. 
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Lewis seeks to endorse for what I will call, for the lack of a better word, the expected ‘plain’ 
classes, that is, classes which do not have any individuals as parts. 
 The general principle G serves to illustrate a further point about membership inheritance. If 
an entity with a member composes some composite whole with that member, then an entity without 
a member also composes a composite whole without that member. Which is both to say that class 
parts bring only their own members with them in cases of fusion; and that the so-called ‘plain’ 
individuals – which we will say are things which do not have any classes as parts – already 
inherited the members of their plain individual parts, all zero of them.11 This conception entails that, 
when the plain entities mix, either with the plain things of their type, or with the plain entities of 
another type, that their fusions inherit the members of each of their parts too. We already know that 
the other things with singletons for parts, at least, are the mixed fusions, which too are purely a 
result of unrestricted composition, in the given context, and the existence of their components. Such 
an idea as the one given here enables mixed fusions to be classes via Lewis’s presentations, because 
they inherit any of the members of their parts. 
 This idea also lets us see how we can prevent the obstruction of the natures of certain 
composites parts from ‘shining through’. In the case of a mixed fusion, which is the composite of at 
least one class and one individual, for the individual part to ‘shine through’ would be for that to not 
add any members to the mixed fusion. We don’t add that it would also mean that the mixed fusion 
is a member just like its individual part, because this is an external function which follows strict 
conditions, as seen in Chapter 2. For the class part to ‘shine through’ would be for that to add its 
members to the mixed fusion. Which is to say, similarly to before, where classes have the property 
of having m members, and m > 0, and individuals have the property of having n members, and n = 
0, mixed fusions of classes and individuals will inherit the property of having m+n members, taking 
numerical values of m and n from all of its proper parts both additively and idempotently,12 just as it 
does in the case of classes with only class parts under Lewis’s system. 
 In this sense, for the property of having zero members in an individual part to conjoin with a 
property of having m > 0 members in a class part, and for both to be properly reflected in the whole 
of a mixed fusion, is for the mixed fusion to have the property of having m > 0 members, which 
entails that the mixed fusion is a class. 
                                                 
11 Compare Lewis describing the null set and the non-mereological notion of inclusion, “To be sure, the null set is 
included in any class x: all its members – all none of them – are among x’s members.” (1991, 10) 
12 Idempotence in the mathematical sense of when an operation is performed by an element on itself, and it returns the 
element itself, i.e., an unchanged value. For more on the concept of idempotence in mereological contexts, see Cotnoir 
(2015). 
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 We can almost hear Lewis express the idea behind this himself if we transpose the noun of 
his famous passage (1991, 81-2) on the ontological innocence of mereology – which he expects to 
follow on from the thesis of CAI – from ‘cats’ to ‘sets’. 
if we accept [classical] mereology, we are committed to the existence of all 
manner of mereological fusions. But given a prior commitment to [sets], say, a 
commitment to [set]-fusions is not a further commitment. The fusion is nothing 
over and above the [sets] that compose it. It just is them. They just are it. Take 
them together or take them separately, the [sets] are the same portion of Reality 
either way. Commit yourself to their existence all together or one at a time, it’s 
the same commitment either way. If you draw up an inventory of Reality 
according to your scheme of things, it would be double counting to list the 
[sets] and then also list their fusion. In general, if you are already committed to 
some things, you incur no further commitment when you affirm the existence 
of their fusion. The new commitment is redundant, given the old one. 
It is only almost hearing because it is really both individuals and sets/classes that fit the bill for 
mixed fusions. But the point stands. If a composite is nothing ‘further’, nothing ‘over and above’ its 
parts – if it ‘just is’ the parts – then how could composites which have singletons as parts not have 
the very things which are the members of those singletons as their members also? As this is more or 
less how Lewis portrays the plain plural classes having their members, as inheriting them from their 
atomic singleton proper parts, it is not credible to think that mixed fusions wouldn’t be doing the 
same thing. This is because the conditions claimed for compositional identicality, analogous or 
otherwise, for the property of having members across the plural classes are the same conditions for 
compositional identicality as they are for the mixed fusions. Which means that, on Lewis’s account 
and yet contrary to the Second and Main Thesis, mixed fusions have members and are thereby 
classes.13 
3.3 Why mixed fusions should not have members 
Having established that Lewis’s CAI thesis permits there to be classes with non-class parts, what 
are we to say now about his Second Thesis? Is he not entitled to object to my claim that via his 
views on composition there are mixed fusions that have members, and object based on his 
advocating the Second Thesis? The trouble with this line of response, of course, is that the Second 
Thesis being true would work further against the plausibility of the CAI theses we have 
                                                 
13 I note here that if this consequence is to hold that much of what is discussed in Chapter 2 needs to be re-evaluated to 
see how the issues highlighted there could be affected. 
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encountered, because there would be a serious mismatch in the properties of the whole and of the 
parts amongst mixed fusions. The Second Thesis being true makes CAI fail. 
 So we come to a dilemma. Are mixed fusions the way Lewis baldly asserts – non-members, 
and memberless – or are they the way his CAI thesis implies? If mixed fusions do exist in the way 
Lewis attests then concepts of property inheritance presumed to be of a piece with CAI are false, or 
at least, are not universal – a serious problem for accepting CAI in general. If mixed fusions do not 
exist in the manner that Lewis attests, and are in fact classes in virtue of having members, then a 
significant problem arises involving the contradiction of the Extensionality axiom of set theory, a 
problem which I will turn to now. 
3.3.1 Sets offender 
Even if Lewis’s proof of it fails, this of course does not mean that the Second Thesis is not true. So, 
our next step is to offer a new argument for its acceptance. Before doing so it is helpful to note that 
even though Lewis’s defence of the Second Thesis tends towards accepting the expanded version of 
the Main Thesis, in defending the Second Thesis alone this is not required, as will be shown below. 
 The argument I give for the truth of the Second Thesis (in terms of proposals for Lewis-style 
parthood structure for classes) can be aided easily by a small mereological model of some 
composite entities which have both class and non-class parts, as shown 
{a, b}i 
 
{a, b}  {a}i  {b}i 
 
{a}    {b}       i 
Figure 3.1 Model A. 
Like with the models from an earlier chapter, read the lines going up the page as representing 
relations of proper parthood from the underlying elements to the overlying elements of the model. 
 On Model A14 the mixed fusion {a, b}i of the singletons {a} and {b} and the individual i, is 
a class on the supposition that the Second Thesis is false. This means that while {a, b}i and {a, b} 
are different classes mereologically, in being different entities, they are in fact identical classes set 
                                                 
14 Which violates the First Thesis in that {a, b}i is a subclass of {a, b}, per hypothesi, yet not a part of it. 
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theoretically, because both of them only have the members a and b. This is unacceptable due to a 
key set-theoretic axiom of Extensionality being violated. This is an axiom which Lewis endorses, 
rendering it as the principle which states that no two classes have the same members (1991, 100), 
and it is the key axiom for the identity of classes. In this instance two (mereologically) different 
classes have the same members, violating Extensionality. 
 Perhaps, if there were one, some proponent of the Second Thesis being false in this context15 
might resist my conclusion here, and they might insist that although these are different entities 
mereologically, for having different parts, they are still the same class, for having the same 
members. And this proponent might follow through on this insistence as being revelatory, in that it 
leads to new frontiers of thinking about classes and mereology. Yet, although this case of a mixed 
fusion having the same members as its largest plain class part does appear to open up the possibility 
of the divorce of mereological identity from class identity, I leave it up to that proponent of the 
Second Thesis being false to explore this notion. I instead insist in opposition that some facet of 
difference is enough to make this a clear case of a violation against the axiom of the adopted class 
theory. 
 My objection here, then, is that following GEM’s principle of mereological uniqueness, the 
mixed fusions and their largest plain class parts are different entities because of their different parts, 
tout court, which means that they are different classes but with the same members, a clear violation 
of the axiom of Extensionality. Lewis informally describes the principle of the Uniqueness of 
Composition as that it never happens that the same things have two different fusions (1991, 74), 
which, in some of the more formalised presentations of GEM (which Lewis 1991, 73 does cite),16 is 
known as Strong Supplementation. This is the condition that if y is not part of x, then y has some 
part z that does not overlap x – which results in mereological fusions being extensional and unique. 
I offer that we take the spirit of class Extensionality at face value, and recognise that even if it is not 
explicit in its mereological considerations, that it is meaning to suggest that the entity is unique, in 
being the only entity with such members. With all of this I think it is fair to say that mixed fusions 
having the members that their largest plain class parts have is a conclusion that nobody should want 
to reach (and as far as I can tell, nobody currently does endorse such a conclusion), unless they are 
willing to completely redefine set/class theory, and thereby much of modern mathematics. 
                                                 
15 The qualification of ‘in this context’ is important here because there are many proposals of non-GEM 
mereologisations of set theory where classes are said to have non-class parts. See, e.g., Katz (1998), Fine (2010), 
Caplan et al. (2010) and McElhoes (2017). 
16 See, e.g., Simons “SA5” (1987, 1.4). 
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 Therefore the best defence that I can think to give of the Second Thesis is that it prohibits 
Extensionality violations in the case of Lewis-style parthood structure for classes. If its falsehood 
were to allow the sorts of cases as represented by Model A, then because these violate the 
extensionality of sets and classes, the Second Thesis is best offered as a means to avoid such 
violations. To be sure, the Second Thesis is not something which can be shown to govern other 
class conditions on purpose, however. So although it may be best to hold it following a requirement 
to avoid violations of Extensionality, the Second Thesis does not directly prevent these violations if 
there are other conditions already in place which achieve the same effect. This is seen in the fact 
that the Second Thesis is satisfiable in less structured cases of parthood among classes, such as if all 
classes are only mereological atoms (e.g., The only part any class has is itself), or if classes are not 
mereological at all (e.g., No class has any part that is not a class, because no class has any parts). 
So, if classes were to have only improper parts, or even no parts at all, the Second Thesis would still 
be able to be true. This shows that any prohibitive effect of the Second Thesis on Extensionality 
violations is only valuable in cases where this is even plausible, such as in Lewis’s proposed 
mereological structure for classes. 
 I stated earlier that a host of new difficulties arise if mixed fusions have members, and this is 
that the standard set and class theories would be declared literally false, and not the whole story 
about how their sort of membership operates. Clearly Lewis should have no truck with this, as 
throughout Parts of Classes he states an intention to take mathematics as it is found, rather than 
mutilating it to suit philosophy (e.g., 1991, 58-59). This is in addition to stating that the 
mathematical aspect of the work, and its mereological enterprise, is not supposed to run afoul of 
ordinary mathematical practice in any way (1991, vii). Rather, the point is to show that there “is 
more mereology in set theory than we usually think.” (1991, vii) In his promoting realism about 
classes and their parts, Lewis’s aim is to show that the philosopher’s mereology is globally 
compatible and consistent with the mathematician’s set/class theory, and that neither system needs 
to be revised in light of the other. 
 But if it is not permissible for mixed fusions to have members without violations of set/class 
theory, what are we to make of the evidence from CAI which suggests that they do? 
3.4 Resisting mixed fusions as classes 
By now it should be clear that the problem I am having here is with how something like a mixed 
fusion could be so radically different to its parts – especially in the context of CAI. To go along 
with Lewis’s express attitude towards mixed fusions, however, would actually undermine his 
endorsement of composition as many-one identity. This is because he describes mixed fusions as at 
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least not really like and at most nothing like their parts, especially by saying things about them 
which imply that they are anti-members, and also by asserting that they are the lone type of thing in 
the fourth division of membership, the sole anti-members (following our membership division 
Table 2.4 displaying Lewis’s positions in Chapter 2). I concur with Lando (2017) that “if the 
analogy between composition and identity has any content—it seems unavoidable that the features 
of the whole and the features of the parts are strictly connected, either by Indiscernibility or in a 
weaker ... way.” (2017, 206) 
 I think the dilemma faced by proponents of CAI in conjunction with any mereology which 
accommodates mixed fusions – so not just GEM if some other systems do accommodate them – is 
whether to restrict the mereology so that mixed fusions are not formed by composition, such as by 
denying that GEM is absolutely general/universal/topic-neutral; or otherwise to reject CAI. I 
suspect that there is no plausible option to restrict CAI from being absolutely 
general/universal/topic-neutral, and this is because the identity relation itself is the pinnacle of 
claims to absolute generality, universality and topic-neutrality (cf., Uzquiano 2006). Also, aside 
from it being an ad hoc response, to permit CAI to be non-absolute under these circumstances 
seems like it would amount to restricting identity to be non-absolute too, making this an implausible 
move for proponents of CAI. This to me suggests that CAI ought to be rejected, if the mereology is 
not otherwise restricted. 
 For Lewis, to reject CAI would also be to lose one of his defensive supports for the 
acceptance of GEM.17 For example, he argues that  
whenever there are some things, they have a fusion. Whenever! It doesn’t 
matter how many or disparate or scattered or unrelated they are. [...] There is 
still a fusion. So I am committed to all manner of unheard-of things: trout-
turkeys, fusions of individuals and classes, all the world’s styrofoam, and 
many, many more. [...] It is no problem to describe an unheard-of fusion. It is 
nothing over and above its parts, so to describe it you need only describe the 
parts. Describe the character of the parts, describe their interrelation, and you 
have ipso facto described the fusion. [...] Its character is exhausted by the 
character and relations of its parts. (1991, 79-80) 
Lando (2017) offers an interpretation of “a fusion is nothing over and above the fused entities” as 
meaning “that the fusion has no feature that its parts lack.” (2017, 204) Further to this is the more 
                                                 
17 Not that CAI is necessary for GEM (Lewis 1991 just uses it as a key support for it). See Lando (2017) for discussion 
and criticism of the notion that CAI is necessary for GEM. 
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positive aspect of the interpretation, that the fusion also has features of its parts, which is echoed 
above in Lewis saying “to describe [a fusion] you need only describe the parts” – which to me is 
another clear indication that mixed fusions should be seen to have the members of their class parts 
under CAI. To not forget the other facets of the CAI claim, here, however – if the mixed fusion is a 
composite of a plain class and a plain individual which is a cat, say, then the identity of the cat will 
contribute to the identity of the mixed fusion too. In this case the mixed fusion will be a cattish 
thing which has members, yet not solely a cat: a cattish class, perhaps. No doubt this fits the bill as 
being an unheard-of-thing, much like a trout-turkey. 
 Considering that the domains in which mereology is usually or more commonly applied to 
are those involving material objects, or otherwise spatial domains, it is understandable that one may 
seek to eliminate any problems involving mixed fusions by restricting GEM’s absolute universality, 
thereby losing mixed fusions altogether, rather than rejecting CAI. Especially when this specific 
problem for CAI is not being found within more ordinary mereological domains, and only in more 
exotic mixed ones. 
 Lando (2017), for instance, remarks that if absolutely universal applications of GEM lead to 
undesirable consequences it is worth restricting mereological universality, which is what he opts to 
do for reasons not involving mixed fusions. Lewis, however, offers no such restriction, and GEM 
has no explicit restrictions of this kind intrinsic to it. Here it appears that Lewis does not have a 
credible out under these circumstances that does not involve dropping one of his major 
commitments. As the attitude we’re following here is that of Lewis explicitly saying “of course, 
nothing has two singletons” (1991, 15), I advance the rejection of CAI as illegitimate to hold 
universally, and thereby at all, because of class Extensionality violations. For one, if the mereology 
denies the entry of mixed fusions, then there is nothing left to talk about. For another, I think the 
problem we have encountered, of mixed fusions having the same members as their class parts, 
thereby violating class Extensionality, actually arises due to other notions supporting the CAI 
thesis, and not due to GEM specifically. Therefore it is CAI which is to be rejected in this 
contrastive instance, for being the culprit. 
 We can hear echoes of Lewis again in this proposal “there is no good independent reason to 
restrict composition. [Classical] Mereology per se is unproblematic, and not to blame for the set-
theoretical paradoxes; so it would be unduly drastic to stop the paradoxes by mutilating mereology, 
if there is any other remedy.” (Lewis 1991, 19) The better remedy, to start with, is to restrict not 
composition, but rather the CAI thesis, and in full. By this I mean that CAI should not be seen as 
something which is universal, and as universality is tied to it via claims to explaining identity, CAI 
cannot be said to hold in any case. But I don’t think this is the whole story here. The reason I said 
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CAI should be rejected to start with is because of the choice between CAI and GEM, and, in this 
instance, CAI looks to lose out as being the major reason class extensionality is violated. Yet, I have 
also suggested that property inheritance in general suggests that mixed fusions have the members of 
their class parts, whether or not this property inheritance is conditioned by a CAI thesis. To be clear, 
all CAI theses are understood to entail property inheritance, but not all property inheritance 
conceptions are understood to entail CAI. 
 This makes the problem of mixed fusions having the members of their class parts rear again 
anyway, but in slightly different circumstances. In this case we are now faced with a choice 
between GEM and property inheritance. In this instance, even though I would still say that property 
inheritance is the culprit, in that it is the reason why mixed fusions have the same members as their 
class parts, I advance that we restrict GEM instead, by restricting its composition principle, because 
it is the reason we even have to contend with mixed fusions. I think that this is an acceptable 
strategy in this case specifically because property inheritance is supposed to be a “fairly 
uncontroversial” notion which is “not really in need of argument” (recalling Bennett 2015), and one 
which “everyone accepts” (recalling Sider 2007). Contrast this with GEM and its principle of 
unrestricted composition which are fairly controversial18 and in need of significant justification – 
hence Lewis himself trying to support GEM by bringing in CAI (1991, 81-7). 
 To be clear, Lewis’s version of CAI consists in unrestricted composition as “the second 
aspect of the analogy” (1991, 85) with composition and identity, but as I have already mentioned it 
can be the case that other forms of composition could constitute a CAI-thesis together with other 
principles. The more straightforward version of my argument here, then, is that, as a package of 
principles, CAI is sufficient for mixed fusions with members – a situation which should be rejected 
by rejecting CAI. To elaborate, CAI is sufficient for mixed fusions with members by consisting in 
both unrestricted composition (or some other suitably liberal composition principle) and also 
property inheritance, among other principles. The suitable composition principle is necessary for the 
formation of mixed fusions but not sufficient for them to have members, whereas property 
inheritance is insufficient for the formation of mixed fusions on its own as it makes no claims to 
composition. However, property inheritance is sufficient for mixed fusions to have members in the 
case that mixed fusions are formed. Hence CAI is to be rejected primarily in being sufficient for the 
problem of mixed fusions having members, in being the package of theses that it is. 
 Consequently, if we consider a context which does not have the greater package of CAI in 
play, but still has both the right sort of composition principle and property inheritance remaining, 
                                                 
18 Witness the literature on the Special Composition Question, and the rejections of Universalism therein. 
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the question then arises of whether to reject the principle which is mereologically necessary but 
property-wise insufficient for mixed fusions having members (the composition principle) or to 
reject the principle which is only property-wise sufficient for mixed fusions having members, just in 
case the right sort of composition abounds. In the case of unrestricted composition I propose that we 
stick with the widely accepted property inheritance in favour of the controversial composition 
principle. Moreover, to rule out the problem of mixed fusions having members altogether, I propose 
that we deny any composition principle which will permit them – as I imagine any candidate 
principle which is able to permit mixed fusions will still be less acceptable than property 
inheritance. In this way, if we start in a context of property inheritance being accepted then we 
should brook no composition principle which will result in mixed fusions having members. 
 The further difference between the two dilemmas given here is that CAI can itself be 
controversial in other contexts, so the dilemma present between it and GEM is more on par. But 
because GEM can be endorsed without CAI (Lando 2017), one can be rejected in place of the other 
too. And although GEM could be endorsed without property inheritance too, it does not appear to 
be the case that anybody does so, and I see no good reason to challenge such a conventional notion 
as property inheritance by upholding GEM instead. This is even though, without property 
inheritance, set and class theory are not violated in the manner described, and things like mixed 
fusions are able to be radically different to their parts. To insist to keep GEM after rejecting CAI, 
then, is tantamount to rejecting property inheritance, and this looks to be far less justifiable than 
restricting GEM in this instance. Therefore, the problem of mixed fusions having the same members 
as their class parts sounds like a good, independent reason to restrict composition principles which 
permit mixed fusions, such as GEM’s unrestricted composition. In this way, mixed fusions do not 
have members, and thereby do not violate class extensionality, because mixed fusions do not exist. 
3.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter I argued against a kind of mereological hybridism found in mixed fusions of classes 
and individuals, their key difference of one type of entity being membered, and the other type not 
being membered. I presented an argument to the effect that if one thing has zero members, and 
another thing has one member, their fusion should have one member – a conclusion which I 
claimed follows on from our ordinary conception of property inheritance. The problem with this 
conclusion, however, is that it results in violations of standard membership theory axioms of 
Extensionality, where classes are uniquely defined by their members. To maintain the restriction 
against more than one thing having the same collection of members I advanced that composition 
principles and systems which allow the fusion of memberless and membered things should be 
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rejected. Throughout the chapter I also discussed Lewis’s assessment that mixed fusions do not 
have members, given his Second Thesis which engenders that result, and showed how these do not 
succeed against his claims to the thesis of CAI. From this I argued that Lewis is forced to deny this 
composition thesis, and thereby lose one of his main supports for accepting GEM in the first place, 
a system which I further ended up rejecting anyway for its permitting of mixed fusions. 
 Although I believe these issues over memberless and membered composites are a 
compelling reason for the rejection of mixed fusions and their supporting conditions on their own – 
as this feature of theirs is one which is guaranteed – this situation only presents one form of 
mereological hybridism worth resisting. Other aspects of mereological hybridism that merit 
consideration and rejection, and which are plausibly found in the case of mixed fusions, are 
presented in the chapters to follow, which together reinforce the rejection of mixed fusions here as 
one of the many components of a robust cumulative argument against a variety of mereological 
hybridisms in general. 
 In the next chapter I argue against a recent claim that mixed fusions are grounded by their 
proper parts, and claim that they are better off regarded as grounding entities instead, if at all. 
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Chapter 4 
Grounding the mixed 
mereological Universe 
108 
4.0 Introduction 
In Chapter 1 I explained that when it comes to mixed fusions that these are rarely, if ever, given 
more than a cursory treatment in the literature, and that they are frequently treated in a dismissive 
manner – even by the one who introduced them, David Lewis. In this chapter we are going to look 
at one of the rare cases which go against this norm, and one that is very recent. This comes in 
Trogdon and Cowling’s (2019) defence of abstract atomism, which is the view that abstract entities, 
insofar as they have proper parts, are grounded in their proper parts. That paper goes against the 
normal attention given to mixed fusions because it explicitly relies on a positive conception of 
mixed fusions to argue for the abstract atomist position. 
 In this chapter, what I set out to do is provide a critical assessment of Trogdon and 
Cowling’s claims, and to point out where I think their discussion goes right, where it goes wrong, 
and what I think they miss. Roughly, I will show that, although they mostly focus on mixed fusions 
with only abstracta for proper parts, and which they claim are grounded in their proper parts, 
Trogdon and Cowling’s arguments also carry over to mixed fusions in general, including cases 
where these would have concreta proper parts too. From here I argue that if mereological gunk – 
i.e., any entity which has proper parts all of which have proper parts (so no mereological atoms) – is 
included in the account then we arrive at an ontology with conflicting grounding directions. This is 
because, in this case, and due to unrestricted composition, there would be things grounded in their 
proper parts (the abstract mixed fusions) fused with things that are not grounded in their proper 
parts (the gunk), resulting in the contradiction of mixed fusions which are both grounded and not 
grounded by their proper parts. With Trogdon and Cowling admitting that they “take the possibility 
of concrete gunky objects seriously” (2019, 2037 fn 22), my claim is that by following the 
consequences of their grounding proposal, along with fairly expanding the examination of mixed 
fusions to their general case across the entirety of Reality, and also by allowing for concrete gunk in 
the system, that their position is turned on its head. 
 Specifically I will argue that as this kind of expansion would either lead to mixed fusions 
not being properly grounded in their proper parts (contradicting Trogdon and Cowling’s proposal), 
or worse – mereological gunk which grounds entities (which goes against the usual conception of 
gunk as having no basis to ground from) – that the best remaining grounding result is one wherein 
the mereological Universe as a mixed fusion is grounding of everything else. Such that it is a 
grounder of, rather than grounded by, its proper parts. In addition to this I will demonstrate how, 
regardless of gunk, the generalised expansion of Trogdon and Cowling’s proposal actually leaves 
their view open to other criticisms which undermine their grounding scheme entirely – along with 
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any prospects of there being such a mixed fusion as the mereological Universe that is grounded or 
grounding as described. 
4.1 The projects of foundationalism 
To start, Trogdon and Cowling set out what the expected task of ontological foundationalism is, 
that of identifying which existents ground other existents but are not themselves grounded by 
anything. Trogdon and Cowling note that usually the project of ontological foundationalism focuses 
specifically on the thesis of concrete foundationalism, which has the task of identifying not just 
what existents ground what other existents, but specifically which concreta ground other concreta 
but are not themselves grounded by any concreta. They claim that there is potentially more to the 
story of ontological foundationalism when it comes to the consideration of abstract entities, and 
they offer another thesis of abstract foundationalism, which has the task of identifying which 
abstracta ground other abstracta but are not themselves grounded by any abstracta. 
 Amongst both foundationalisms runs the common thread of inquiry over whether the 
grounding elements are either mereological atoms or mereological wholes, with the usual positions 
involving what the grounding elements are being called atomic or monist positions respectively. So 
while an atomic foundationalist will claim that the existents which ground other existents but are 
not themselves grounded by anything are mereological atoms, which are the proper parts of those 
other existents, a monist foundationalist will claim that the existent which grounds other existents 
but is not itself grounded by anything is a mereological whole, which is the mereological sum of all 
of the other existents. 
 What Trogdon and Cowling argue for explicitly is the superiority of an abstract atomic 
foundationalist position over an abstract monist foundationalist one. To get there, they first 
introduce category-relative conceptions of fundamentality and grounding for both abstracta and 
concreta. With regards to concreta, they say that an entity is c-grounded just in case it is grounded 
by concreta, and an entity is c-fundamental just in case it is not c-grounded (2019, 2030). Similarly, 
with regards to abstracta, they say that an entity is a-grounded just in case it is grounded by 
abstracta, and an entity is a-fundamental just in case it is not a-grounded (2019, 2031). Note that 
this clearly entails both that any concreta which is not a-grounded is a-fundamental and that any 
abstracta which is not c-grounded is c-fundamental. This will be important later. 
 With these conceptual distinctions in place, they then say that an entity is complex just in 
case it has proper parts, and an entity is simple just in case it isn’t complex (2019, 2033). Having 
assumed what I will (in Chapter 5) call the homeomereity theses with regards to concreta, wherein 
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these only have concreta for parts, and also for abstracta, wherein these only have abstracta for parts 
(2019, 2033 fn 11), Trogdon and Cowling’s next step is to say that, with regards to a totality 
concretum, x is the “cosmos” just in case x is concrete and, for any y, y is concrete and numerically 
distinct from x just in case y is a proper part of x. In terms of a totality abstractum they say, x is the 
“amalgam” just in case x is abstract and, for any y, y is abstract and numerically distinct from x just 
in case y is a proper part of x. From here they formulate the theses of atomism and monism in both 
their abstracta and concreta variants. 
Concrete atomism there are multiple simple concreta, any simple concrete entity is  
   c-fundamental, and any complex concrete entity decomposes into simple 
   concreta such that the latter ground the former. (2019, 2033) 
Concrete monism there is a cosmos that is c-fundamental, and any concrete entity numerically
   distinct from the cosmos is grounded by it. (2019, 2033) 
Abstract atomism there are multiple simple abstracta, any simple abstract entity is  
   a-fundamental, and any complex abstract entity decomposes into simple 
   abstracta such that the latter ground the former. (2019, 2033) 
Abstract monism there is an amalgam that is a-fundamental, and any abstract entity  
   numerically distinct from the amalgam is grounded by it. (2019, 2034) 
To be precise, Trogdon and Cowling actually name the concrete theses ‘priority’ atomism and 
monism, respectively, following the usual naming in the literature which comes from Schaffer 
(2009; 2010). However, these are names which I find a bit misleading in the context of there being a 
proposal for both a concrete atomism/monism and an abstract atomism/monism, because these 
theses already do actually specify what types of entity they are making claims about. I reserve the 
less specific ‘priority atomism’ and ‘priority monism’ for the following theses, which make no 
explicit commitment to things being either concrete or abstract specifically. 
Priority atomism there are multiple simple entities, any simple entity is fundamental, and any
   complex entity decomposes into simple entities such that the latter ground the
   former. 
Priority monism there is a unique mereological Universe that is fundamental, and any entity 
   numerically distinct from the mereological Universe is grounded by it. 
All of these theses can be accommodated by the two main views of composition found in the 
literature, that of mereological nihilism, which denies the existence of composite entities, and that 
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of mereological universalism, which asserts that for any two things there is a composite of them. 
Nihilism and universalism, for short, clearly diverge, but they are each able to accommodate 
atomistic and monistic theses. Nihilism does so by distinguishing between plurality nihilism and 
singular nihilism. Plurality nihilism takes the atomistic clause that there are multiple simple entities 
yet has an empty value for the term ‘complex entity’, such that even if it is true that “any complex 
entity decomposes into simple entities”, as there are no complex entities on this view the 
consequence is irrelevant. Singular nihilism accommodates the monistic theses by taking the 
monistic clauses that there is either a cosmos, an amalgam, or a unique mereological Universe, and 
it is just that this is the only existent, making it mereologically atomic and without proper parts. 
 Although usually a mereological Universe is described as a complex entity which is the 
singular totality whole which has every other existent as a proper part, all it needs to be is the thing 
which has all existents as parts, either proper or improper. In having only itself as a part, and an 
improper one, a single mereological atom can be a mereological Universe under this conception, 
even if it is only one thing which has no proper parts, as in Horgan and Potrč’s (2000; 2008) 
‘blobject’. Such an atom is still a mereological Universe insofar as it is the singular mereological 
totality of all things. As there are no entities which are numerically distinct from the mereological 
Universe on such a view, the consequence of these being grounded by the mereological Universe is 
irrelevant. 
 Universalism can accommodate any of the atomistic and monistic theses by the fact that it 
permits both simple and complex entities. As a thesis about composition, universalism is most 
commonly associated with the standard theory of parthood relations, GEM, with its presentation of 
the principle of unrestricted composition therein. What sets GEM and universalism apart from 
mereological nihilism, besides the acceptance of composites, is their ability to accommodate either 
atoms or gunk, or a mixed system of both atoms and gunk. Any entity which is entirely gunky is 
mereologically infinitely divisible, as all of its proper parts have proper parts, to the point that there 
are no mereological atoms or simples among its parts. Yet it is supposed that some things may be 
only partially gunky, in that they have at least some atoms as parts, yet are otherwise composed of 
other entirely gunky elements. As stated, GEM is able to be formalised to accommodate any of 
these options (for details see Simons 1987; Varzi 2016). 
4.2 Abstracta and sets 
To return towards explaining how Trogdon and Cowling explicitly argue for the superiority of an 
abstract atomic foundationalist position over an abstract monist foundationalist one, we note that 
their next step is to embrace as a working hypothesis a set-theoretic conception of abstracta (2019, 
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2035). “On such a view, any abstract entity is either a set or something constructed from sets. As for 
the categories of abstracta, we assume that there are properties (monadic and n-adic), propositions, 
and mathematical entities.” (2019, 2035) 
 What this view allows is that while some abstracta are sets, not all abstracta need to be, but 
only if these are at least composed of sets. Which means that from the outset they deny that there 
are any mereologically simple abstracta which are not sets. I do not believe this is a necessary 
condition for their argument for abstract atomic foundationalism, however, as that argument only 
needs for there to be mixed fusions of non-empty sets and non-membered things, it is actually 
irrelevant to their argument whether the non-membered part of a mixed fusion is the empty set or 
not. We will come across this idea again in more detail later. For now, from embracing a set-
theoretic conception of abstracta Trogdon and Cowling go on to refer to Lewis’s (1991) proposal 
for the mereology of sets. 
We begin with [some] terminology. The empty set is the unique set without 
members. A non-empty set is any set distinct from the empty set. So a non-
empty set is either a singleton—a set with only one member—or a set with 
more than one member. Let one set be a subset* of another just in case the 
former is a subset of the latter and both are non-empty. So, while the empty set 
is a subset of any set, the empty set isn’t a subset* of any set; and, while there 
is one and only one set that’s a subset of the empty set (itself), no set is a 
subset* of the empty set. Lewis plausibly suggests that subsethood* is a special 
case of parthood—the parts of a non-empty set are all and only the non-empty 
subsets of that set. [...] The picture that emerges is this: any set is either 
complex or simple; a set is simple just in case it’s a singleton or the empty set; 
a set is complex just in case it’s a multi-membered set; and, since multi-
membered sets decompose into singletons of their members, any complex set 
decomposes into simple sets. Given Lewis’ metaphysics of sets and our 
assumption that abstract reality is set-theoretic in nature, all complex abstracta 
decompose into simple abstracta. Gunky abstracta—abstract entities such that 
all their parts have proper parts—are impossible. (2019, 2036-7) 
Note that within and around this nice summary of Lewis’s mereological system for sets, as 
explained in more detail in my earlier Chapter 1, Trogdon and Cowling diverge from Lewis’s 
account in several ways. For one, they focus on sets and do not incorporate classes (2019, 2036 fn 
20), and for another they treat the empty set as an abstract mereological atom while Lewis treated it 
as the mereological sum of all individuals, as in all non-membered members. They explicitly opt for 
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this view of the mereological character of the empty set for at least two reasons. The first being that, 
while singletons have no non-empty proper subsets, the empty set “has no proper subsets period, 
[so] it’s plausibly taken to be simple as well.” (2019, 2036) The second being that it comports with 
their proposal of abstract atomic foundationalism, whereby the empty set, along with all other 
abstract mereological atoms in the singletons form the grounds of the amalgam as the sum of all 
sets. 
 Indeed, Trogdon and Cowling explain how both Lewis’s and their acceptance of unrestricted 
composition allows for there to be a mereological sum of all abstracta, viz., the ‘amalgam’ as 
defined earlier. One mischaracterisation of Lewis they make, however, is to say that he suggests 
that the empty set is the ‘cosmos’ (2019, 2031 fn 26), as in the mereological sum of all and only 
concreta (as met earlier). Yet Lewis makes no such claim. Instead, Lewis opts for a characterisation 
of the empty set as the maximal sum of non-membered members – whether these be abstract or 
concrete or whatever – and does not constrain this to only be a singular cosmos at all.1 Lewis settles 
on this characterisation of the empty set because he thinks that at least something would exist to be 
able to stand for it/fulfil the role. Whereas if we were to select some arbitrary individual as the 
empty set, like one of his cats, say, then the contingency of that feline’s existence would be too 
precarious to base the entire foundation of set-theory upon (see 1991, 1.4 for the full discussion). 
This is especially in terms of the iterative conception of sets wherein the hierarchy of sets begins at 
the null set and goes through iterative stages of that being a member of a singleton, which is then a 
member of a singleton, and so on. But Lewis does not overtly commit to the individuals that exist 
being only concreta, and in fact makes no final determination either way (even if he has apparent 
preferences). He at best accepts the following 
Remember what an individual is: not necessarily a commonplace individual 
like Magpie or Possum, or a quark, or a space-time point, but anything 
whatever that has no members but is a member. If you believe in some 
remarkable non-classes – universals, tropes, abstract simple states of affairs, 
God, or what you will–it makes no difference. They’re still individuals, 
however remarkable, so long as they’re members of classes and not themselves 
classes. (Lewis 1991, 8-9) 
                                                 
1 This is expected to follow from Lewis’s (1986) account of the plurality of concrete worlds, in which there are 
infinitely many concrete cosmoi. Moreover, Lewis does not prohibit these concrete worlds from having abstract 
immanent universals as parts, making this allowance for the sake of not inadvertently precluding different theories of 
properties from the outset. All of which is to be discussed further in Chapter 5. 
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That being said, Lewis does distinguish between the maximal sum of individuals and the maximal 
sum of singletons/sets/classes, going so far as to say that “Reality itself – the mereological fusion of 
everything – [divides] into one part which is the most inclusive individual and another which is the 
most inclusive class.” (1991, 8) This means that one conceptual distinction between Trogdon and 
Cowling’s account and Lewis’s amounts to what they think the mereological Universe is maximally 
composed of. In Lewis’s case he thinks that it is composed of the most inclusive individual and the 
most inclusive class,2 whereas in Trogdon and Cowling’s case the mereological Universe appears to 
be composed of the maximal abstractum – the amalgam – and the maximal concretum – the 
cosmos. 
 While it is not clear from Lewis that the most inclusive class is the maximal abstractum nor 
that the most inclusive individual is the maximal concretum,3 it is clear for Trogdon and Cowling 
that the cosmos is the most inclusive composite of non-membered members (sans the empty set, and 
modulo my arguments for any mixed fusions as members). For them this means the cosmos is the 
sum of all individuals because they don’t classify the empty set as an individual (2019, 2036 fn 20), 
whereas their amalgam is not the most inclusive class, nor even the most inclusive set, as this has 
nothing to do with their avoiding specifically class-theoretic terminology (2019, 2036 fn 20).4 The 
amalgam is neither of these things for Trogdon and Cowling, and this is because the amalgam is a 
mixed fusion on their view – even without the empty set part being classified as an individual. Here 
is where an alternate view of mixed fusions as, at least, the sums of classes and singulates, as per 
my terminology in Chapter 2, looks to arise. Even with their terminological differentiation, 
however, because Trogdon and Cowling still treat the empty set as a held singulate, their view still 
incorporates mixed fusions in the manner of Lewis’s original account, viz., as the sums of 
individuals/held singulates and classes. 
 Unlike Lewis who accepts there being a most inclusive class, Trogdon and Cowling 
properly avoid the notion of there being a most inclusive set, permitting that the mereological sum 
of all non-empty sets may be something which isn’t itself a non-empty set (2019, 2037). They 
would still view this as an abstract entity, however, hence their specification earlier that any abstract 
entity is either a set or something constructed from sets (2019, 2035). Given a restricted version of 
my arguments in Chapter 3 though, I would insist that anything which resolves into only atomic 
singletons parts itself has members, pressuring Trogdon and Cowling’s account to accept that the 
                                                 
2 Which I dispute in Chapter 2 by arguing that some mixed fusions of individuals and classes are themselves properly 
characterised as individuals, in that they are non-membered, yet members of sets/classes. 
3 Nor does he appear to even be trying to endorse any position on this issue. 
4 Recall my discussion of the technical differences between sets and classes in Chapter 2. 
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mereological sum of all non-empty sets, even if it may be something which isn’t itself a non-empty 
set, is at least going to be a free class, instead of another kind of anti-member (which to me look 
similar to Nolan 2002’s mentioned fusions of classes which are not themselves classes). I expect 
that whether such a sum is a proper class or not depends on how many members it has, as well as 
other factors such as the limitation of size of sets, as discussed in Chapter 2. 
 The most important point for our purposes here though is that Trogdon and Cowling would 
not posit this sum of all non-empty sets as the most inclusive abstractum, inclusive in terms of 
parthood, and this is because it does not have the empty set as one of its parts. This entails that the 
sum of all non-empty sets is in fact a proper part of the amalgam, which is the most inclusive 
abstractum on their account. Trogdon and Cowling agree with this, and put forth that the amalgam 
is a mixed fusion which has abstract, atomic parts in the empty set and all singletons, and no other 
atomic parts (2019, 2037-8). 
4.3 Existence grounding, and grounding as a relation 
We are almost now in the territory of Trogdon and Cowling’s arguments for abstract atomism. 
Before we cross over we should look at an aspect of their discussion which would be an argument 
against abstract monism, if it weren’t for one of their express ideological commitments as well as 
what I take to be a flawed view they hold on the membership eligibility of mixed fusions. Early on 
in their paper Trogdon and Cowling advise that they make the assumption that grounding is not a 
relation, in the sense of it not being an entity which exists alongside other entities like tables and 
chairs (or numbers and classes), for instance. Instead they say they help themselves “to grounding 
as an element of our best metaphysical theories and an indispensable tool for stating facts about 
metaphysical structure”. (2019, 2030) 
 Why not treat grounding as a relation qua entity? For Trogdon and Cowling it is better to 
see it as a piece of ideology, in the vein of Kment, who says “It shouldn’t be assumed that all 
ingredients of reality must be individuals, properties, or relations—or entities of any kind, for that 
matter. For example, it’s possible that in order to describe reality completely, we need to use some 
primitive piece of ideology that relates to some aspect of reality that doesn’t belong to one of these 
three ontological categories, and which may not be an entity at all” (2014, 150). This allows them to 
avoid the expected questions of whether grounding as an entity faces a vicious regress, in terms of 
what grounds grounding, i.e., the “question of what abstracta if any ground the grounding relation 
itself” (2019, 2038 fn 26). It also means that for any particular grounding claims, these are not to be 
understood as making a claim that the grounder(s) stand in any particular relation to the 
groundee(s). As Trogdon and Cowling explain, “remember that the abstract monist claims that the 
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amalgam grounds its proper parts. So in making this claim, we shouldn’t interpret the abstract 
monist as claiming that the amalgam stands in a particular relation to its proper parts.” (2019, 2038) 
 Beyond the understandable desire to avoid difficult questions of regress management, 
Trogdon and Cowling also favour not treating grounding as a relation because were they “to treat 
grounding as a relation then abstract monism would be false, as the amalgam doesn’t stand in any 
relations.” (2019, 2038) They believe that the amalgam doesn’t stand in any relations because they 
believe that no mixed fusion stands in any relations, and they believe this notion because they think 
that no mixed fusion is eligible to be a member of any set. This is important following their set-
theoretic conception of properties which follows Lewis (1986), where to have a property or to stand 
in any relations is to be a member of some set (2019, 2038). Yet by the rules of set-formation which 
they heed in following Lewis’s (1991) formulation, it is implausible that no mixed fusions are 
members of sets. In Chapter 2 I argued that actually many mixed fusions can be members under 
Lewis’s system, even as he himself implausibly denies it, and as Trogdon and Cowling have 
followed suit here. 
 Although I only say “many” mixed fusions, the ones to be excluded would presumably not 
be the amalgam, because there is nothing clearly about it being a member which would lead to a 
set-theoretic paradox. Which, in the context of accepting set/membership-theory, is the most 
sensible reason to restrict membership for any given thing anyway. Besides this, it is just 
implausible to say that mixed fusions do not have properties or stand in relations. Here’s one 
example: each mixed fusion has the property of having a part which has a member. Here’s another: 
each mixed fusion has the property of having two or more parts. Or even: each mixed fusion stands 
in either the relation of proper part or of whole to some other thing. You get the idea. 
 This all being said, Trogdon and Cowling’s actual argument for abstract atomism does not 
appear to be affected by these issues of mixed fusions being members or not (and regardless of 
whether another view is prematurely excluded or not). But discussion of these issues helps frame 
the notion that Trogdon and Cowling seek to convey in their atomistic grounding claims. On their 
view the grounders of things are going to be entities that don’t stand in grounding relations to the 
things they ground, but rather are to be said to ground the things that they do by making them exist. 
Here Trogdon and Cowling explain the distinction they make between existence grounding and 
content grounding, in the context of abstracta. 
Suppose that there are propositions and that they’re abstract in nature. Given 
what we’ve said so far about grounding, the following question is coherent: 
(1) What a-grounds the proposition that Socrates is a philosopher? 
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In posing (1), however, there are at least two questions you might have in 
mind: 
(2) What abstracta make it the case that the proposition that Socrates is a 
philosopher exists? 
(3) What abstracta make it the case that Socrates is a philosopher? 
When someone asks (2) they want to know what abstracta, if any, make it the 
case that the proposition exists regardless of whether the proposition is true. So 
let’s say that (2) concerns existence a-grounding. In contrast, when someone 
asks (3) they want to know what abstracta, if any, make it the case that 
Socrates is a philosopher. Hence, (3) doesn’t target the existence of 
propositions in the same way that (2) does. So let’s say that grounding claims 
like (3) target content a-grounding rather than existence a-grounding, where 
questions of this sort concern what abstracta make a proposition true. (2019, 
2032) 
With their focus being on existence grounding rather than content grounding, Trogdon and 
Cowling’s claim that abstract atomic entities are the grounds for all abstract composite entities is 
the claim that the abstract composite entities exist because of the abstract atomic ones. If it was the 
other way around, as an abstract monist foundationalism would attest, the claim that an abstract 
composite totality entity is the grounds for all abstract atomic entities would be the claim that the 
abstract atomic entities exist because of the abstract composite totality. Trogdon and Cowling’s 
argument for abstract atomism hinges on this difference in attitude towards the existence 
‘direction’, and the plausibility that they find in favour of the abstract atoms making the abstract 
composites exist in this case. 
4.4 Narrowing the focus 
For their argument, although Trogdon and Cowling say “let’s narrow our focus to the abstract 
atomist’s claim that the singletons ground the amalgam, and the monist’s claim that the amalgam 
instead grounds the singletons” (2019, 2039), they should actually be including in each claim that it 
is the singletons plus the empty set – i.e., that the amalgam is a mixed fusion, as discussed earlier in 
section 4.2. This is because those component parts are what they take to be all of the atomic 
abstracta, and so Trogdon and Cowling are not entitled to make the claim that it is only the 
singleton atoms which ground the amalgam (qua sum of all abstracta), as a key component would 
be missing. If the empty set is not atomic, nor an abstracta, however, as they think Lewis (1991) 
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holds, the empty set should still feature in a grounding claim about the sum of all singletons and the 
empty set (which is also what Trogdon and Cowling identify the amalgam with). However, the 
empty set being a concretum, simple or complex, would at least complicate, if not ruin, their 
proposal here, of the singletons (plus the empty set) grounding the amalgam. 
 To help differentiate the two ways to construe the entity, which may be rendered as two 
distinct entities depending on the categories its parts belong to, let’s keep the amalgam as whatever 
is the sum of all abstracta, and let’s call the sum of all singletons and the empty set the ‘set-sum’. If 
Trogdon and Cowling are right to treat the empty set along with each singleton as all of the atomic 
abstracta, which are the parts of all of the abstracta, then the set-sum will be the amalgam. 
However, if the empty set is instead concrete, then the set-sum will not be the amalgam. Nor will 
the amalgam be a mixed fusion in this latter case, as it will be the sum of all abstract singletons 
only. This is actually a problem for Trogdon and Cowling’s upcoming argument for the grounding 
of mixed fusions to be seen in the next section, as they rely on the amalgam being a mixed fusion to 
make the case for abstract atomism. 
 Which to me suggests that Trogdon and Cowling’s choice to make the empty set an 
abstractum is not so much an optional choice, but is rather a requirement for their proposal. It also 
means that their call to narrow our focus also spoils the argument they end up making for abstract 
atomism because it is the fact that the amalgam is a mixed fusion that their main argument for 
abstract atomism rests upon, and we cannot both exclude the empty set from view as well as keep it 
there implicitly when it comes to the question of whether the fusion of all sets, empty or not, is 
either grounded in its proper parts or grounds them. 
 So, rather than allowing that Trogdon and Cowling keep their ‘narrow focus’, as it looks to 
beg the question, we can just extend the grounding discussion to be the general one which does not 
focus on the categories of the things involved. This also makes sense for the bigger picture for how 
this fits into the context of this thesis, because Lewis’s system of sets and mixed fusions still mostly 
mirrors what Trogdon and Cowling are doing here. Not the grounding directional claims, to be sure, 
just the mereological structures and co-ordination of sets among them. Which means it can 
therefore be understood along similar lines, at least with respect to the grounding claims, even if not 
specifying what is and what is not abstract or concrete. 
4.5 The argument for the grounding of mixed fusions 
For the sake of discussing Trogdon and Cowling’s actual argument for abstract atomism we will 
keep the empty set in view explicitly and put aside the other concerns I have raised surrounding 
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their inclusion of it. (It is worth keeping the emtpy set in view because it is the only part of the 
composite amalgam that Trogdon and Cowling can guarantee is non-membered from the outset – 
which helps ensure that the amalgam is a mixed fusion as required for their argument, and a mixed 
fusion in virtue of it having other (non-empty) sets as parts too.) Here is the main quote of their 
argument. 
Consider the following substantive general grounding claim: mixed fusions 
(fusions of non-empty sets and either the empty set or individuals) are 
grounded by the entities that compose them. As the amalgam is a mixed fusion, 
the [abstract] atomist’s claim is an instance of this general grounding claim. 
And we think that this general grounding claim is highly plausible. 
 Consider, for a moment, exotic entities such as trout-turkeys—individuals 
composed of trout and turkeys. Notice that the only reason we have to think 
that there are such things is because we already think that there are trout and 
turkeys and we accept universalism, the thesis that composition is unrestricted. 
There are no independent reasons to believe in trout-turkeys. [...] As such, 
trout-turkeys simply aren’t candidate grounds for either trout or turkeys. More 
generally speaking, they play a substantive role in neither ordinary discourse, 
our best scientific theories, nor our philosophical theorizing. 
 This moral extends to mixed fusions. The only reason we have to think 
that there are such things is because we already think that certain other things 
exist and we accept universalism. We lack independent reasons to posit them. 
Consider, for example, cat-singleton-whiskers, fusions of cats and singletons of 
their whiskers. We think that there are such things only because we already 
think that there are cats and singletons of their whiskers and we accept 
universalism. Turning to the amalgam, we think that there is such a thing only 
because we’re already on board with the singletons and the empty set and 
again we accept universalism. As such, mixed fusions are no more candidate 
grounds for their proper parts than trout-turkeys are. [...] Provided that mixed 
fusions don’t ground the things that compose them, we get the desired 
conclusion: mixed fusions are grounded by the entities that compose them. 
(2019, 2039-40) 
What makes Trogdon and Cowling’s argument troubled from what I said before is that we can see 
the places in their argument where they bring the empty set back in for the sake of making their 
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points about mixed fusions, although this was supposed to be cut off for the discussion. Although 
troublesome, I already said that this is a technicality we would put aside. In terms of plausibility, I 
should say that I think the gist of this argument is satisfactory – it is difficult to imagine that 
composite mixed fusions ground their proper parts in general, in the sense of ground as make them 
exist, when these entities have never been entertained outside of a few philosophy texts, and only 
seem to be an ‘artefact’ of unrestricted composition and the independent commitments to non-
membered entities and membered entities. Indeed, a rejection of sets would entail that no mixed 
fusions exist, and as the existence of sets as abstracta is contentious in the face of anti-Platonist or 
nominalist views concerning existents, it seems fair to think it would be unwise to permit mixed 
fusions as the objects which all others depend for their existence on. 
 The recognition of the existence of mixed fusions makes much more sense in the direction 
of starting with common entities, and seeing how a powerful principle has certain logical 
consequences. That is, it looks to be the case that we learn about the existence of mixed fusions via 
some principles of mereology and our previous commitments, rather than it looking to be the case 
that mixed fusions are what account for the existence of the things we are committed to. Yet I said 
‘all others’ above because even though Trogdon and Cowling try to focus on abstracta only, 
everything that they say still accords with the picture of the mereological Universe as a whole, and 
in the context of there being both sets and non-membered entities other than the empty set, the 
mereological Universe itself is a mixed fusion. This leads to a big problem for their argument. 
Although it is supposedly constrained for its conclusion, it is clearly presented with general 
applicability, such that it actually has some bearing on the questions of both priority atomism and 
priority monism in general. However, Trogdon and Cowling do nothing to engage with the 
problems that stem from the general case. 
 Consider that under their system and proposal the mereological Universe is a mixed fusion. 
This is the same as in Lewis’s (1991) system, where Lewis calls this mereological Universe 
‘Reality’. The mereological Universe is a mixed fusion here because it is the sum of all things – all 
the membered things and all the non-membered things. Going along with Trogdon and Cowling’s 
substantive general grounding claim, that mixed fusions are grounded by the entities that compose 
them, it follows that the mereological Universe is grounded by the entities that compose it. 
 Yet there is a key difference to be found in our attitudes towards the mereological Universe 
and any old mixed fusions. While it may be the case that the only reason we have to think that there 
are such things as mixed fusions is because we already think that there are sets and non-membered 
things and we accept universalism, there are independent reasons to believe in the existence of a 
mereological Universe, even if not many use this name or terminology. One such instance is the 
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ordinary belief that there is something that we and everything else are all a part of. While there are 
several mereological criteria which need to be met to make this ordinary idea more rigorous – such 
as which conditions enforce the uniqueness of that mereological Universe, and just which 
composition principles can support one, especially as not everyone who accepts that there are 
composites accepts that composition is unrestricted – it is still such an ordinary idea that it isn’t 
something that might be said to be only cooked up by a certain combination of metaphysical 
principles, unlike how mixed fusions themselves can be seen to be. 
 Further to this, unlike the situation with trout-turkeys we cannot say that the mereological 
Universe simply isn’t a candidate grounds for either trout or turkeys, or anything else, because this 
is the very question at issue in the general case of priority atomism vs. priority monism! That is, 
whether the proper parts of the whole ground the whole or whether the whole grounds its proper 
parts is exactly the question at issue. And more generally speaking, the mereological Universe does 
play a substantive role in each of our ordinary discourse, our best scientific theories, and our 
philosophical theorizing. Across these situations it is an ordinary posit that finds its way into how 
people place themselves amongst existents, modulo the details; in any nominalist science it is just 
the cosmos or the physical universe; and in philosophy it is a key item in the very debate at hand. 
So one of my contentions is that Trogdon and Cowling cannot make the argument they make for 
abstract atomism without begging the question against a priority monism involving a mixed fusion 
as the mereological Universe, and this is clearly unacceptable. 
4.6 What about gunk? 
My other contention is that Trogdon and Cowling’s argument also begs the question against the 
possibility of mereological gunk, that entity which is infinitely divisible into more and more proper 
parts. We can see this if we consider that gunky things are paradigm non-well-founded entities in 
the context of their proper parts founding them, and this is because there is no decompositional 
entity/entities at which their mereological structure terminates. While this is not to say that gunk is 
not grounded,5 however, it is the case that on the ordinary conception of metaphysical or 
ontological foundationalism – one particular view of which Trogdon and Cowling espouse in terms 
of grounding and abstract foundationalism – that this thesis at least requires well-founding (Bliss 
2014). 
 This is an issue for their view, then, which asserts that mixed fusions are grounded in their 
proper parts. This is because for some of the proper parts of the mereological Universe to be gunky 
                                                 
5 For discussion of well-founding in grounding, see Dixon (2016), and for distinctions between well-founding and 
grounding see Trogdon (2013, 108). 
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parts is for these, in being non-well-founded, to not provide appropriate foundations for the 
mereological Universe which they are supposed to ground. As Trogdon and Cowling advocate a 
kind of priority pluralism (cf., Schaffer 2010) in which the mereological Universe is said to be more 
than the usual “fully grounded by any proper parts which together compose it” (Dixon 2016, 444) 
(my emphasis), because it is also founded by them – a priority pluralism I will dub proper part 
foundationalism – the prospects of there being gunk in the cosmos in this scenario are cut off. This, 
of course, will not do, as Trogdon and Cowling say that they “take the possibility of concrete gunky 
objects seriously” (2019, 2037, fn 22).6 
 This makes sense – one of the reasons to favour GEM over mereological nihilism is that it 
leaves the question of gunk open, whereas nihilism precludes it from the outset. Additionally, 
Trogdon and Cowling maintain much of Lewis’s system, wherein he says, in describing the 
potential mereological makeup of Reality, “Maybe there isn’t any gunk; or maybe there aren’t any 
atomic individuals; or maybe there are both.” (1991, 21) All of which leaves their proposal in a 
precarious position, because of what it implies for the general case beyond just abstracta. 
 As Dixon highlights “Schaffer [2010] discusses several strategies the pluralist might employ 
in an attempt to accommodate the possibility of gunky objects. Each of these strategies, Schaffer 
points out, puts the pluralist in an awkward position. Of relevance to the issue at hand is the strategy 
in which the pluralist admits the possibility of non-terminating grounding chains. But this, Schaffer 
notes, contradicts the claim that grounding is well-founded. As Schaffer does not think any of the 
other strategies are successful either, he finds reason to prefer monism to pluralism.” (2016, 445) 
 Although it is available for Trogdon and Cowling to forgo the well-foundedness of 
grounding, such that their claims to a general priority pluralism could still hold in the case of a 
partially gunky mereological Universe which is a mixed fusion, this is not in keeping with their 
foundationalism as presented, and would require a much greater defence of the grounding 
conditions than the one they provide. Worse than this is that, even leaving aside these issues 
surrounding well-founding, there are still other problems for their proposal. We see this if we ask 
after the a- and c-grounding status of a mereological Universe such as Lewis’s Reality, or such as 
one that follows their strictures, which I will call the ‘cosmalgam’. 
                                                 
6 Recall, however, that they already preclude gunk in the abstract domain via their claims that the only abstracta are 
formed from sets, and that all of the singleton sets and also the empty set are atomic. 
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4.7 What is the grounding status of the cosmalgam? 
Recall Trogdon and Cowling’s definitions of a- and c-grounding: “let’s say that an entity is c-
grounded just in case it’s grounded by concreta, and an entity is c-fundamental just in case it isn’t c-
grounded ... let’s say that an entity is a-grounded just in case it’s grounded by abstracta, and an 
entity is a-fundamental just in case it isn’t a-grounded” (2019, 2030 and 2031). 
 Now consider their express commitment that “reality divides, exclusively and exhaustively, 
into the abstract and the concrete” (2019, 2036) (my emphasis). From this package we have it that 
every entity is either abstract or concrete, and there are no other possibilities, and that every entity 
is at least one of (but maybe more) a-grounded, c-grounded, a-fundamental and c-fundamental. I 
say ‘but maybe more’ here because it appears that via the definitions, and also according to 
Trogdon and Cowling’s discussion, there can be a variety of combinations. For instance, from the 
definitions we can tell that if something isn’t c-grounded that it is c-fundamental, which seems to 
allow that an abstractum which is a-grounded may be c-fundamental if it is not c-grounded. 
 Trogdon and Cowling endorse this general sentiment when they say “It’s an open question 
whether any ground for a concrete[/abstract] entity is itself concrete[/abstract]. So, from the fact that 
a concrete[/abstract] entity is grounded, it doesn’t follow that it’s grounded by concreta[/abstracta] 
in particular, at least in the absence of further argument.” (2019, 2030 and 2031) Now, it would be 
the case that any a-grounded thing is c-fundamental if being a-grounded precluded it from being c-
grounded. This is following the condition that “an entity is c-fundamental just in case it isn’t c-
grounded”. Yet this preclusion doesn’t hold up under Trogdon and Cowling’s openness. Indeed, 
they even offer that “Singletons of concreta such as {Socrates} are potential examples of abstracta 
that have concrete grounds but lack abstract grounds.” (2019, 2031) However, there is further 
argument that such grounding-kind heterogeneity, as I will call it, is implausible, and is not in fact 
what Trogdon and Cowling articulate in terms of the amalgam. 
 We will start with the latter issue of this not being what Trogdon and Cowling articulate, 
and cover the implausibility claim after. Take the given example of singletons of concreta such as 
{Socrates}. According to Trogdon and Cowling, by their use of ‘grounds’ “we always mean ‘fully 
grounds’. Intuitively, a full ground provides a fully satisfactory explanation of what it grounds, 
while a mere partial ground does not.” (2019, 2030) This is one of their five starting assumptions 
regarding grounding (2019, 2030). Another one is that grounding is transitive, such that if A 
grounds B and B grounds C it follows that A grounds C (2019, 2030). In the example of singletons 
of concreta such as {Socrates} being grounded on their concrete members, the claim that the 
singletons and the empty set fully ground the amalgam does not hold. This is because, even if all 
singletons of concreta are a-fundamental, in that they have no a-grounds – which Trogdon and 
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Cowling hold of all singletons, that they are a-fundamental – these are still c-grounded. If to be 
grounded is just to be fully grounded, then all singletons of concreta are fully grounded in the 
concreta which are their members. But if all singletons of concreta are fully grounded in concreta, 
and the amalgam is fully grounded in every abstracta membered set and concreta membered set and 
the empty set, and grounding is transitive, then the amalgam is fully grounded in both abstracta and 
concreta. 
 Yet, as detailed earlier, Trogdon and Cowling argue for the thesis of abstract atomism: there 
are multiple simple abstracta, any simple abstract entity is a-fundamental, and any complex abstract 
entity decomposes into simple abstracta such that the latter ground the former. (2019, 2033) (my 
emphasis) Remembering that “the latter ground the former” is to be read as “the latter fully ground 
the former”, as in “the latter provides a fully satisfactory explanation of the former” we run into the 
issue that it does not look like it can be properly said that the simple abstracta, of which the 
singletons of concreta are supposed to be some, genuinely fully ground the amalgam, let alone less 
maximal complex abstracta. How can they, together with the abstracta membered singletons be said 
to fully ground the amalgam, if they themselves are fully grounded in concreta? 
 This suggests that the notion of something fully grounding something else is not that it 
provides a fully satisfactory explanation of what it grounds. Which is to say that if we are told that 
the sets fully ground the amalgam, as Trogdon and Cowling do tell us, and we are told that this is a 
fully satisfactory explanation of the amalgam’s grounding situation, it sounds like we are being 
misled. Key information is missing – most notably the fact that the concreta which are members of 
singletons fully ground their singletons, thereby fully grounding the amalgam in concert with the 
abstracta only membered sets and the empty set. Even if we think that some of what this means is 
that the notion of full grounding being transitive is troubled, the bigger problem for Trogdon and 
Cowling is that their abstract atomism thesis looks to be obviated as is. 
 Turning to the former issue, we now examine my claim that grounding-kind heterogeneity is 
implausible in this context in general. Notice that because of the exclusivity and exhaustivity 
conditions with regards to things being only either abstracta or concreta, that the mixed fusion 
which is the mereological Universe – the cosmalgam – must be either abstract or concrete. 
Presuming that it is not abstract, because Trogdon and Cowling want the amalgam to be just the 
sum of all sets, empty or not, then the cosmalgam must be concrete on their view. Following the 
assumption that grounding is transitive, let’s say that according to priority pluralism in this case that 
as the concreta proper parts of the cosmalgam all ground the cosmos proper part, and the abstracta 
proper parts of the cosmalgam all ground the amalgam proper part, that thereby the cosmos along 
with the amalgam grounds the cosmalgam. As before, if we are to understand by ‘grounds’ that 
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what is always meant is ‘fully grounds’, and remembering that every entity is at least one of a-
grounded, c-grounded, a-fundamental and c-fundamental, and that the cosmalgam is being claimed 
to be grounded, we would like to find out whether the cosmalgam is fully a-grounded or fully c-
grounded or both or neither. 
 Prima facie it sounds like to ask of something that is said to be grounded in its array of 
abstract and concrete proper parts whether it is either fully a-grounded or fully c-grounded is 
absurd, because the ‘full’ in each grounding type appears to deny the grounding contribution of the 
proper parts which are not of such types. That is, when the amalgam and the cosmos jointly ground 
the cosmalgam, neither can “fully” a- or c-ground it, for an entity is a-grounded just in case it is 
grounded by abstracta, and an entity is c-grounded just in case it is grounded by concreta. The 
cosmalgam fits neither of these bills, as it is not grounded by either solely concreta or abstracta. 
 If we were to generalise the grounding statements here, they would only amount to ‘an 
entity is grounded just in case it is grounded by ________”, which just means “an entity is 
grounded just in case it is grounded”. This tautology does not sound informative at all. Now we 
have a big problem. If the cosmalgam is not a-grounded, then it is a-fundamental, and if the 
cosmalgam is not c-grounded, then it is c-fundamental, by our earlier definitions. If those are the 
exhaustive types of fundamentality as supposed, in that being either a- or c-fundamental or both is 
the only type of ‘fundamental’ a thing can be then the cosmalgam is simply fundamental. But 
anything that is fundamental is not supposed to be grounded at all. Clearly this goes against the 
claim of the priority pluralist, whether atomic or gunky, that the proper parts of the mereological 
Universe are the grounds for it. So we are left with the terrible situation that a generalisation of an 
argument for the grounding of the amalgam on its proper parts to the grounding of the cosmalgam 
on its proper parts, ends up contradicting the thesis that it should be defending. 
4.8 Conclusion 
The mereological Universe as a mixed fusion that is a cosmalgam, then, does not plausibly look to 
be grounded in its proper parts. This, and the other issues presented, also suggests that Trogdon and 
Cowling’s proposal is inadequate for defending the claim that the amalgam is grounded in its proper 
parts. Whether this conclusion leads to it being the case that the mereological Universe as a mixed 
fusion is better seen as the grounds for its proper parts, or whether grounding claims (in any 
direction) involving such a Universe should instead be rejected, is work for another time. 
 For the purpose of this thesis, though, this result leaves us in a similar place as that at the 
end of Chapter 2. That is, while it is not apparently paradoxical or contradictory for the 
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mereological Universe to ground everything else, it definitely appears to be less plausible that the 
mereological Universe qua mixed fusion is the reason everything else exists given the conceptual 
contingency of mixed fusions. Moreover, it also presents another situation which is largely 
unprecedented in the literature. As such, this outcome still has an aporetic feel to it, much in the 
same way as how the double non-well-founding in Chapter 2 does not look to be paradoxical but 
yet is still very undesirable for presenting only bad options going forward if we don’t drop 
unrestricted composition. I do think that if one were to insist on sticking with GEM and unrestricted 
composition here, it just seems like it again would leave us at a crossroads of unpalatable decisions 
to make, either doubling down on an implausible grounding by the mereological Universe, or 
discarding the concept of grounding entirely (because minimising it to small, mereological pockets 
also seems farfetched). For proponents of grounding I expect this to be an unpleasant choice, and so 
I offer that the better way out really is to reject the mereology and composition principles which 
seem to force it. 
 In fact, I think that if Trogdon and Cowling do wish to maintain their grounding scheme, 
that they had better reject unrestricted mereological composition/universalism after all. Moreover, 
their scheme looks to be one that requires such a restriction (and could maybe be put forth as an 
argument for restricting composition). This is because their view actually strictly prohibits 
composition between abstracta and concreta by their holding that concreta only have concrete parts, 
and abstracta only have abstract parts, and these being exhaustive kinds. In that case sums of 
abstracta and concreta can be neither of these kinds, and therefore cannot exist (a type of situation I 
detail further in Chapter 5). I suppressed this issue earlier for the sake of my argument, to show the 
problem of the cosmalgam upending their grounding claims, yet my argument only really works if 
we ignore the fact that the cosmalgam shouldn’t be concrete or abstract anyway, according to their 
proposals. 
 With regards to the subtle mereological hybridism which reared in this chapter, via the 
common kinds of parts being either abstract or concrete, I think we have learned too that when it 
comes to grounding in the context of a mereological Universe which is a transcategorial sum of 
abstracta and concreta, that things are more complicated than they may at first appear. Furthermore, 
there’s also the problem that given the usual view of the ontology of classes as abstracta, and the 
usual view of ourselves and the natural universe as concreta, for instance, that in the case that the 
mereological Universe is the ground of all things, there could be a mixed kind of grounding taking 
place, from something which is not clearly either abstract or concrete itself. 
 Although the question of a form of mixed grounding won’t be pursued in this thesis, in the 
next chapter I do go on to specifically examine the issues surrounding mereological hybridism in 
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the case of abstract-concreta fusions, such as mixed fusions having both abstract and concrete parts, 
with these being issues that do not involve notions of grounding at all. 
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Chapter 5 
Mereology, modality, and the 
abstract–concrete distinction 
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5.0 Introduction 
To make a case against unrestricted mereological composition principles, in this chapter I adapt and 
analyse a conception of the abstract–concrete distinction as one which distinguishes between the 
kinds of parts that entities belonging to these different categories may have. The conception being, 
roughly, that abstract entities have only abstracta for parts, and concrete entities have only concreta 
for parts. 
 While this conception is able to satisfy the traditional notion stemming from Plato that 
abstracta and concreta belong to two fundamentally distinct realms, the trouble is that its 
mereological character engenders a dilemma when coupled with a theory of part-whole relations 
which permits arbitrary fusions of things from any category of entity whatsoever, like the standard 
classical mereology. As these sorts of parthood theories allow mereological sums consisting of parts 
from both the alleged abstract and concrete realms, questions about such composites naturally arise. 
Are wholes with both abstracta and concreta for parts themselves abstract? Or are they concrete? Or 
do they instead undermine the dualism and not belong to either of these categories? 
 The dilemma arises because the standard abstract–concrete distinction at least involves 
conceptions of both mutual exclusivity and exhaustiveness across the two realms of beings (Katz 
1998, Kaufman 2002, cf., Cowling 2017, 70-1). This appears to preclude such transcategorial 
composites, let alone there being any further category for them to fall under. Clearly we have a 
choice to make – do we restrict our mereology to avoid such violations or do we reject the standard 
abstract–concrete distinction? 
 As I see it, significant instances of incidentally taking the latter strategy are to be found 
within the ontology deployed in both David Lewis’s (1986) On the Plurality of Worlds and his 
(1991) Parts of Classes. These works make substantial use of distinguishing between the abstract 
and the concrete; and also contain influential defences of GEM, and importantly in respect to its 
principle of unrestricted composition. Although such objects are not at all his main focus in these 
texts, therein Lewis acknowledges that the unrestricted composition principle entails certain supra-
world fusions. The two varieties he describes either fuse parts from within multiple concrete worlds 
or fuse parts from both within concrete worlds and outside of them. 
 It is these latter entities in particular that can make good representatives of abstracta and 
concreta fusions, as Lewis’s express views on concrete worlds imply that entities entirely outside of 
these worlds are abstract. Specific instances of such in/out concrete/abstract composites can be 
found in some of Lewis’s mixed fusions. This is because mixed fusions are allegedly composed 
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from set-theoretical classes – which are abstracta and outside of worlds on his view – and set-
theoretical individuals – such as ordinary concrete beings like cats and crows. (I only say ‘some’ 
mixed fusions here because there could be abstracta that are individuals, after all.) In contrast, the 
former type of entity – what Lewis calls ‘trans-world individuals’ – may serve as a different species 
of transcategorial entity, insofar as their being outside of concrete worlds results in them being 
abstracta, even with their concreta parts. 
 Considering that Lewis is a leading proponent of GEM, the fact that each of these kinds of 
entities appear to have cases whereby they comprise both abstract and concrete parts suggests that 
the clear line for him to take is to reject my mereologised version of the standard account of the 
abstract–concrete distinction. However, as he neither addresses the abstract/concrete status of either 
kind of supra-world fusion, nor treats the general issue of transcategorial fusion directly, we will 
need to determine what his rejection of this distinction might entail, and whether it is justified. 
 On my assessment, how Lewis applies an abstract/concrete division in his work, including 
how he characterises the consequences of entities being concrete and also the relations between in-
world and out-world entities, leads to major problems for his modal system. By way of trying to 
reconcile Lewis’s professed views in these works, some of the point of this chapter is to 
demonstrate and examine various constraints which arise for mereological views in the context of 
their employing such categorial delineation. Moreover, I seek to show that Lewis’s mixed fusions 
and trans-world individuals are worth rejecting on the grounds that the troubles stemming from their 
alleged supra-world fusion instead justify a restriction on composition, specifically as a relation 
which does not cross world boundaries. Accordingly, this looks to overcome the well-known 
Lewis/Sider objections that any restriction on composition is unwarranted for leading to 
unintelligible vague existence/vagueness in how many things exist (Lewis 1986, 212-13 for the left 
side of the slash; Sider 1997 and 2001, 4.9 for the right). 
 To start making my case for these claims, in section 5.1 I introduce the standard abstract–
concrete distinction, explaining some of the ways abstracta and concreta have been contrasted and 
conceived. I also give a summary of a variety of entities that fuse along the abstract/concrete 
dimension to indicate that some of the ramifications of my analysis may extend beyond Lewis’s 
systems alone. In section 5.2 I suggest various abstracta and concreta parthood theses that are 
plausibly connected to the standard distinction, and I begin to examine how these can constrain 
mereological relations between the two kinds of entities. Additionally, I discuss how Lewis’s 
concrete modal realism does not quite fit the standard distinction and start to consider his options 
for making the distinction in other ways. 
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 Following this, in section 5.3 I present an argument that for Lewis’s views to be consistent, 
he had better reject an element of the claims to the exclusivity of the two realms. I claim that he 
should instead accept concreta as able to have abstracta for parts (but not vice versa). Yet I also 
argue that due to the plausible notions of property inheritance that Lewis explicitly advances which 
support this outcome – namely a principle of concrete inheritance such that anything with any 
concrete parts at all is itself concrete – that he is forced to accept concrete impossible objects. This 
is a result which runs contrary to his well-known aversion to such entities, and which I further argue 
serves to undermine his case for concrete modal realism. (Note that such entities are not simply a 
contradiction in terms for technical reasons, as is made clearer by section 5.6.4.) To be clear, this 
principle of concrete inheritance is not one which Lewis can simply dispense with, both because he 
defends it directly and indirectly in a variety of ways, and also because he admits that without this 
inheritance his concrete worlds are not concrete. Which means that to dispense with it would be a 
death blow for his view of an infinite plurality of concrete possible worlds. 
 After demonstrating in section 5.4 that certain mereological outlooks are incompatible with 
the standard abstract–concrete distinction – and that some attempts to avoid this incompatibility are 
flawed – in section 5.5 I conclude my assessment of the prospects for abstracta and concreta 
fusions. In particular, I argue for restricting mereology to prohibit various claims of supra-world 
summation, such as that which permits mixed fusions and trans-world individuals. To be clear, I do 
not present an argument against abstracta and concreta fusions altogether. This is because the 
principle of concrete inheritance from Lewis’s account that was used to make the previous case 
only suffices to prohibit abstracta from having concrete parts, and not the other way around. 
Instead, I claim that in the case of an exhaustive distinction between abstracta and concreta 
understood along the usual lines of their being fundamentally different that, at the least, every 
abstractum is concreta-part free. Even though I am inclined to believe the converse, and to thereby 
maintain the standard abstract–concrete distinction mereologically overall, it is not something I try 
to defend herein. 
5.1 Beginnings of an abstract–concrete distinction 
Making a distinction between abstract entities and concrete ones is a longstanding project in 
philosophy. On one understanding, the Platonic dualism between ideal Forms and sensible objects 
is seen as the origin of the distinction. Here Plato classified existents into two overarching domains, 
realms or worlds: the allegedly imperfect realm of mutable and particular sensible things, and the 
supposedly perfect realm of the immutable and universal, non-sensible Forms, which transcends it 
(Katz 1998, 125-6; Kaufman 2002). 
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 For the sake of illustrating their expected ontological separation as concreta and abstracta, 
we might stylise this two realm view as follows (with no spatial or mereological implications 
intended). 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1 Stylised two realm view of concreta and abstracta. 
Beyond its rejection of the Forms, the modern view of the abstract–concrete distinction mainly 
differs from Plato’s by disagreeing on the causal status of abstracta. Where Plato viewed the Forms 
as exerting causal influence on the way the things are in the sensible realm, the prevailing 
contemporary notion of abstract entities regards them as having zero causal influence on the way 
things are anywhere (Rosen 2017). This negative conception of abstract entities is dominant when it 
comes to presentations of what their other general features might be, in that abstract entities are 
customarily depicted in terms of the features they lack. 
 For instance, abstracta are routinely presented as being, at the least: non-spatial, non-
temporal,1 non-mental, non-sensible, non-physical, non-material, non-corporeal, non-changing, and 
as we have already seen in the modern sense, non-causal.2 Besides the Forms, some of the usual 
candidates for abstract entities are: numbers, sets, classes, properties, universals, relations and 
propositions, among other things.3 
 Concrete entities, on the other hand, are commonly regarded as having at least some of the 
features which abstracta are said to lack, if not all of the positive counterparts from their negative 
list above (modulo the mental for the obvious reasons). The usual candidates for concrete entities 
are physical/material entities, like what animals, plants and geological formations are normally 
                                                 
1 Non-spatiotemporal also. 
2 However, one positive description commonly associated with abstracta is that they are necessary (cf., Tennant 1997). 
3 For the much longer list from which this one is derived, see Oppy (2014, 170). Whether alleged (supernatural or 
otherwise) gods are also abstracta candidates is highly contentious, even if they are considered to share some 
similarities to abstracta in being, for example, necessary, or non-corporeal, or ‘beyond’ space-time (all potential 
characteristics of proposed gods which require explicit specifications depending on the theology, of course) (cf., Leftow 
1990). This can also be because gods are often understood to stand in causal relations to the natural world, which sets 
them apart from the way the usual abstracta candidates are normally conceived (cf., Cowling 2017, 83). As expected, 
within an exhaustive and exclusive two category view any gods would need to belong to one or the other category. 
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taken to be, which are kinds of entities ordinarily understood to have both spatial and temporal 
aspects. Other candidates include mental entities (such as minds), for importantly having at least 
temporal attributes. Across these cases, a key expectation for attributing concreteness to something 
is often that the entity exists within space and time, either as a part of the physical universe, or as 
one of the entities amongst which the physical universe could be understood to operate. 
Concreta Abstracta 
Physical Non-physical 
Spatial Non-spatial 
Temporal Non-temporal 
Causal Non-causal 
Changeable Non-changeable 
Table 5.1 Some common attributions of concreta (sufficient) and abstracta (necessary). 
As is usual, just as there is varying consensus on what all of the concrete entities are, there is no 
unanimous agreement on what to accept as any of the abstract entities.4 In fact, some philosophers 
find it unreasonable to even consider that there are things that exist outside space and time, and 
therefore reject completely the conception of abstract entities from a purportedly transcendent 
realm.5 This means that for any candidate entities that they wish to keep in their ontology which are 
usually taken to be abstracta, they have to explain how these are not really abstract entities, contrary 
to the standard expectation. Philosophers who elect to deny the existence of abstracta are generally 
called ‘nominalists’, whereas those who accept abstract entities along with concreta are usually 
called ‘platonists’.6 
5.2 Distinguishing realms 
Following Plato’s historical lead, a tendency among philosophers (and platonists in particular) when 
subscribing to an abstract–concrete distinction is to invoke two disparate realms of entities. For 
instance, according to Edward Zalta, “in our metaphysical foundations, there are two fundamentally 
                                                 
4 For a very informative book-length treatment on conceptions of and debates regarding abstracta, see Cowling (2017). 
5 Witness Goodman and Quine “We do not believe in abstract objects [...] Any system that countenances abstract 
entities we deem unsatisfactory as a final philosophy” (1947, 105); Kotarbiński’s view that there are only material 
bodies (Woleński 2016); and his friend Leśniewski, the progenitor of modern mereology, who “in elaborating his logic 
he emphatically rejects anything which is not concrete, individual, located in space and time” (Simons 2015, 4.3). 
6 With a lowercase ‘p’ to signify that it is not Plato’s view of transcendent objects that they specifically share, but rather 
one with something of the same flavour, viz., an accepting of entities which are in addition to the familiar concrete ones 
we engage with on a daily basis, additional entities which exist in a radically different manner from those ordinary ones. 
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different kinds of objects, abstract objects and ordinary objects, constituting mutually exclusive 
domains.” (2006, 678)7 Along this line, Cowling (2017) says that questions about the abstract–
concrete distinction may be of interest “because they demarcate explanatory projects and theoretical 
roles undertaken by the abstract realm and its inhabitants.” (2017, 100) And besides the fact that 
Sider seeks to reject the abstract–concrete distinction as “a relic of a certain theory” which thwarts 
the simplification of ideology, he too conveys it as promoting that “reality divides into two 
realms—abstract and concrete—in a way that is significant on various fronts. Epistemic: we know 
about the abstract a priori. Modal: facts about the abstract are necessary. Causal: the abstract is 
causally inert. Spatial: abstract entities are not in space and time.” (2013, 287) 
 Usually this presumed separation of the abstract and the concrete arises precisely from 
following some contrastive account of the expected differences in features that either kind of entity 
is supposed to have in comparison to the other.8 As Kaufman points out, after describing the 
traditional distinction as something that “for [platonists] has been a standard dualistic ontology ... in 
which reality consists exclusively of two types of objects, abstract and concrete” (2002, 216), the 
defining of abstracta as “anticoncrete” in the manner of negative features given above ends up 
establishing the two as substances in fundamental opposition to each other, thereby enforcing their 
mutual separation (2002, 230-31). Indeed, this dualistic conception is what further serves to 
separate the abstract from the concrete by putting them not just under different categories, but also 
into different realms, or ‘worlds’. As Jerrold Katz explains it, 
Early in the development of the theory of Forms, Plato seems to have held a 
“two world” view. In addition to the world we inhabit together with other 
spatiotemporally located and causally interrelated things, there is an 
independent world of nonspatial, atemporal, and causally inert Forms.9 This 
view explains the objectivity and autonomy of the concepts examined in 
dialectic by taking the abstract to be transcendent (dwelling outside our world) 
and the concrete to be immanent (dwelling in our world). Plato’s account of 
how we know the Forms would seem to commit him to the “two world” view. 
(Katz 1998, 125-6) 
From its usual depiction, David Lewis’s (1986) modal realism appears to be intuitively recognisable 
as a modern take on this two realm conception of an abstracta/concreta divide – even if it might not 
                                                 
7 What Zalta means by ‘ordinary’ is our ‘concrete’ (cf., Wildman (2016, 184)). 
8 From a nominalist point of view this separation is, of course, guaranteed. 
9 This last piece of the description is flawed on Plato’s account, however, because his Forms are supposed to contribute 
to the being of things in the sensible world as “causes par excellence” (Rosen 2017). 
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at first be understood to assert a singular concrete realm. This qualification is because, according to 
Lewis, there exists an infinite plurality of mereologically disjoint10 concrete possible worlds, each 
causally independent and isolated from the other, each with their own self-contained spatiotemporal 
relations and world inhabitants. What exists in their entirety outside of all of these worlds, for 
Lewis, are the infinite number of mathematical objects posited by set theory, each of which counts 
as an abstractum on his view, for not being a part of any concrete world. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2 Stylised view of a small number of Lewis’s plurality of concrete worlds stretching onwards, with transcendent abstracta. 
With its multitude of concrete worlds, Lewis’s system helps us put into focus a need to clear up 
potential ambiguity surrounding the notion of ‘realm’ in the context of the abstract–concrete 
distinction – and a clarification which I believe is worth making when discussing realms altogether. 
The ambiguity I refer to arises because at first one might assume that an exhaustive division of 
reality into two such realms entails that reality has two major parts, one abstract realm part and one 
concrete realm part, where a decomposition of each realm into constituent parts gives the denizens 
of said realm. Indeed, that is what the two world view modelled earlier in Figure 5.1 can suggest. 
Yet for this to be the case (especially under GEM) requires that each realm be a mereological unit, 
either as a simple or a sum, consisting only of the things which belong to the category which the 
realm represents. 
 However, it is not required that for a realm to be counted as one that it needs to be a 
mereological unity.11 There are other options, two of which I find pertinent to consider for Lewis’s 
system specifically. The first we might contemplate is that the realms are classes, whereby, e.g., the 
class of all concreta is identified as the concrete realm because it has all of the concrete entities (i.e., 
the worlds and their concrete parts) as members. Indeed, as Lewis accepts a class of all individuals 
                                                 
10 I.e., non-overlapping by not sharing any parts. 
11 This is an important point to consider for the sake of not foreclosing realms under restricted composition mereologies, 
such as mereological nihilism which denies all composition. As other mereologies might still use the concept, such as to 
assert that the concrete realm contains e.g., all of the concrete simples (or otherwise all of the restricted concrete 
composites), they should be able to make this claim without the realm needing to be a whole. 
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qua concreta/possibilia,12 this seems promising. Where it falls apart, however, is in identifying the 
abstract realm with a class too – presuming, as is plausible, that both of the purported realms are the 
same kinds of unities. The obvious problem arises because if the realm of abstracta is supposed to 
be the class of all abstracta it would therefore need to contain itself, in violation of the standard set-
theoretic rules against self-containment for classes.13 
 I think the better option at least, for Lewis, is to see both of the single realms as genuine 
pluralities.14 In this case, the concrete realm is to be identified with the plurality of concrete things, 
and the abstract realm is to be identified with the plurality of abstract things. Provided they have 
some different occupants,15 each realm can be unique. If they together comprise all entities, then the 
realms are jointly exhaustive, and if they further share no occupants, then they are mutually 
exclusive. Although a myriad of pluralities in general can satisfy each of those three conditions, 
Lewis has the convenience of anchoring his identification of the occupants of the plurality of 
concreta to all of those things which have parts in possible worlds, leaving the rest which do not 
have such parts to be the abstracta.16 
 To be clear, the realms of the abstract and the concrete on this suggestion are not singular 
objects, like a class or a mereological composite would be. Rather they are literally unique 
pluralities of things, the occupants of which satisfy the requisite conditions for being abstract or 
concrete, and which would comprise either of those other two kinds of unities – either as the 
members of a class, or the parts of a whole, respectively – provided this was ontologically 
consistent. So, considering that Lewis is a major proponent of unrestricted composition, thereby 
allowing distinct fusions of every concrete object and every abstract one, why can’t he just identify 
the realms with mereological sums? 
 The problem here lies precisely with the composition principle which affords those fusions, 
as it also yields so much more besides. To see it, recall that with unrestricted composition entailing 
that any plurality of entities forms a whole, it will follow that on Lewis’s account of possible worlds 
there is a composite (let’s call it ‘C’) with all of the concrete possible worlds (and transitively their 
                                                 
12 “[W]e have no notion what could stop any class of individuals – in particular, the class of all worlds – from 
comprising a set. [...] I continue to accept a set of all worlds, indeed a set of all individuals.” (1986, 104) 
13 Lewis is well aware of this, e.g., “we dare not say that whenever there are some things, there is a class of them” 
(1991, 8). 
14 See Simons (1982, especially section 7) for how pluralities (what he calls ‘manifolds’) may be counted as one, 
without literally being one. 
15 While the term ‘member’ may be fitting in this context, I use ‘occupant’ instead to contrast with classes. 
16 Furthermore, this should be acceptable as Lewis is favourable towards plurals (cf., 1991, 3.2). 
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parts17) as its parts. This is in addition to a composite (let’s call it ‘A’) which has none of the parts 
of any possible world as its parts. At first it seems we need look no further than these two 
mereological sums to see two realms on Lewis’s account – one composed of all of the parts of 
concrete worlds, the composite C; and one composed of all of the parts disjoint from concrete 
worlds (whereby all of those parts disjoint from concrete worlds are themselves abstract) the 
composite A. 
 However, while this may give us an intuitive depiction of two distinct realms, one which has 
a large fusion of abstracta and the other which has a large fusion of concreta as parts (but not 
necessarily ‘large’ in the set-theoretic sense discussed in Chapter 2), such a portrayal is insufficient 
to capture the complete picture of all entities which exist under this system. Specifically, this 
conception neglects the abstracta-concreta fusions which unrestricted composition entails. In 
addition to not accounting for such ‘cabs’, as I will sometimes call the abstracta-concreta fusions, 
there is also the issue of trans-world sums which are not part of any concrete worlds also being a 
part of the proposed concrete realm, composite C. The trouble here is that, on the common reading 
of Lewis’s modal realist system, concreta are only parts of worlds. So, treating trans-world sums as 
concreta is erroneous as they are not parts of worlds, which makes their inclusion as parts of C 
undermine the prospect of that composite being appropriately identified as the concrete realm. 
 What’s more, these two kinds of supra-world entities, the ones which are cabs (whether 
mixed fusions or otherwise) and the trans-world sums, further complicate the legitimacy of even my 
‘realms as plurals’ conception. This is because it is unclear whether cabs should themselves be 
identified as abstracta or concreta, as well as it being dubious that the common reading of Lewis’s 
‘out-world’ entities as abstracta is consistent considering that a great number of these will have 
some concrete parts and therefore, presumably, some concrete properties. 
5.3 Mereological hybrids meet mereological models 
Besides the examples from Lewis’s work, there are a variety of other potential cases of 
abstracta/concreta based mereological hybridism to be found across the metaphysical literature. 
Immanent universals, pantheistic gods, the universe as a whole, impure sets, and structured 
Russellian/singular propositions all appear as candidates for entities which might contain both 
abstract and concrete parts.18 Not all of these candidates are presented with the intention of them 
                                                 
17 Remembering that the concrete worlds are parts of themselves too – i.e., improper parts. 
18 There have also been variously considered what Parsons (2007a) calls ‘mixed objects’, which have both 
spatiotemporal entities and non-spatiotemporal entities as parts. Here the former could be ordinary material things like a 
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being recognised specifically as instances of such mixed creatures, however, rather they may only 
be proposed within the greater context of whatever theory it is that they are used to support (or are 
supported by, or are consequences of, etc.), and just so happen to also be cases of transcategorial 
composites – much like those examples sourced from Lewis’s work above. 
 To be sure, the way that these entities can be regarded as cross-category composites depends 
on their specific mereological construal. For instance, a god regarded as mereologically simple will 
not be a transcategorial composite,19 whereas a pantheistic one as the sum of all things, or perhaps 
similarly as the sum of all possible worlds, very well may be.20 Similarly, if all propositions are 
paradigmatically understood to be abstracta, then whether propositions about particular concrete 
individuals are literally structured by having these individuals among their constituent parts (along 
with e.g., properties and relations (à la Soames 1987), and these taken as abstracta) will warrant 
regarding them as transcategorial sums. If propositions are not so structured, it might not be. In a 
different manner, impure sets21 need not be accepted as having either their members or the null set 
as parts, which hinders impressions that impure sets are indeed abstracta22 with concrete parts, and 
thereby transcategorial composites.23 
 Although Lewis himself proffers scepticism about what the abstract–concrete distinction 
exactly amounts to, he does accept that these two categorisations mark “fundamentally different 
kinds” (1986, 1.7), while also himself deploying a specific conception of concreteness for possible 
worlds wherein their proper parts all have (‘analogically’ or familiar) spatiotemporal relations with 
distinct parts within the same world (1986, 1.6). Therefore, as some distinction between the two 
kinds is still essential for Lewis’s defence of concrete possible worlds, it is worth examining how 
best to reconcile the aforementioned difficulties in abstractum/concretum identification to see how 
Lewis’s options affect the prospects of his systems plausibility. This is a task which should also 
prove useful for considering such issues more generally, as with the abundance of other potential 
cabs. It is also worth considering some of these concepts in more detail, and in general, to further 
understand how the varying conceptions constrain our options overall, whether or not a framework 
like Lewis’s is adopted. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
human, a cat or a river, and the latter could be numbers, presumably, or places qua immaterial things (2007a, 205 and 
226-7; cf., Lewis 1986, 212 fn 9; Armstrong 1997, 13; Oppy 1997, 327; and Effingham 2011, 458 fn 5 and 466). 
19 Or a composite at all, cf., Lombard (2007–2010), vol. 1, p. 108. 
20 See Oppy (1997) and Nagasawa (2014; 2016; 2017) on such topics of divine mereological complexity. 
21 I.e., those sets which have ordinary things as (at least some of their) members. 
22 As sets in general are paradigmatically understood to be. 
23 For a variety of non-GEM strategies for treating sets as having their members as parts see Katz (1998), Johnston 
(2006), Fine (2010), Caplan et al. (2010) and McElhoes (2017). 
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 To illustrate specifically the problems Lewis’s system faces with regards to the two realm 
view, though, and to assist with examining the associated consequences, consider the following 4-
atom GEM style model consisting of two abstracta atoms and 2 concreta atoms.24 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3 A four atom model of concreta/abstracta fusion. 
If we treat C1 and C2 each as the sole distinct possible worlds for the sake of argument, then their 
sum C1C2 is the sum of all possible worlds on the model – paralleling the composite C above. And 
the sum A1A2 is itself a parallel of the composite A above, as it has none of the parts of any 
possible world as its parts.25 Following this understanding of the model, the most we can say with 
confidence is that C1 and C2 are each concrete, and that A1, A2 and A1A2 are all abstracta. But 
what about the rest? The model reveals how we can’t treat the two composites C and A as 
exhaustive in terms of everything being either abstract or concrete, because there would be many 
entities unaccounted for that are not parts of either of those sums. (Indeed, on the model most of the 
entities are cabs.) What’s more, the idea that C1C2 is itself the concrete realm actually flounders 
against the expectation that any non-world entities are abstracta. This is also an expectation which, 
if followed through completely, would make the totality C1C2A1A2 the best candidate for the 
abstract realm as a whole, for its having all abstracta as its parts, yet also the worst candidate for 
being the abstract realm, for having all concreta as its parts too. 
 This sort of model clearly reveals my concern with how unrestricted mereological fusion 
does not seem compatible with the standard abstract–concrete distinction, especially as it operates 
                                                 
24 Where a mereological atom is an entity which has no proper parts, and only has one (improper) part – itself. 
25 Notice too that because A1A2 is the sum of the things which overlap no parts of worlds, it only has the kind of not-
world parts which themselves do not have any parts from possible worlds as its parts. 
C2 C1 A1 A2 
C1C2A1A2 
C2A1A2 C1A1A2 C1C2A2 C1C2A1 
C2A2 A1A2 C2A1 C1A2 C1A1 C1C2 
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alongside realms and/or worlds. In the next section I go into greater detail about what exactly the 
problem stems from and makes troubles with, while starting to precisify some of the complex 
arrangements of theses proposed for this situation. 
 An important collection of questions to resolve are whether cabs are in fact abstracta or 
concreta? Or even whether the abstract–concrete distinction needs to be reformed, if not outright 
rejected, in the presence of certain mereological principles? Or whether, instead, it is the 
mereological principles which prove unworthy of being maintained? To consider this series of 
questions we keep our model in Figure 5.3 above in mind, but also focus on the epitome of abstracta 
and concreta sums given in Lewis’s mixed fusions of classes and concrete individuals. 
 To keep things mereologically uncomplicated, let’s consider a mixed fusion which is a 
composite sum of just two mereologically simple entities – something like C1A1 from Figure 5.3. 
For the abstract part of this mixed fusion we will treat ‘unit classes’ or ‘singletons’ (i.e., classes 
with only one member), as Lewis (1991) defends them, viz., mereological atoms which have no 
other parts besides themselves. For the sake of this example, for the concrete part of the mixed 
fusion we will imagine electrons as having no other parts besides themselves. Then, with the 
singleton ‘S’, of the null set, and an electron ‘E’, from the moon, say, together forming a composite 
‘MF’ by unrestricted composition, some of our earlier questions arise: is the mixed fusion MF an 
abstract entity, a concrete entity, or neither? Let’s examine the prospects for these answers in turn. 
5.4 Are fusions of both abstracta and concreta abstract or concrete? 
For the two questions of whether MF is an abstract entity or whether it is a concrete one, we need to 
consider if it is feasible that any abstract entity can have any concrete parts (and vice versa). We 
have already encountered the expectation that this is implausible, both because of the negative 
contrast usually given to abstract things when compared to concrete things and because of the two 
realm view which puts abstracta in a domain separate from concreta. Consequently, the 
suppositions that abstracta are uniformly abstract and that concreta are uniformly concrete are ones 
which it seems fair to say would not allow that either abstracta or concreta have the other kind of 
thing specifically as parts. 
 As Katz avers, following the convention that concreta are spatiotemporal objects, “It is 
implicit in the traditional26 abstract/concrete distinction that the abstract has no taint of the concrete 
and the concrete no taint of the abstract. An abstract object can have nothing about it that is 
spatially or temporally locatable, and a concrete object can have nothing about it that is neither 
                                                 
26 Modulo our previous correction regarding the causal aspect of Plato’s Forms. 
141 
spatially nor temporally locatable.” (1998, 121)27 In this vein, Katz seeks to explicate the standard 
abstract–concrete distinction in terms of his: 
(D) An object is abstract just in case it lacks both spatial and temporal location 
and is homogeneous in this respect. An object is concrete just in case it has 
spatial or temporal location and is homogeneous in this respect. (1998, 124)28 
Katz characterizes homogeneity in the following way “I shall say that an object is homogeneous 
when, roughly speaking, its constituents each have the same ontological nature as the object itself. 
Abstract objects are, as it were, abstract all the way down, and concrete objects are concrete all the 
way down.” (1998, 121) We can precisify Katz’s characterisation of homogeneity here using 
Seibt’s stricter definition of things when they are uniformly like-parted as these things being 
‘homeomerous’.29 
(H1) A whole of kind K is homeomerous just in case all its parts are of the 
same kind as the whole, i.e., of kind K. (2017, 256) 
From here we can distinguish homeomereity from homogeneity which varies by recognising that a 
whole may be identified as of a different kind to its proper parts, while these parts are all of the 
same kind as each other. 
(H2) A whole of kind K is homogeneous30 just in case all the parts of a whole 
of kind K are all of kind K*, which may differ from kind K.31 
For example, a whole which is of the kind ‘cardboard box’ can be identified as homogeneous with 
respect to32 all of its proper parts which are of the kind ‘cardboard’. This whole is not 
                                                 
27 Cf., Hodes (1984: 127) “Numbers are so pure, so unstained by the cement of the universe, that reference to them and 
their ilk seems quite sui generis.” 
28 Note that this is clarified to include mental entities which, if not spatial, are at least temporal. Compare Frege taking 
abstract objects as belonging to a third realm separate from both a distinct “external world” and realm of consciousness. 
(Beaney 1997, 336-7) 
29 This follows a transliteration and simplification of the ancient Greek adjective ‘όμοιομερής’ (homoeomerēs) and the 
associated noun ‘όμοιομέρεια’ (homoeoméreia), terms which may have first been used systematically by Aristotle 
(Seibt 2017, 255). In the distinction between homeomerous and homogeneous, roughly, ‘homoe’ (like) and ‘meros’ 
(part) are being contrasted with ‘homo’ (same) and ‘genos’ (kind). 
30 Seibt mistakenly writes ‘homeomerous’ again for this definition of ‘homogeneous’. 
31 Across both definitions the term ‘part’ is meant to be read in the restricted sense of ‘proper part’ only. 
32 Note here that both definitions may be employed in more restricted senses which relate to what is called the 
‘granularity’ of the parts concerned. In this case, proper part recognition is restricted to something like ‘cardboard 
piece’ grain-size, while things like the molecules that are proper parts of the cardboard box (on ordinary views) which 
142 
homeomerous, however, with respect to the kind ‘cardboard box’, as not all of its proper parts are 
cardboard boxes, if any. 
 Looking back at Figure 5.3 we can therefore identify the composite C1C2, if an abstractum, 
as homogeneous (and not homeomerous) with respect to the kind ‘concrete’, as all of its proper 
parts are concreta. This situation presents a further issue we need to consider alongside the 
plausibility of cabs when it comes to unrestricted composition – that of whether a whole which is an 
abstractum can be homogeneously concrete. I think the instinctive and natural response is no, 
because it’s absurd, a response which may be shared by many. Consider Kaufman (2002) making 
clear that – despite some differences between the more traditional conception of the abstract–
concrete distinction and Katz’s version given in (D) – “the two have one common feature: the 
abstract and the concrete are taken to represent two fundamentally different orders of things, 
metaphysically homogeneous33 things with incompatible properties.” (Kaufman 2002, 218) 
 What I plan to do, using the definitions given, is precisify this sort of objection, and to 
discuss the strategies some might take in response. Before we continue, however, further 
clarification of the usual understanding of the abstract–concrete distinction as involving at least the 
joint exhaustiveness and mutual exclusivity of the two categories is in order. Here, on my 
understanding, to assert that the abstract–concrete distinction is exhaustive is to accept 
Exhaustivity  Every entity is either abstract or concrete, or both. 
While my Exhaustivity thesis here asserts that no entity can be neither abstract nor concrete – as 
that would be a further option beyond what has been exhausted – it additionally does not imply that 
each entity is only one of either abstract or concrete, as that is what the claim of exclusivity is for.34 
Compare, e.g., Cowling who instead offers, “(i) Exhaustiveness. The abstract–concrete distinction is 
exhaustive. It applies to absolutely all entities and guarantees that each entity is either abstract or 
concrete.” (2017, 70) 
                                                                                                                                                                  
are not themselves cardboard pieces have been ignored. For questions involving abstracta-concreta fusions the size of 
parts is irrelevant, because of how broad these categorisations of kinds are supposed to be. 
33 As Kaufman’s paper primarily discusses Katz’s views here, it is expected that what Kaufman means by 
‘homogeneous’ follows Katz’s definition too. 
34 It should be noted that Exhaustivity operates solely along the dimension of the abstract and concrete here. This means 
that this thesis does not preclude there being other category delineations which are either supersidiary or subsidiary to it, 
such as, e.g., ‘object’ as a category covering both of them (cf., Rettler, Bailey 2017, 1.1; Katz 1998, 145), or, e.g., class 
and proposition being subsidiaries of the category abstract, or, e.g., physical and mental being subsidiaries of the 
category concrete (cf., Katz 1998, 145). Also note that Exhaustivity is still compatible with either purely concreta (à la 
reist or nominalist) or purely abstracta (à la Pythagoreanist) ontologies. 
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 This slight difference in our definitions results in Cowling’s succeeding statement of 
exclusivity being redundant because its main point, that no entity belongs to both of the two 
categories, is already implied. “(ii) Exclusivity. The abstract–concrete distinction is exclusive. No 
entity belongs to the category abstract entity and to the category concrete entity. When paired with 
Exhaustiveness, Exclusivity partitions all entities into the two categories of abstract entity and 
concrete entity.” (2017, 70) 
 Besides this, Cowling-Exclusivity fails to ensure that an important criterion for the platonist 
is met, namely that not only should no entities belong to both of the categories, but also that each 
entity is completely either abstract or concrete and does not harbour any traces of the other category 
– in other words, that both of these kinds of entities are uniformly their own kinds.35 (After all, this 
is both why inhabitants of the two realms are kept apart and not integrated on this view, as well as 
why the properties attributed to either kind of entity are set in distinction to the other.) 
 With this in mind, on my understanding, to assert that the abstract–concrete distinction is 
exclusive is to accept 
Exclusivity  Abstracta and concreta are each uniformly their own kinds. 
How exactly the term ‘uniformly’ is to be understood in this context is something elaborated upon 
below. For now we have, at least, that Exhaustivity guarantees there are no other categories (along 
the same dimension) beyond the abstract and the concrete, whereas Exclusivity ensures that where 
something is of one of those categories that it is of it uniformly, and thereby also unable to belong 
to both categories. 
 Following all of the foregoing lines of thinking, the standard abstract–concrete distinction 
therefore appears to imply that the two categories are both mutually exclusive and jointly 
exhaustive, with exclusivity understood in the sense that the things of each category do not have 
things of the other category as their parts, and with exhaustivity understood in the sense that there 
are no other categories besides these two. From this perspective, then, it seems like the abstract–
concrete distinction can be understood to entail that the things that exist are exactly either entirely 
abstract or entirely concrete (in the homeomerous sense), and nothing else.36 I call this the Ex-Ex 
thesis: 
Ex-Ex   Anything is only either entirely abstract or entirely concrete. 
                                                 
35 Cf., Katz (1998, 121 et alibi). 
36 ‘Nothing else’ along this specific dimension, to be sure. 
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For our question of whether mereological composites like MF (which recall has an abstractum 
singleton S and a concretum electron E as its only proper parts) are themselves abstract, the 
consequence of the Ex-Ex thesis is that they are not. Nor are they concrete. These consequences 
come from the Ex-Ex thesis’s two implicit abstracta and concreta homeomereity theses, that 
anything which is an abstract entity only has abstract entities as parts, and that anything which is a 
concrete entity only has concrete entities as parts. 
Abstracta Homeomereity Any abstract entity only has abstract entities as parts.37 
Concreta Homeomereity Any concrete entity only has concrete entities as parts.38 
With such homeomereity conditions prevailing, it is not possible for things composed of both 
abstract and concrete entities to be either abstract or concrete themselves. Along with the remaining 
exhaustiveness commitment of the Ex-Ex thesis, this means that, as understood from the point of 
view of the standard dualistic ontology inherited from Plato through to its slight revision in Katz’s 
(D), mereological composition between entities from these two different categories is denied, 
because such composites can belong to neither of the two available categories, and there are no 
other categories available for these to belong to. 
 The consequence of the Ex-Ex thesis being true is thereby that composition cannot occur 
between things from the two different categories of the abstract and the concrete. Which means, in 
this case, the existence of entities like MF is denied. Such a conclusion constitutes a clear 
obstruction of GEM by restricting its principle of unrestricted composition from operating beyond 
single-category domains in contexts of there being both abstracta and concreta. Although this sort 
of limitation may already be adhered to by GEM supporting nominalists, such as Nelson Goodman 
(1951) who already expect only a concrete domain for mereology to operate in anyway, or also by 
those mereologists that follow the common practice of restricting attention to the concrete domain 
for many typical applications of GEM, such as when seeking to utilise the theory to explicate things 
about spacetime and our surrounding concepts therein (cf., in Kleinschmidt 2014, xxii and Lando 
2017), there are still views which do treat it as an absolutely general theory of composition, 
                                                 
37 Cf., Sajama and Vihjanen’s claim that “abstract entities cannot have parts that are concrete entities.” (2013, 88); and, 
somewhat similarly, Berto and Jago reporting Zalta’s view that “Abstract objects do not have concrete things as parts.” 
(2019, 62) 
38 Cf., Trogdon and Cowling assuming both homeomereity theses for the sake of their defence of abstract atomism 
(discussed in Chapter 4) “We assume that any complex concrete entity only has further concreta as proper parts, and 
any complex abstract entity only has further abstracta as proper parts.” (2019, 2033 fn 11) 
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intended to be applied completely transcategorially and cross-domain without restriction (cf., the 
discussion in Varzi 2006, discussed in Chapter 6). 
 Obviously such a restriction on mereology constitutes a rejection of Lewis’s (1986 and 
1991) views and systems, especially the mereological relations he advances as holding between 
concrete individuals and abstract classes with his proposed mixed fusions. Yet it also goes further 
than this if we maintain the conception of concrete objects as only being the parts of possible 
worlds, and for there not to be any concreta outside worlds, as Lewis (1986) looks to do. To see the 
problem, think back to Figure 5.3 where C1 and C2 are supposed to be distinct possible worlds. The 
above conception of concreta means that the mereological fusion, C1C2, is not a part of any 
possible worlds, which results in the conclusion that C1C2 is not itself a concretum. 
 This seems absurd if we consider that all of C1C2’s proper parts are concrete – i.e., it seems 
absurd to accept that C1C2 is homogeneously concrete without being homeomerously concrete, 
especially when we have understood homeomereity in the case of abstracta and concreta to be 
absolute, and not relative to something like the ‘grain’ size of the parts involved. Although we 
already saw that homogeneity does not entail homeomereity in general, we also recognise that it is 
Lewis’s claimed modal organisation coupled with a conception that entities outside worlds are 
abstract which results in this consequence here, as it is the case that sums of homeomerous concreta 
confined within single concrete worlds are both homogeneously and homeomerously concrete on 
his view. 
 All of this means that, even though Lewis’s system might at first appear to provide a fair 
division into abstract and concrete realms, the candidate concrete realm within the system cannot 
genuinely be identified as itself a concretum without undermining a distinction of the concrete and 
the abstract as between that which is inside of worlds and that which is outside of worlds. In this 
case we are left with a supposedly concrete realm which is itself an abstractum, and also populated 
with an overwhelming majority of trans-world composite objects which are not themselves concrete 
– which clearly invalidates the claim that such an entity is indeed a concrete realm. 
 With Lewis being a major modern defender of GEM, especially understood as operating 
with absolutely generality, he is unlikely to accept any restriction on composition from these 
apparent problems due to mixed fusions and trans-world sums. Instead, I think that Lewis would be 
forced to reject both my Ex-Ex thesis and the conception of entities outside of worlds as only able 
to be abstracta. While I think Lewis may be able to accept a weaker version of the Ex-Ex thesis 
which uses Cowling-Exclusivity here, I do not think the latter option is a strategy which is available 
to him. In the next section I will explain why. 
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5.5 Out-of-world Abstracta and Concrete Inheritance 
Let us first consider the latter issue of the abstract/concrete status of entities outside of worlds. 
Prima facie it is understandable to expect that Lewis generally maintains a concreta and abstracta 
division along an inside-of-world and outside-of-world dimension. We can surmise this first by his 
portrayal of possible worlds and their parts as that which is concrete, with the parts of possible 
worlds, including their improper parts, as the only possibilia (note that there are some caveats here 
to be addressed later though). This then contrasts with Lewis’s assessment that every entity outside 
of possible worlds – whether or not they have parts from within them – are impossibilia. In this 
case, both the mereological sums composed of parts from different worlds (Lewis’s trans-world 
fusions), and things without parts in any worlds (for Lewis, at least sets/classes) are thereby 
impossibilia. 
 Additionally mixed fusions can represent a further type of impossibilia composite here – as 
these can be fusions of individual parts from within worlds and class parts not from any worlds, 
such that no mixed fusion is a part of any possible world either, whether the individual parts are 
from worlds or not. All together, this possible/impossible split conveys an expectation that what is 
possible is in worlds and what is in worlds is concrete, whereas what is not in worlds is impossible 
and what is not in worlds is not concrete – i.e., those are abstract. 
 In addition to this, Lewis contrasts his plurality of concrete worlds view with what he calls 
the ‘ersatz’ view of possible worlds (with ‘ersatz’ basically meaning ‘abstract’ for Lewis in this 
context). 
The ersatzers say that instead of an incredible plurality of concrete worlds, we 
can have one world only, and countless abstract entities representing ways that 
this world might have been. [...] According to ersatzism [there] is one concrete 
world, and one only. It includes all the concrete beings there are. There are no 
other worlds, and no other-worldly possible individuals – not, at any rate, if 
those are understood as concrete (or partly concrete) entities. (1986, 136) (my 
emphasis)39 
The emphasised notion that concrete worlds include all the concrete beings that there are is not one 
that Lewis disputes – the key difference in this context being that Lewis just explicitly proposes 
more worlds than one for concreta to be in, and not for there to be more concreta that are outside of 
worlds altogether. 
                                                 
39 This ‘partly concrete’ qualification is to be addressed with the aforementioned caveats later. 
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 To introduce some further distinguishing terms, within this framework we can continue to 
describe objects as either ‘in’ or ‘out’ of worlds. By leaving ‘in’ to mean ‘pure in’, in the sense that 
all of such thing’s parts, proper and improper, are in a world, we get 3 types of composite (via 
GEM) which have their improper part outside of every world: (1) ‘out but with all proper parts in’ – 
such as trans-world sums comprising 2 mereological atoms; (2) ‘out with some but not all proper 
parts in’ – such as mixed fusions with in-world individual parts, as well as trans-world sums with 3 
or more proper parts; and (3) ‘out with no proper parts in’ – such as how Lewis treats sets and 
classes. We might call these ‘whole outs’, ‘half outs’, and ‘pure outs’ respectively. 
 While Lewis is explicit that he takes classes as abstract, he does not explicitly state whether 
he also takes trans-world sums and mixed fusions to be abstracta, even though these are both out-
world types of objects. (This is regrettable, and I will argue later that it is exactly at these points of 
fusion from within each world to outside it that Lewis’s system faces serious problems.) I think it is 
reasonable to presume from the context of Lewis’s discussion of the abstract–concrete distinction 
(1986, 1.7) that he does not expect there to be a third kind of entity beyond abstracta or concreta, so 
from the fact that trans-world sums and mixed fusions have their improper part outside of worlds, it 
is reasonable to assess that by Lewis’s account they are indeed abstract objects. We can characterise 
this as the thesis that all ‘out-of-world’ entities are abstracta. 
Out-of-world Abstracta Entities which are not parts of possible worlds are abstracta. 
Yet, although Lewis’s concrete/abstract divide appears to follow an in/out or possible/impossible 
arrangement, there are several aspects of his presentation, along with other views which Lewis 
promotes, that I believe compel him to generally accept the non-pure outs as concreta, rather than 
abstracta, leading to violations of the above thesis. 
 First, Lewis appears to accept a fusion principle that any fusion of concreta is itself concrete. 
Concreta Fusion  Any fusion of concreta is itself a concretum.40 
We can see Lewis accepting this when querying the abstract/concrete status of worlds themselves. 
Here he says “Whole worlds ... cannot stand in spatiotemporal and causal relations to anything 
outside themselves, and it seems that nothing can stand in such relations to its own parts” (1986, 
                                                 
40 Cf., Lewis’s (1991) explicit fusion thesis with regards to individuals and implicit fusion thesis with regards to classes, 
as detailed earlier in Chapter 1. 
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84). According to Lewis’s criteria for things being worldmates and proper parts of worlds,41 these 
are conditions which imply that the improper part of possible worlds, the worlds themselves, are not 
themselves concrete. From this, Lewis asks “Should we conclude that worlds – including the one 
we are part of – are abstract wholes made of concrete parts? Perhaps, indeed, divisible exhaustively 
into concrete parts?” (1986, 84) He objects to this, and offers instead that “wholes can inherit 
concreteness from their parts.” (1986, 84) 
 The Concreta Fusion Thesis clearly entails that whole out trans-world sums such as C1C2 
are indeed concrete entities. What’s more, Lewis’s response also signals an acceptance of an even 
more general concreteness inheritance (as without it, his purportedly concrete worlds are not 
concrete after all). 
Concrete Inheritance  Anything with any concrete parts at all is itself concrete.42 
Concrete Inheritance clearly entails that half out sums – like trans-world sums with 3 or more 
proper parts and mixed fusions with concrete individual parts – are indeed concrete entities,43 which 
means that Lewis’s view entails that there are concrete impossibilia. In addition to the principle of 
Concrete Inheritance, Lewis’s commitment to the thesis of CAI (as discussed in Chapter 3) also 
looks to force him into accepting concrete impossibilia, following the terminological distinction 
over entities that are parts of worlds or not, on pain of inconsistency. We can see this especially 
recalling that CAI asserts that composites are collectively identical to their parts, such that any 
                                                 
41 That, roughly, things are proper parts of worlds if they are ‘worldmates’ (1986, 69), where proper parts are 
worldmates iff they are (‘analogically’ or familiarly) spatiotemporally related (1986, 71 definition combined with the 
qualification on 75–76). 
42 Compare Berto and Jago wondering “how can a wholly nonexistent world have a part which exists? [...] a whole with 
an existent part is surely something that in part exists” (2019, 54-55). On this kind of query, Lewis insists that existence 
is a binary matter – that things either do or do not exist. For instance “existence cannot be a matter of degree. If you say 
there is something that exists to a diminished degree, once you’ve said ‘there is’ your game is up.” (1991, 80-81) The 
expectation here is that concreteness follows a similar principle. 
43 Although Katz’s (1998) system does not permit supra-world fusion, it is worth noting that he attempts to reject 
Exhaustivity by introducing a third kind of entity, yet which are ultimately composed only of both abstracta and 
concreta parts, and so are not purely alternate to the abstract–concrete distinction in their own manner. I think his 
attempt fails, however, as his system includes a form of Concrete Inheritance. This serves to defeat his rejection of 
Exhaustivity by entailing that his purported third kind of entity are, in fact, concrete. This expected entailment is not 
peculiar to me either. Kaufman (2002, 233) slightly mistakenly complains that Katz asserts a sole world and universe as 
a physical universe, thereby undermining the proposal of a third kind of category by doing so, presumably from also 
expecting such inheritance to follow. (‘Mistakenly’ only insofar as Katz does not actually treat his one universe qua 
whole or improper part as physical in any explicit sense at all. If he did it would indeed make his alleged third kind of 
entity even more undeniably concrete.) 
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spatiotemporal extension properties that any proper part has will also be had by the wholes which 
they are parts of. 
 Returning to Figure 5.3, to be collectively identical to both C1 and C2 along the dimension 
of their concreteness is clearly for their sum C1C2 to itself be concrete. Even if we relaxed the CAI 
thesis, I find Concrete Inheritance agreeable, as I think it is natural to expect that a whole has some 
of its properties which amount to being cumulative properties of its proper parts, such as mass or 
length.44 For example, considering that concreta are generally understood to have some extension, 
whether spatial or temporal, or both,45 C1C2 should weigh the combined mass of C1 and C2, as 
well as have their combined spatial volumes and (perhaps overlapping) temporal duration. 
 For a more familiar example, think of a red handled screwdriver. Even though the steel shaft 
is grey in colour, making the totality of the colour of the screwdriver a red-grey combo, we can still 
say that the whole thing has some primary colour to it (and you would not be wrong to ask someone 
to pass you the red screwdriver even though it is not entirely red). Similarly, if the handle of the 
screwdriver has some mass, then we can say that the screwdriver itself has some mass, without even 
considering the mass of the steel. The plausibility of Concrete Inheritance thereby rests on this kind 
of notion, that where a property like mass can be a marker of concreteness, that having a part which 
has mass is sufficient for something being concrete, because it too has mass – the mass of its parts. 
From this, then, just like in the screwdriver case where we say it has some primary colour to it, 
when a trans-world sum has some part which has some mass, this means that the whole has some 
mass too, and at least the mass of that part. And because to have some mass is thereby to simply 
have mass, the trans-world sum is concrete due to the mass that it has. 
 In the case of mixed fusions with concrete parts we get the same result – they share the 
mass/length/whatever concreta sufficient property of their concrete parts which makes their 
concrete part concrete, and are themselves thereby concrete too. The consequence for Lewis here is 
that by accepting Concrete Inheritance within concrete worlds it is therefore inconsistent and 
unjustified for him to deny it in the case of either trans-world or supra-world sums. 
 What can be derived from Lewis’s various assertions in this context, then, is that he holds an 
implicit package of at least 5 theses which – within his framework of mereology, classes and 
possible worlds – are together incompatible. The positive side of the package includes the four of 
                                                 
44 For a dissenting opinion on Concrete Inheritance like entailments see Gaskin (2008, 58 ff) who holds both that 
propositions with concrete constituents are still abstracta, and that the world too is “essentially abstract”, even with 
concrete parts. 
45 Cf., Lewis (1986, 73) remarking on some spatiotemporal variety across worlds. 
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Exhaustivity, Out-of-world Abstracta, Concreta Homeomereity, and Concrete Inheritance (which 
itself entails Concreta Fusion anyway). The negative side includes the implied rejection of 
Abstracta Homeomereity which follows from the combination of Out-of-world Abstracta with 
Lewis’s acceptance of mixed fusions and trans-world sums. 
 My contention is that it is this implied rejection of Abstracta Homeomereity via Out-of-
world Abstracta which is at odds with Concrete Inheritance in this context. This is because this 
rejection of Abstracta Homeomereity permits abstracta with concrete parts, whereas Concrete 
Inheritance entails that any candidate abstracta with concrete parts is actually concrete. This results 
in the overall inconsistency of Lewis’s implicit package of theses, because both of the theses of 
Concrete Inheritance and Out-of-world Abstracta are upheld, making his system incapable of 
determining either trans-world sums or mixed fusions with concrete parts as either abstract or 
concrete, and thereby violating Exhaustivity. 
 To see what his options are for avoiding this inconsistency, in the next section I examine 
whether Lewis has any viable options left for salvaging a consistent package of these theses under 
the conditions of plural concrete worlds, GEM, and pure out classes, and determine his best overall 
strategy for denying my Ex-Ex thesis. 
5.6 Lewis’s options for rejecting my Ex-Ex thesis 
As I have argued, if my Ex-Ex thesis as the basis of the standard abstract–concrete distinction is to 
be accepted, GEM is incompatible with a varied ontology consisting of only abstract and concrete 
entities – even if there is only a single concrete world and some abstracta which transcend it. This 
means that a commitment to GEM in such a context requires a rejection of my Ex-Ex thesis, 
something which I think David Lewis, as both a proponent of GEM and an ontology populated by 
abstracta and concreta, is compelled to do. 
 A rejection of the Ex-Ex thesis can be complete or partial, however. This is because the Ex-
Ex thesis consists in three subsidiary theses – the two homeomereity theses already met, and the 
Exhaustivity thesis. As such, Lewis looks to have seven options to consider in this context so as to 
be able to maintain a system of concrete worlds and transcendent abstracta which is compatible 
with GEM: reject the complete package of theses, i.e., reject all three of them, or reject some other 
combination of one or more of the theses. 
 In the previous section I showed that Lewis’s assertions established his position as one 
which already implicitly rejects Abstracta Homeomereity, yet I also showed that this rejection is 
inconsistent with another positive thesis which he endorses, viz., Concrete Inheritance. Therefore, 
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in this section I seek to examine the issue of Lewis’s obligation to reject my Ex-Ex thesis within the 
context of determining which of his theses Lewis is plausibly able to maintain. 
 It should be noted from the outset here that, as the foregoing section also reveals, deciding 
upon the best choice for Lewis in this case is complicated by the fact that it is difficult to determine 
precisely what the premises of his views entail in comparison to what he characterises as the 
consequences of these premises. To try and follow the various potential threads, I will switch 
between examining those of Lewis’s options which stem from endorsing Out-of-world Abstracta, 
and those options which permit its violation. To be upfront, I do think Lewis is most obliged to 
reject Out-of-world Abstracta over the explicitly given Concrete Inheritance. Not just because he 
admits he needs the latter for his worlds to be concrete, but also by following the principles of 
property inheritance that he endorses, whether via CAI or even in the independent sense as 
discussed in Chapter 3, and by the end of my analysis this should be clear. It is this heavily obliged 
Concrete Inheritance that also results in Lewis’s system endorsing concrete impossibilia, however, a 
result I will be demonstrating later in section 5.6.4. For now, though, we start to examine Lewis’s 
options for rejecting my Ex-Ex thesis, beginning with rejecting Exhaustivity. 
5.6.1 Rejecting Exhaustivity 
If we start by first sticking with the original view of Lewis’s concrete/abstract division as one more 
or less following the in–out world distinction, then merely rejecting Exhaustivity won’t permit the 
existence of both trans-world fusions and mixed fusions. This is because these cannot be a third (or 
other) kind of entity that is not abstract nor concrete, a third kind being what a rejection of 
Exhaustivity would allow, and they cannot because of Out-of-world Abstracta. On this thesis, 
mixed fusions and trans-world sums cannot be concreta for being out of worlds but must be 
abstracta, yet following Abstracta Homeomereity they also cannot be abstracta due to their having 
concrete parts. 
 This all means that for a rejection of Exhaustivity to work in this case, Out-of-world 
Abstracta would also at least either need to be rejected outright or otherwise weakened so as to only 
exclude out-of-world things from being concreta, rather than be an assertion that out-of-world 
things are only abstracta. If Out-of-world Abstracta is only rejected by this weakening, however, 
Concrete Inheritance would need to be rejected too, as the mixed fusions and trans-world sums 
could not be concreta under the weakening (which still prohibits out-world concreta), nor following 
Concreta Homeomereity. If Out-of-world Abstracta is instead rejected, rather than weakened, 
though, Concrete Inheritance would still need to be rejected here too as keeping it would obviate the 
aim of rejecting Exhaustivity (to allow for kinds beyond concreta and abstracta). This is because 
both mixed fusions with concrete parts and trans-world sums would still be concreta after all. 
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Additionally, if Concrete Inheritance is not rejected here we would also end up with a violation of 
Concreta Homeomereity (which is being kept in this example) due to mixed fusions being concrete 
via inheritance, yet still with abstracta class parts. 
 In the case of rejecting only Exhaustivity, then, Lewis will be obliged to justify and defend 
an at least three category approach, presumably maintaining pure outs as abstracta, and worlds and 
their parts as concreta, yet while also rejecting his inheritance principles and modifying his implied 
out-of-world views to allow for the third or more kinds. However, I don’t think that denying 
Exhaustivity is a cogent strategy for Lewis here. This is for several reasons. 
 One, because even though Lewis does express reservations regarding the overall aptness of 
the abstract–concrete distinction (1986, 81), he still manages to maintain one in connection with 
possible worlds, i.e., the distinction of what appears entirely in possible worlds being concrete and 
what appears entirely outside of possible worlds being abstract. That troubles with this presumption 
arise when supra-world fusions are scrutinised says more about there being a problem with supra-
world fusions than with the initial presumption that the abstract–concrete distinction tracks the 
mereological in-world/out-world one. 
 Two, rejecting the property inheritance of concreteness undermines Lewis’s claim that 
possible worlds (the improper parts) are concrete after all, and this is a problem worth avoiding in 
the advancement of concrete modal realism. In addition to this, that Lewis advances CAI (which 
brings property inheritance) as a reason to accept GEM (as discussed in Chapter 3), and not the 
other way around, suggests that he should be rejecting the mereology with priority instead. This is 
especially the case when, as I have argued in this context, CAI actually results in problems for the 
mereology rather than properly supports it. 
 Lastly, as Lewis actually gives evidence of a preference for both Out-of-world Abstracta and 
Concrete Inheritance, whereas he gives no evidence of a preference for rejecting Exhaustivity, 
pursuing this option in isolation from considering the choice between these other two principles 
seems unwarranted. This is even more so when rejecting Exhaustivity to properly allow other kinds 
of entities besides abstracta and concreta requires rejecting both Out-of-world Abstracta and 
Concrete Inheritance lest this purported rejection of Exhaustivity alone become a de facto rejecting 
of a homeomereity thesis as well. 
 Taking the rejection of Exhaustivity off the menu for Lewis then leaves him with 3 options 
to deny the Ex-Ex thesis: to either reject Abstracta Homeomereity, Concreta Homeomereity, or 
both. 
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5.6.2 Rejecting Abstracta Homeomereity 
In the context of Lewis’s initial concrete/abstract division as an apparent in–out world distinction 
via Out-of-world Abstracta the rejection of Abstracta Homeomereity alone is insufficient for 
maintaining compatibility between GEM and Lewis’s system. While this allows mixed fusions to 
be abstracta with concrete parts, and the same for trans-world sums, unless Lewis also rejects 
Concrete Inheritance (and Concrete Fusion along with it) the principles are in tension over the 
status of supra-world fusions.46 
 This means a rejection of Abstracta Homeomereity here amounts to deciding between 
rejecting Out-of-world Abstracta or rejecting Concrete Inheritance. The trouble with the former 
option is that Abstracta Homeomereity is no longer rejected in practice, as any alleged abstractum 
with concrete parts is actually instead concrete (and any actual abstractum could only have abstract 
parts), and this becomes rather a rejection of Concreta Homeomereity instead because mixed 
fusions would be concrete with abstract parts. 
 Therefore, for a rejection of Abstracta Homeomereity to be consistent in this context, Lewis 
needs to also reject Concrete Inheritance while maintaining Out-of-world Abstracta. As I stated 
before, this is not really amenable to Lewis’s defence of GEM, nor his claim that possible worlds 
are actually concrete wholes. Beyond this, however, is the further wrinkle that Lewis makes 
allowances for there being either immanent universals or tropes qua in-world abstracta, even though 
he neither specifically endorses nor rejects them herein. 
[If] ordinary particulars contain universals or tropes as (non-spatiotemporal) 
parts, then worlds composed of ordinary particulars will in turn have universals 
or tropes as parts; in which case not all the parts of worlds are paradigmatically 
concrete. Indeed we might contemplate a theory of numbers – one which says, 
for instance, that the number three is the structural universal of tripartiteness – 
according to which some parts of worlds would turn out to be paradigmatically 
abstract. (1986, 82) 
Recalling that Out-of-world Abstracta does not entail that all abstracta are out of worlds, but only 
that all out-world entities are abstract, the fact that Lewis does not strictly exclude abstracta from 
being in-world too thereby results in the potential for violation of Concrete Homeomereity as well 
here, as any concrete thing with abstract immanent universals or tropes for parts would entail. 
                                                 
46 Note well that there is no room here for out-world entities to be both abstract and concrete as Exhaustivity alone 
allows. After all, Out-of-world Abstracta says out-world entities are abstracta, not both, and Concrete Inheritance says 
that things with any concrete proper parts are concrete, not both. 
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 In this case, because a rejection of Abstracta Homeomereity is off the table for Lewis here 
unless he makes even further independent and undefended rejections again, including the additional 
rejection of either Concreta Homeomereity or both immanent universals and tropes, I conclude that 
this is also not a plausible option for Lewis to pursue. 
5.6.3 Rejecting Concreta Homeomereity 
In the context of Lewis’s initial concrete/abstract division as an apparent in–out world distinction 
via Out-of-world Abstracta the rejection of Concreta Homeomereity alone is also insufficient for 
maintaining compatibility between GEM and Lewis’s system. This is because, in this instance, 
neither trans-world sums nor mixed fusions can be concreta (for being out of worlds) or abstracta 
(for having concreta parts under Abstracta Homeomereity), and yet there is no other kind for them 
to be following Exhaustivity. This leaves such hybrid entities incompatible with the remaining 
package of theses. 
 Therefore, for a rejection of Concreta Homeomereity to get towards permitting supra-world 
fusions, Lewis needs to go beyond the initial division and reject Out-of-world Abstracta outright. 
(Merely weakening it to be Out-of-world Not Concreta is inadequate because without a denial of 
Exhaustivity here any out-world entities can still only be abstracta, and Concrete Inheritance is still 
contradicted.) Under Exhaustivity this allows that out-world entities may be either concreta, 
abstracta, or both. Following the implications of Concrete Inheritance, we hereby end up with a 
reason to reject Concreta Homeomereity in the case of mixed fusions with concrete parts, as these 
would be concrete entities with abstract parts (the class parts) – which invites an assessment of 
abstracta as precisely those things with no concreta for parts. 
 This is good, because here we have a principle which looks to support a homeomereity 
thesis rather than for such a thesis to be merely a stipulation. That is, Concrete Inheritance looks to 
entail Abstracta Homeomereity precisely because any alleged abstractum could not have concrete 
parts and yet still be abstract, leaving things with only abstract parts as abstracta, a homeomerous 
result. In this case too, the inclusion of either abstract immanent universals or tropes make no 
trouble as concreta are permitted to have abstracta parts once Concreta Homeomereity is rejected, it 
being only the converse that is prohibited with Abstracta Homeomereity being maintained. And we 
are also not rejecting any property inheritance principles which Lewis shows support for in multiple 
places, making this the most attractive option for Lewis to pursue thus far. 
 There are two further complications worth discussing with regards to Lewis’s allowances for 
certain in-world abstracta here. The first is that he initially describes these as non-spatiotemporal (as 
above in 1986, 82), which is difficult to reconcile with his assertion that the parts of concrete worlds 
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are spatiotemporal worldmates. Yet it’s likely that Lewis initially describes them as non-
spatiotemporal because they are either paradigmatically abstract, or commonly taken to be such. In 
this case, Lewis remains clearly open to there being concreta with abstract proper parts, as he says 
“if universals or tropes are non-spatiotemporal parts of ordinary particulars that in turn are parts of 
worlds, then here we have abstractions that are parts of worlds. So, by and large, ... it seems that 
indeed I should say that worlds as I take them to be are concrete; and so are many of their parts, but 
perhaps not all.” (1986, 86) Because Lewis accepts that particulars can still be concrete even with 
abstract parts, I think we are safe to insist that this means that any mereological combination of 
abstracta and concreta should be understood to form a concrete composite from his views too. 
 The second complication to be discussed actually upends the first one, however, and also 
serves to reduce Lewis’s account from being conclusively non-concrete homeomerous. This is 
because Lewis goes on to argue that spatiotemporal location is heritable, either from part-to-whole 
or from whole-to-part, so long as one of them is the primary bearer of a location. In the latter case, 
after all, “if a universal is wholly present in each of many located particulars, as by definition it is, 
that means that it is where its instances are. It is multiply located, not unlocated.” (1986, 83) We 
met the former case of heritability previously when Lewis insisted that possible worlds inherit 
concreteness from their concrete proper parts – with this being an instance of these worlds at least 
inheriting the collective location from their proper parts. In the context of these claims, Lewis 
attests that “worlds and their parts – including the universals, if such there be! – are concrete.” 
(1986, 84)47 
 Although tropes and other candidate abstracta weren’t specified here, the generality of 
Lewis’s attitude, that parts are located where their wholes are, and (at least collectively) vice versa, 
achieves the same result. This brings with it some problematic consequences, however. Consider 
that by Lewis’s account there is a mereological Universe, ‘Reality’ which has everything that exists 
as its parts. By Concrete Inheritance Reality is concrete, and by the locational aspect of that 
inheritance it is located at the collective locations of all of its located parts. In the case that there are 
in-world and out-world entities, and even if the pure outs are meant to be abstract, these are all 
                                                 
47 Note that the difference in the complications here is not from Lewis being inconsistent – rather he is surveying the 
consequences of a variety of ‘Ways’ the abstract–concrete distinction has been made, such as by distinguishing 
paradigm cases or by making reductions to them, or by denying certain features for abstracta, or by treating abstracta as 
special forms of generalisations from specific instances, i.e., as abstractions. What this means is that rather than 
revealing Lewis’s views here as expressly problematic, then, we learn instead that he has no specific objection to certain 
conditions being upheld, like non-Concreta Homeomereity. 
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going to be located where Reality is. Indeed, everything is going to be located where Reality is, 
whether via a sub-location of Reality’s total location, or sharing it. 
 Yet if this is the correct analysis of this situation, whereby everything would have 
spatiotemporal location after all, insofar as anything at all has some and mereology is classical, then 
spatiotemporality can no longer serve as a means to distinguish between abstracta and concreta in 
this context. For a small consequence: Lewis then loses the option to claim that immanent 
universals etc are concreta after all. What we might say instead is that some apparently non-
spatiotemporal things are only derivatively located (but not thereby spatiotemporal!) in a weak 
subsidiary sense by being parts of things which are the primary bearers of a location.48 Additionally, 
we might say that composite wholes either properly derive their locations from primary bearers of 
them which are their proper parts, in a strong supersidiary sense, or are only derivatively located in 
a weak subsidiary sense at the location of the things that they are a part of too (provided that there is 
even some location to derive). 
 Under this interpretation, possible worlds, trans-world sums and mixed fusions will all 
strongly inherit collective locations from their located proper parts, and thereby be concreta, 
whereas candidate non-spatiotemporal proper parts of located concreta will only weakly be 
associated with the locations of any concreta that they are parts of, and thereby be abstracta. A 
rejection of Concreta Homeomereity can then be maintained on two fronts here – via pure out 
abstracta class parts of concrete mixed fusions, and by in-world abstracta homeomerous parts of 
concrete worlds. 
 To begin to wrap up this sub-section, there are two more outstanding issues to be mentioned, 
one resolved fairly simply, and one which will require further examination of Lewis’s claims. The 
first issue is to resolve the denial of Lewis’s more explicit view of Out-of-world Abstracta. Here I 
think we are justified in insisting that Lewis needs to choose between that or Concrete Inheritance, 
and that because he gives greater defence of the latter in multiple contexts, and it has greater import 
for his view of concrete possible worlds, that he is better off maintaining the inheritance principle 
rather than the out-of-world one. 
 Besides this point, Out-of-world Abstracta appears to be more of a generalised assumption 
derived from following the common notion that mathematical objects like classes and sets are 
abstracta and outside worlds to infer that all things outside of worlds are abstracta too. This is 
especially so when the mereological misfits of trans-world sums and mixed fusions are not the usual 
                                                 
48 Here I ignore any complications from the debate over substantivalist vs relationalist views of location that there may 
be, hopefully without issue. 
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suspects on first consideration and only come to mind as out-world beings under the conditions of 
absolutely unrestricted composition. So I think it is legitimate, in this sense at least, to deny Lewis 
as having any reasonable warrant to insist that out-world entities can only be abstracta, when he 
both has principles in operation against it and lack of justification for it. 
 The second problem to be mentioned here is that, with the in/out-world split being a 
possible/impossible object split, Lewis’s best view ends up committing him to concrete impossibilia 
– something which he apparently rejects. Before we think that maybe this is not the best option for 
Lewis after all we need to examine what this rejection of concrete impossibilia properly amounts to. 
This is because, as I will show, it is not strictly a view against just concreta being outside of worlds, 
but rather, against there being concreta which instantiate logical contradictions. 
 One further caveat – although I do say that this is the best option for Lewis, this claim is 
based upon the amount of defence he gives to certain views and principles in comparison to the 
others, and the sort of overall project he has in mind being maintained rather than discarded, even 
with all of these acknowledged deficits. So even though I will show how Lewis can end up 
accepting some concrete impossibilia after all, I still think that the overall collection of options 
available to Lewis along with this one are all too problematic to maintain in general, and that in the 
end rejecting GEM by restricting composition to avoid supra-world fusions is still the most justified 
option amongst them. 
5.6.4 Isn’t Lewis against concrete impossibilia? 
The issue to be addressed here is that, as Lewis specifically argues against concrete impossible 
worlds (1986, 7 fn 3; 1983, 21), whether he is also against concrete impossibilia in general, as some 
have taken him to be (cf., sentiments like this in Vacek 2013a, 298 and 2016, 84; Kiourti 2010, 34 
and 167-8; and Yagisawa 1988, 182-183 via Vacek 2020, 27). If so, this would put some obstacles 
in the way of my claim that his views lead him to accepting some concrete impossibilia. However 
the evidence for his, at least obliged rather than clearly endorsed, acceptance of these is in my 
favour. 
 To start, we can see that even though Lewis does not explicitly set it up in terms of 
contrastive cases, he clearly distinguishes between two kinds of impossibilia – impossibilia which 
are contradictions (as discussed in 1986, 7 fn 3), and impossibilia which are (merely) out-world 
parts (1986, 211 ff). While Lewis denies the existence of impossibilia which are contradictions in 
any form, whether these are any of the four varieties found in being out-world/in-world and 
impossible/concrete, he does not deny the existence of impossibilia qua out-world entities and non-
contradictions. In fact he accepts them both as of a piece with his commitment to unrestricted 
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composition in any supra-world sums (e.g., 1991, 7), and also the kind of objects that mathematical 
classes are (e.g., 1986, 94 fn 60). 
 Because Lewis does not deny that impossibilia exist, and instead only denies the existence 
of contradictory impossibilia in or out of worlds, his arguments should be understood to be strictly 
only against contradictory existents (whether in worlds or not) rather than against any “free-
floating” (cf., 1986, 230) or otherwise less-than-maximal out-world impossibilia, concrete or 
abstract. However, as much of the succeeding discussion on this topic and concerning the strengths 
and weaknesses of Lewis’s stance on concrete impossibilia has been with regards to (concrete) 
impossible worlds alone, it is easy to see why this distinction is not frequently associated with 
Lewis’s views on impossibilia in general.49 
 Following this, as Lewis only provides arguments against certain kinds of concrete 
impossible worlds, and does not make any case against concrete impossibilia in general, I claim that 
even within Lewis’s own system we do not need something like Vacek’s indispensability argument 
for concrete impossibilia – which concludes that “We ought to have ontological commitments to 
concrete impossibilia” (2013b, 148) – to assess that Lewis, or anyone else who accepts supra-world 
fusion and Concrete Inheritance, is obliged to commit to these. Even if only of a specific kind, 
Lewis already directly serves up concrete impossibilia all by himself anyway. 
 My assessment that Lewis is at a minimum implicitly committed to concrete impossibilia, at 
least in the out-world sense, goes beyond Concrete Inheritance entailments to be furthered by how 
he discusses a strategy to conceive of trans-world individuals as ‘possible’ in virtue of the status of 
their proper parts. 
If we thought they [i.e., trans-world individuals] should not be ignored, 
perhaps because we thought that we ourselves were trans-world individuals, it 
would be appropriate and easy to give ‘possible individual’ a more inclusive 
sense. We could say that an individual exists at a world iff, quantifying only 
over parts of that world, some part of that individual exists – that way, the 
trans-world individuals would count as possible. [Continuing in a footnote:] 
                                                 
49 We can see the influence of this focus in inexact statements like Vacek’s that “According to David Lewis impossible 
individuals do not exist as it is contradictory to postulate them” (2016, 84), especially when they are contrasted with 
Lewis’s own characterisation that “Parts of worlds are possible individuals; trans-world individuals are therefore 
impossible individuals.” (1986, 211) Cf., Lewis in an earlier work saying that “the possible individuals are not all the 
individuals. I wish to impose no restrictions on mereological summation of individuals, hence I must grant that there are 
individuals consisting of parts from several worlds. But such a cross-world sum is not a possible individual.” (1983, 39) 
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Indeed, I think that in this sense, there would be no impossible individuals. No 
individual is wholly distinct from all the worlds; so every individual is 
divisible into parts which are parts of worlds. (1986, 211) 
Here we see Lewis adverting to a different sense of ‘being in’ a world that goes beyond something 
being a part of a world to include something merely having parts in worlds as sufficient for being in 
a world (as discussed among other options for interpreting ‘being in’ in (1986, 96) and (1983, 39-
40)). In the case of trans-world individuals, all of their parts resolve to some part(s) in worlds, 
whereas for mixed fusions, some of their parts only resolve to worlds in the case that the individual-
type part of the mixed fusion is a part of a world. 
 Besides the generic possibilia as concreta assimilation, what makes this interpretation 
friendly to the proposal of concrete, mereologically out-world impossibilia, on my view, is that 
Lewis does not immediately discredit the notion that “we ourselves [are] trans-world individuals”.50 
This is even while throughout the text he clearly inclines towards the understanding, and is also 
very amenable to the notion, that we, like donkeys, are concrete beings, and usually deemed to also 
be parts of concrete worlds.51 The implication here, of course, is that if concrete out-world 
impossibilia were absolutely objectionable to Lewis, he would be unlikely to entertain them, and 
especially not us ourselves as some of them. Hence I think that to deny that we would also be 
concreta if indeed we thought that we ourselves were trans-world individuals is not really an option 
for Lewis. I think this all suffices to subvert the ordinary understanding of Lewis’s view as limiting 
out-world parts to only be abstracta, even if he does not intend such a consequence. 
 Overall, on the question of whether Lewis is against concrete impossibilia, I would say that 
while he plainly disfavours them by some of his statements, it is by others that he is obliged to 
                                                 
50 An idea which he also expresses earlier in the piece as well: “individuals may be partly actual – big individuals, 
composed of parts from more worlds than one, and so partly in each of several worlds. If there are any such trans-world 
individuals that are partly in this world, hence partly actual, should we call them ‘actual’ simpliciter? – That depends. 
We needn’t, if we think of them just as oddities that we can mostly ignore. I think they are exactly that. (See section 
4.3.) But if we were reluctant to ignore them in our quantifying, perhaps because we thought that we ourselves were 
among them, then we might appropriately call them ‘actual’.” (1986, 96) 
51 For instance, Lewis (1986) calls donkeys paradigmatically concrete (83; 168 ff) and says that we are their worldmates 
(110). He also commonly uses phrases like “the world I am part of” (94), as in “I, and the world I am part of” (208); or 
more inclusively as in “worlds – including the one we are part of” (84) and “my indexical theory of actuality, on which 
the worlds are all of a kind and to call one world actual is only to say that it is the one we are part of.” (123) Cf., “the 
concrete totality we are part of” (140) and “we do know for certain that the world we are part of is the actual world – 
just as certainly as we know that the world we are part of is the very world we are part of.” (93) (Interestingly, this last 
quote appears to claim knowledge at odds with us being trans-world individuals after all). 
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accept them, in case his account be less supported from the theses he promotes. However, with the 
implications from Lewis’s principles and other assertions being that his system includes concrete 
impossibilia regardless of how he seems to characterise what follows from his stated views, what 
remains to be seen is whether this is a problem or not for his system in itself, beyond its 
characterisation. In the next section I argue that a key problematic situation is out-world entities 
having in-world properties, as well as their potential for multiple in-world causal involvement, and 
even the latter regardless of their abstract/concrete status. 
5.6.5 Problems from out-world entities having in-world concrete parts 
Consider that a consequence of Concrete Inheritance appears to be that out-world parts can have 
paradigmatically in-world properties, such as mass and length. And not in some simulated or merely 
implicitly representational sense either – like what Lewis objects to in the case of a ‘pictorial 
ersatzist’ claim that, roughly, abstract donkeys are just like concrete donkeys, only abstract (1986, 
3.3 for many details). No, for it is by Concrete Inheritance that the concrete properties had by out-
world entities are had by them in the exact manner that the in-world composites do. (This also 
seems to be the case if universals are immanent parts of concrete worlds, because the out-world 
composites will have those universals as their parts too, even regardless of whether the out-world 
entities are abstracta or not.) 
 This consequence thereby suggests a simple reason to deny such supra-world fusions – that 
they undermine the natural expectation that out-world entities do not have in-world properties. In 
doing so, they also seem to force an expansion of ordinary conceptions surrounding the means for 
demarcating worlds and properties which serves no other purpose than permitting these unfamiliar 
out-world beings to be included in the ontology. Although we are no longer calling these entities 
abstracta due to Concrete Inheritance, Lewis makes a parallel point with regards to demarcation for 
the abstract–concrete distinction, when discussing the prospects of an ersatz donkey being just like 
a concrete donkey, yet abstract. Here he says “The sharing of properties across the divide between 
concrete and abstract must have its limits.” (1986, 168) While the divide Lewis mentions here is of 
course not the in/out-world under the current conditions, the point made is very similar even still. 
There is supposed to be something fundamentally different between in-world and out-world beings, 
and abstracta and concreta (cf., Lewis 1986, 81), otherwise why entertain the distinctions? 
 This objection works against both trans-world sums and mixed fusions when they are 
recognised as concrete via Concrete Inheritance, and it works against the latter too even in the case 
of only a single concrete world making mereological connections with things out-world to it. The 
trouble remaining for unrestricted composition here is that even if one thought a retreat back to Out-
of-world Abstracta was now more justified, we are still left with the unappealing consequence that 
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putatively abstract composites like mixed fusions and trans-world sums, with proper parts that have 
mass or some form of extension, do not themselves have those properties, because of some 
purported metaphysical barrier. 
 While Lewis at least provides workable criteria for the concreteness of our own world (i.e., 
regardless of other concrete possible worlds), we have already seen that his account still has the 
limitation that world wholes themselves are not viably concrete unless there is Concrete Inheritance. 
This serves to make a restriction on Concrete Inheritance at the boundary between in-world and out-
world terribly ad-hoc. Clearly, if we find in-world Concrete Inheritance plausible, denying it at this 
boundary needs greater motivation than for the sake of avoiding uncomfortable consequences. 
Besides – if the problems of out-world entities having in-world properties (or abstracta having 
concreta properties) is a reason to invoke Out-of-world Abstracta, why not just restrict supra-world 
fusion instead? 
 Beyond this, the retreat to Out-of-world Abstracta faces a disagreeable causal situation 
anyway. Consider that in the context of mixed fusions there are proper class many singletons which 
each independently fuse with every single concrete object. Following the natural intuition that to 
causally interact with a part is sufficient to causally interact with a whole which it is a part of,52 we 
reach the undesirable consequence that proper class many abstracta (at least!) are causally 
interacted with, severely violating the understanding that abstract entities do not enter into causal 
relations (or at least the same causal interactions as concreta, more on this sort of issue below). 
 For some in-worldly examples of part relevant cause and effect think of a cat knocking a 
glass off a table with its tail. Here we can recognise a distinction between the cat as a whole with a 
tail for a part, and accept its tail as where the force for the knocking is primarily exerted from, yet 
still also accept that it was the cat knocking the glass. Consider too that eating an apple which is 
part of a trans-world individual is also consuming some part of a trans-world sum. Or imagine if I 
get COVID-19 and one of my lungs collapses. That would be an event which happens to both my 
lung and to me. And if the disease manages to kill me and I’m also part of many mixed fusions, 
then what happens to these mixed fusions is that one of their parts passes away. 
 I believe that this notion of causal interaction is importantly different, however, to those 
which can face impure sets which have in-(single)-world concreta for members. Due to space 
limitations I cannot explain the situation thoroughly, but the difference mostly follows from Lewis 
                                                 
52 Thanks to Claudio Mazzola for suggesting this line of inquiry. 
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upholding that the members of classes are not parts of classes.53 In this situation, although Lewis 
argues that impure sets can have both some sort of causal involvement and spatiotemporality,54 a 
case can be made that these instances are more derivative and indirect for the impure sets than they 
are for any composite wholes. This allows that the impure set cases can be resisted in a way that the 
supra-world sum cases cannot. 
5.6.6 Out of options 
It appears that out of all of Lewis’s options for rejecting my Ex-Ex thesis to save unrestricted 
composition in the context of abstracta/concreta fusion both across and transcending concrete 
possible worlds, his best option, ostensibly, is to reject Concreta Homeomereity. This is especially 
considering the inter-working of the other commitments he appears to uphold, most notably 
Concrete Inheritance. Yet after analysis, I think that this option leads to problems worth restricting 
composition for too. In addition to this, because many supra-world fusions will be located at 
multiple worlds – with the mereological Universe being in every world – all of these are also 
causally interacted with regardless of it being some of their parts only that are located in worlds. 
This is also regardless of whether they are, as single entities, abstract or concrete (or even 
otherwise, like some third kind). 
 So the problem I see for Lewis’s account, and any with a similar understanding, is that 
regardless of which of the many out-world entities considered here, all of them lead to problems 
once involved causally in-world, to the point that it is worth prohibiting such an involvement by 
rejecting the formation of out-world entities with mereological links to in-world entities. Without 
much incentive for radicalising the notion of causal involvement besides ‘saving the phenomena’ of 
supra-world fusions I think we are left to better deny such fusions and the principles which support 
them to avoid such a requirement. 
 In addition to this, from what I have argued, I believe the proposal for rejecting Concreta 
Homeomereity is spoiled in the case of out-world concreta. However, my arguments do not seem to 
                                                 
53 As before, see Johnston (2006), Fine (2010), Caplan et al. (2010) and McElhoes (2017) for a variety of non-GEM 
views which do treat members as parts of sets. It would be worth determining whether any of these proposals face the 
troubles I am describing for supra-world fusions if they were to include such entities in their ontologies, however I have 
not evaluated them here due to limitations of space. Note that Katz (1998) treats members as parts of sets following a 
non-GEM view too, yet explicitly rejects supra-world fusion, as mentioned earlier. 
54 See Lewis (1986, 83-4 and 94-95); cf., Maddy (1990, 59). However, Lewis (1991, 33) does walk the location claim 
back, to say that we haven’t a clue whether classes are in space and time or whether they are not, even though he is 
himself explicit in keeping them outside of space and time in the sense of not being parts of any possible worlds (Lewis 
1986, 94 and 1991, 142; cf., Nolan 2002, 155). 
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have any bearing on there being in-world abstracta such as what immanent universals could be. So 
although this leaves a rejection of Concreta Homeomereity still available in the case of in-world 
concreta having abstracta parts, this is no solution for Lewis and other supra-world fusers. That is, I 
think Concreta Homeomereity can be rejected only insofar as supra-world fusion is rejected too. 
Because we were looking at rejections of my Ex-Ex thesis for the sake of maintaining such 
unrestricted composition, this is a rejection which does not actually achieve such an end.55 
 The final strategy for Lewis, for the sake of completeness, is to consider the rejecting of 
both homeomereity theses. The implausibility of such a strategy should by now be clear, however, 
in that out-world causal involvement will still occur in this instance regardless of whether out-world 
entities are abstract or concrete. Similarly, the implausibility of Lewis rejecting Concrete 
Inheritance has also already been addressed, which suggests that this dual rejection is not a strategy 
with any great purchase. Finally, even if it doesn’t matter for the system whether out-world entities 
are specifically abstract or concrete, what does matter is how they are connected to worlds and what 
this kind of connection usually is thought to entail. As we have seen, it is the mereological 
connection which invites the problems, so prohibiting that looks to be the best option to avoid them. 
With the rejection of both homeomereity theses being the last of his options I think that Lewis is 
doomed to having an obligation to restrict composition after all. 
5.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter I examined the prospects of there being cabs, i.e., mereological sums of abstract and 
concrete entities. One of the questions was whether any such sums could be acceptable, or whether 
composition ought to be restricted to avoid them. In discussing the conception of possible worlds 
and various cabs from Lewis (1986 and 1991), I concluded that supra-world fusions like mixed-
fusions with concrete parts and trans-(concrete)world sums are objectionable for a variety of 
reasons, and ultimately because of these composite wholes being out-world entities with 
unjustifiable in-world involvement. I claimed that there is no good reason to maintain supra-world 
                                                 
55 As an aside, I believe that if one wanted to maintain a version of an Ex-Ex thesis in the case of in-world abstracta, 
one could swap my Exclusivity out for Cowling-Exclusivity. In that case, concreta can have abstracta parts (and vice 
versa) because the thesis only requires that an entity on its own belong to only one of those two categories (if at all). 
That is, Cowling-Exclusivity allows singular entities to be either abstracta or concreta regardless of the kinds of their 
proper parts. While this establishes a variant Ex-Ex thesis which is significantly different from my own in not being 
constrained by homeomereity, I don’t think it makes out-world entities any less problematic in terms of the ways I have 
described. I thereby think it is best left as an in-world variant option for those who want to make an abstract–concrete 
distinction without there being supra-world fusions, and which seeks to at least permit in-(concrete)-world abstracta. 
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fusions involving in-world concreta, whether fused with concreta or abstracta in other worlds or 
with any of either merely outside altogether. 
 This is therefore an argument against unrestricted composition, and against the classical 
mereology which holds it, drawing a line for composition at the boundary of worlds. I expect much 
of what I said can generalise to be against other forms of composition in different mereological 
systems, to be prohibitive of supra-world fusion generally. However, because I did not determine a 
serious problem with abstracta being parts of concreta after all, in this chapter I have made no claim 
against restricting abstracta and concreta fusion absolutely. Yet this does not mean that I endorse 
abstracta being parts of concrete objects and worlds. It’s only that I think that if there are to be any 
cabs at all under a concept of concreteness involving worlds, they will be in-world cabs alone. The 
further consequence here is that for mixed fusions to exist, sets would have to be (presumably 
abstract) parts of concrete worlds (which Lewis does not accept). Combined with my other 
arguments against mixed fusions, however, I think this is a form of mereological hybridism worth 
resisting, and we would be better off leaving abstract sets outside, and denying that they form 
composites with concrete, in-world individuals at all. 
 In the next chapter we look towards a more generalised discussion of mereological 
hybridism in the case of the Universe being a mereological one and thereby combining all things 
into one, irregardless of the categories which any entity may belong to, and apply some of the 
lessons learned from this chapter. 
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Chapter 6 
Invitation to an 
Ontological Beheading: 
Transcategorial sums and the 
mereological Universe 
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That which does not have a name does not exist. Unfortunately everything had a name. 
Nabokov (1959) 
6.0 Introduction 
The name that we might be inclined to give to everything that exists, as some sort of totality, is the 
Universe. Yet exactly what this name is supposed to refer to is unclear, because the sort of totality 
which it names on one understanding is a different sort of totality than what it names on another. 
For instance, according to the view of physicalism “the universe and everything in it conforms to 
[the] condition of being physical” (Stoljar 2015). In contrast, and as discussed in the last chapter, 
according to the view of modern platonism there are also abstract entities – with numbers, 
propositions and universals being common candidates for such beings – which are said to be 
entirely non-physical because they are not taken to exist in space or time (Balaguer 2016). 
 Besides the potential for disagreement over what we might call the ‘contents’ of the 
Universe, there is also room for disagreement over what sort of entity the Universe itself actually is, 
in terms of the kind of totality it exemplifies. Is it a single entity, or is it a genuine plurality of 
entities? If it is a single entity, is it some sort of maximal whole with everything else as one of its 
parts, or is it a type of unique collection with all other things as its members? And if it is a 
multiplicity of entities, are these singular elements each such that they satisfy a certain substantive 
condition? Or do they not necessarily have anything in common, and are merely many single 
entities which the plurality consists in? 
 The debate over whether all that exists is properly characterised as either strictly singular or 
strictly plural can be understood to be a debate over whether the Universe as this totality of all 
things is one that is monistic or pluralistic – over whether the Universe is either properly one or 
properly many. One prominent view in favour of the referent of the term ‘Universe’ being a strictly 
singular entity of course comes via GEM, wherein both the uniqueness and unrestrictedness of 
composition within it result in a single, maximal and unique totality whole. 
 Yet because GEM makes no claims as to what the specific contents of its Universe are, 
knowing that the system guarantees one is very different from knowing what that Universe itself is 
like. This is because what it is that is said to be mereologically unified in such a way depends on 
what it is that actually exists. If it is the case that there are only physical things, then the Universe as 
a singular whole must itself be a physical thing. If it is the case that there are only both physical and 
abstract things, for example, then the Universe as a singular whole must itself be one of these kinds 
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of entities – similarly to how Exclusivity operated in the previous chapter by limiting what 
categories every separate thing belongs to. 
 Following GEM’s non-commitment to the nature of the contents of any composite, we know 
that the principle of unrestricted composition is able to live up to its name by entailing that there are 
composites with parts from any kind or category of entity that there may be. And at this point in the 
thesis we have seen transcategorial sums explicitly exemplified in several ways, including fusions 
of the membered with the non-membered; the abstract with the concrete; the possible with the 
impossible, and even combinations of the three pairings via some mixed fusions as in the last 
chapter. 
 Yet this small selection of occasions of mereological hybridism is not all that is available for 
consideration. For instance we may like to consider the prospects of cross-categorial sums of the 
material and the immaterial; the physical and the non-physical; spatial/non-spatial; temporal/non-
temporal; necessary/contingent; extended/unextended; located/unlocated, and so on. Admittedly, 
some of those mentioned – depending on one’s view of things – may be extensionally equivalent 
categorical divides, whereas others may only be acceptable provided that these divisions are 
deemed to be suitably categorial splits. (It may also be the case that mixed fusions can fit into some 
of these divisions and exemplify a large variety of prospective transcategorial sums, but this too will 
depend on the other characteristics of each of the mixed fusions proper parts, beyond just these 
parts having members, and being members, or not). The point is that, as it stands, mereological 
hybridism is as widespread as what both the scheme of categories and the style of composition 
allows. 
 By now in this thesis it is clear that I think that there are certain types of transcategorial 
sums which, if actually formed, would either contradict the very conditions which are supposed to 
accommodate them or otherwise lead to serious problems which make their host theories less 
plausible. Yet, while my main line of argument throughout this thesis has been to restrict 
composition to avoid mixed fusions and other troublesome mereological hybrids that have similar 
category content, it is not strictly the case that I have been arguing for a Universe as a plurality. 
After all I haven’t strictly been endorsing nor denying the existence of abstracta, say. Rather, I have 
been reflecting on what I see as the consequences of certain entities existing, given the principles 
which have been said to apply to them. Due to the fairly conditional nature of my discussion (i.e., 
“if x exists and y applies, what do we end up with? Is it acceptable?”) it may well be that I could 
support a mereological Universe so long as there are only concreta and sums of them. 
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 With this in mind, the aim in this chapter is of a more general nature. So, while in previous 
chapters I covered some of the ways in which I think the formation of mixed fusions lead to all sorts 
of different issues, it is in this chapter that I examine more of the conceptual prospects surrounding 
mereological hybridism generally. In doing so, I still take aim at an entity which may or may not be 
understood to be a mixed fusion (and the biggest and probably most significant mixed fusion of 
them all, i.e., Lewis’s ‘Reality’), but only depending on auxiliary commitments. And even if the 
mereological Universe at the heart of this discussion is not understood to be a mixed fusion, I show 
that there is still room for concern over mereological hybridism in other ways. Such as if, e.g., 
numbers are said to exist outside of space and time and are not sets, or there are said to be 
impossibilia which are not sets either, or there are claims to non-extended minds alongside extended 
matter, and so on, then we still need to properly determine just how a mereological Universe 
comprising such disparate kinds of entities is able to itself have unity. 
 In doing so, I also contribute to and enhance the debate between Simons (2003) and Varzi 
(2006) over how transcategorial sums could be seen to affect the plausibility of the notion of a 
mereological Universe, and argue that, given the great potential for problems as I have 
demonstrated in my thesis, that a mereological Universe qua transcategorial sum is an entity worth, 
at the least, being very cautious about, and in many instances, worth rejecting. As I will argue, I 
think this is ultimately because we are not entitled to simply assume the compatibility of 
mereological hybrids. Instead, we actually have to work to confirm that the compatibility is 
genuine. 
 To start we look at the concerns Simons (2003) presents against the mereological Universe 
being a transcategorial sum. 
6.1 Simons against unrestricted composition 
Simons (2003) thinks that the main reason for doubting “the unbridled existence of mereological 
sums is that individuals [i.e., single things] come from different categories: things, properties and 
relations (if one takes these to be individuals), events, abstract objects, and perhaps more. If even 
two of these categories are occupied, and the principal of mereological summing applies 
everywhere ... then we have to contend with transcategorial sums.” (2003, 237) 
 Simons abjures polycategorial ontologies which also incorporate mereological Universes. 
This is by following the expectation that with there being many categories, that any absolute totality 
which has parts from each of these will in some way make problems for the purported system of 
categories itself. Although Simons only specifically presents what he takes to be problems in the 
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case that a mereological Universe is a transcategorial sum, the concerns he raises can be generalised 
to transcategorial sums in general, as in the following1: 
 (i) If transcategorial sums are in one of the categories occupied by their proper parts, 
  why does this category trump the rest? 
 (ii) If transcategorial sums are in a different category unshared by any of their proper 
  parts, why do they get a new category? 
 (iii) If transcategorial sums are in more than one of the categories occupied by their 
  proper parts, and possibly in all of them, then wouldn’t this be an ad hoc exception
  to the idea that categories are mutually exclusive? 
 (iv) If transcategorial sums are in no category at all, why are they exempt? 
Unfortunately Simons does not go further to show why the concerns he raises are altogether 
conclusive reasons for rejecting the prospects of there being a transcategorial mereological 
Universe, or even any transcategorial sums in general. Although Varzi (2006) agrees with Simons 
that (iii) and (iv) are unacceptable for the lone reason that they are utterly ad hoc (2006, 109), he 
picks up on the lack of overall conclusiveness and offers several objections to Simons’s claim that 
the universe is not a single mereological being. 
6.2 Varzi’s resistance 
To start, Varzi resists Simons’s conclusion by offering that the mereological Universe being 
transcategorial in many cases would not be unique to it alone. 
Now, I agree that if the universe were the only entity with parts in different 
categories, each of these options would be embarrassing and ultimately 
unacceptable. However, the universe cannot be the only such entity. If the 
universe has parts in different categories, then so does the universe minus 
Chisholm’s left foot [e.g., a physical object], or the universe minus Sebastian’s 
stroll in Bologna [e.g., an event], or the universe minus the number 42 [e.g., an 
abstractum]. If the universe has parts in different categories, then so do lots of 
its proper parts: there is no obvious reason to rule out those mereological sums 
if we are considering countenancing the universal sum. [...insofar as parthood 
is closed under least upper bounds.] (2006, 109 and fn 5) 
                                                 
1 Also modifying Varzi (2006, 109). 
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Varzi finds no problems with option (i) – insofar as it applies to the Universe – provided that the 
mereological system which guarantees the mereological Universe also entails that there are 
composites which are exactly like it in terms of the multitude of categories which their parts are 
from. 
Whatever category hosts that thing that is the universe minus Chisholm’s left 
foot can host the universe as a whole, and that category gets the privilege [i.e., 
of hosting the universe] precisely because its members have parts in all 
categories. There would be a problem if the universe minus Chisholm’s left 
foot, the universe minus Sebastian’s stroll in Bologna, the universe minus the 
number 42, and so on, were themselves in different categories. (In that case we 
would be forced to put the universe in more than one category, as per [(iii)].)2 
But there is no reason why that should be the case. Those parts of the universe 
are equally representative of all there is and will therefore be in the same 
category. And the whole universe can be in that category, too. (2006, 109-110) 
Yet Varzi’s plausible claim that the mereological Universe would not likely be unique in being a 
transcategorial sum with parts from every category does nothing to appease the generalised version 
of Simons’s problem with transcategorial sums in (i), it merely delays it. 
 To see this all we have to do is consider some fusion F which is a proper part of the 
mereological Universe, and which has parts from every category, yet is such that it itself has no 
proper parts which also have parts from every category. In this case F may face the concern raised 
by (ii) in having its own category, and the natural concern is why does it occupy a category which 
none of its proper parts do? It makes no sense to reply that because a lot of other entities could be in 
the same position with regards to their own categorisation that F itself is off the hook due to the fact 
that the problem is not unique to F. This reply merely avoids answering the concern, which should 
count against F and any other entity like it, and not give them some plausibility just because they 
are not alone in doing so. 
 What I think Varzi has done in his response to Simons here is focus on the least important 
component of Simons’s objection. To see how this is the case I will need to back up a little bit and 
provide both Simons’s and Varzi’s mereological Universe specific renditions of problem (i). Where 
Simons asks “why does this category trump the rest and get to “bag” the universe?” (2003, 237), 
Varzi rephrases it as “why should a single category ‘trump’ all the others and get this exclusive 
                                                 
2 This is a non-sequitur. From all that Varzi has said, the Universe in this case could just as easily be in its own category 
too. 
171 
privilege?” (2006, 109)3 What we can see is that Varzi’s angle on resisting Simons here focuses on 
the ‘exclusive privilege’ clause which can be omitted for the general case. This I think shows what 
the critical problem Simons poses really is, which is that of why one of the categories of some 
thing’s proper parts of which it similarly occupies is the category of the transcategorial sum itself. 
 The issue I am raising here is that it is not at all answered by Varzi why a specific category 
which a composite occupies along with only at least some of its proper parts is able to trump any of 
the other categories that some one of its other parts occupy. Varzi only offers a way to see that the 
category which a transcategorial sum occupies might not be a category which it exclusively 
occupies in comparison to its proper parts. Furthermore, even if the category which hosts a 
transcategorial sum is not an exclusive category which it alone occupies in comparison to its proper 
parts – which we would not expect a trumping one to be anyway, as a trumping one trumps all other 
categories its proper parts occupy with one of the categories of at least one of its proper parts – this 
still does not explain why this one in particular is allowed to trump the other categories. That is, in 
offering how it might at least not be exclusive, Varzi has done nothing to show why it is plausible 
that this category is the trumping one. 
6.3 Resisting Varzi 
Considering that Varzi advocates for transcategorial sums as able to belong in different categories 
to their proper parts, how does Varzi meet the concern expressed by (ii), over why a transcategorial 
sum should get a new category to some of its proper parts? Regrettably, he doesn’t, and in fact goes 
as far as to say that he expects transcategorial sums to belong to new categories in some cases: “it 
seems clear that in a polycategorial ontology at least some [transcategorial] sums call for unheard-of 
categories.” (2006, 111) Instead of defending this expectation or trying to explain why it should 
stack up, Varzi offers scepticism towards the idea of being critical of novel category proposals or 
consequences, saying “Who are we to decide what there is and what there isn’t on the basis of ... 
our modest apparatus of categorial distinctions?” (2006, 112) 
 But this is more a diversion from the issues than an answer to our questions of whether 
transcategorial sums are acceptable or not. Certainly we are able to note that any system of 
categories that we propose and anticipate may be fallible, yet we are still also free to analyse the 
plausibility of certain situations with those frameworks in mind. That is, we can still put forth a 
series of ontological conditions and check whether a claimed posit is viable under those conditions, 
even if we do not have absolute confidence that these conditions hold. In the end what we get from 
                                                 
3 I.e., of being the category which ‘hosts’ the mereological Universe. 
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Varzi here is that it seems most likely that a mereological Universe which is an every-category-
transcategorial-sum will not be unique in its transcategorial fusing, and that some of its proper parts 
will also be every-category-transcategorial-sums too. 
 But this does not put us any closer towards answering how a composite wholes category can 
trump any of the categories of its proper parts. Therefore let’s consider what Varzi offers as a 
motivation for this nonchalance towards transcategorial fusion. With regards to whether 
transcategorial sums have their own, perhaps ‘new’, categories he asks 
What do we do in such cases? Shall we declare non-existent all those sums for 
which our palette of ontological categories is too poor? [...] I for one am 
inclined to be quite liberal in this regard. For one thing, not only do I think that 
a thing is identical with the mereological sum of its constituent parts. I also 
share the view that a thing is ‘nothing over and above’ its parts, hence I don’t 
think the question of the existence of a mereological sum makes much sense in 
case we already agree on the existence of the pieces. The sum is just the pieces 
‘counted loosely’, as some like to say. (2006, 111-112) 
The view that Varzi is referring to here is CAI.4 In later work, Varzi explicitly states that he broadly 
and loosely understands CAI as the thesis that a composite whole is nothing over and above its 
parts, and the parts nothing over and above the whole. (2014, 47) Presuming his conception has 
remained quite the same over that period, it is very unclear to me how this is supposed to help 
Varzi’s case that concern over transcategorial sums is overblown, as it looks to be question-
begging. 
 Consider that Varzi offers that what CAI amounts to is the assumption that there are not 
irreducible composite wholes which “exemplify properties and relations that are not reducible to or 
grounded on the properties and relations exemplified by the things that compose them” (2014, 63) If 
the key element of the CAI thesis according to Varzi is that there are no irreducible composite 
wholes we should then be able to look at certain posited wholes and evaluate whether they are 
plausibly irreducible or not. And while we may not already specifically agree on the existence of the 
pieces, the point of the discussion at hand is able to be conditional too – if certain pieces exist, and 
they are of certain categories, is composition between them plausible? 
 The reason Varzi’s claim to CAI looks to be question-begging then is that he assumes that it 
can suitably override issues of what sort of category a composite could be said to belong to, because 
                                                 
4 A thesis which I resist in Chapter 3. 
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the composite is just identical to its parts counted loosely. But clearly this runs in to immediate 
problems, some of which even Varzi himself takes issue with. On one reading this might sound like 
the transcategorial composite occupies every category which its proper parts belong to – after all it 
is identical to all of them altogether and is nothing over and above them. Yet Varzi explicitly 
rejected this option, which is Simons’s (iii), as being “utterly ad hoc” (2006, 109). As I cannot see 
what other way this identity claim could work, I believe that we are owed an explanation of how it 
makes sense. 
 Without option (iii) we are left to look at a trumping option for the category of the 
composite, with it either being in a completely new category that none of its proper parts are in, or 
the composite itself being in one of the categories that at least one of its proper parts is in, but one 
that not all of them are in. There is no clear way that the composite could then be said to be 
identical to its proper parts in this case either – after all it is either only identical to some of them, 
on the metric of ‘sameness of category’, or identical to none of them, for having its own category. 
 So how does the CAI thesis help Varzi here? I don’t think that it does, and he doesn’t show 
how it could. In fact the claim to CAI seems to work against the idea that the sum could even have 
its own category – how can it if it is ‘no more than’ (say) its proper parts? A composite entity with 
its own ‘new category’ (2006, 111) which is distinct from its proper parts looks like a simple case 
of something being over and above its proper parts. What is even more confusing about all of this is 
an example which Varzi gives which is supposed to show that 
in some cases we may even feel at home with a transcategorial sum. Take a 
tornado – say hurricane Gloria. An object? Not really: the water molecules, the 
leaves, and the other stuff that is involved in the hurricane might all be objects, 
but the hurricane is something over and above all that. An event, then? No – 
because hurricanes move, or so we find it natural to say, while events are 
temporally extended and thus it makes no sense to say that they move. There 
are lots of little events involved in Gloria, but the hurricane itself is something 
over and above such events. So maybe we can say that Gloria includes both 
objects and events as parts – it is a transcategorial sum. (2006, 112) (my 
emphasis) 
Looking at this quote, I don’t see how Varzi is properly upholding CAI here. In the context under 
discussion – because we are discussing the mereological Universe of which everything is supposed 
to be a part – it is the case that everything is mereological, in having at least one part, itself. Which 
means that the proposed hurricane is mereological. It also happens to be a composite whole, with 
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the kind of parts offered for this thing by Varzi being one of only either object or event. What 
confuses me is that Varzi tries to argue that such a transcategorial sum is neither an object nor an 
event because the hurricane is both something over and above objects and something over and 
above events. 
 But that does not make any sense in terms of the CAI thesis as given. With the agreed upon 
parts of the hurricane in the example being some objects and some events, surely the hurricane, in 
being composed of objects and events, cannot be something over and above its parts. I expect that 
what Varzi must have meant instead is that the hurricane is not just the objects which are its parts, 
and not just the events which are its parts. But of course! The CAI theorist would say it is just both 
– both all of the objects and all of the events which are its parts. That Varzi then permits the 
hurricane itself to be neither object nor event is what leaves us with the question of how this third 
unknown category trumps the other two, but it also leaves open again the problem that this third 
category is not clearly reducible to either of the other two categories, something which immediately 
confounds any claims to the plausibility of CAI. 
 Putting this another way, if to maintain Varzi’s CAI endorsement we grant that what he 
really means is that the hurricane does not have only objects as parts nor only events as parts – 
which is a required for us to grant anyway considering that is what is being offered as the case in 
the example – we still have the problem that he offers that the hurricane itself belongs in neither of 
the categories of which its parts do. On Simons’s question (ii) of how could a composite belong to a 
category which none of its parts do, we are no further towards understanding why it is able to. 
6.4 Smid’s commitments 
Nor are we given much help in a similar case following Jeroen Smid’s discussion surrounding the 
potential implications for ontological commitment under conditions involving GEM. Here Smid 
(2015) spells out an argument that one might use to object to GEM (but which he does not actually 
endorse). The issue is that from the categories one is already committed to GEM appears to entail 
that there are extra ontological categories, thereby obliging an increase in ontological commitments. 
He calls this the Argument from Qualitative Extravagance:5 
 L1. UMC [i.e., unrestricted composition] is an axiom of [classical] mereology; 
 L2. UMC entails the existence of sums, objects that were previously not in one’s 
  ontology; 
                                                 
5 Smid (2015, 3), with the square bracket text added by me throughout L1-L5. 
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 L3. These objects are (sometimes) of a different ontological kind or category [than the 
  one’s originally in one’s ontology];6 
 L4. Such a different ontological kind or category is an additional [ontological]  
  commitment; 
 L5. Hence, mereology commits one to additional kinds of objects. 
Smid accepts that this argument does seem to have persuasive force if it is the case that accepting 
GEM “entails accepting cross-categorial entities that were (by assumption) previously not there.” 
(2015, 11) Yet he resists the notion that this is a problem, as “the defender of mereology can hold 
that she simply accepts one, big cross-categorial universe, and that the ontological commitment to 
this (very special?) kind of entity entails an ontological commitment to the other (‘pure’) 
categories.” (2015, 11) 
 Here Smid relies on the situation at hand being relevantly similar to another one which he 
addresses in the case of purported additional ontological commitments when it comes to the parts of 
a whole and the whole itself. Smid’s argument for the quantitative parsimony of GEM follows on 
from his claim that proper parts are not additional ontological commitments to the wholes which 
they are proper parts of (2015, 7-11). 
 Smid’s argument for this claim is roughly as follows: the truth-conditions for a sentence 
such as ‘O exists’ (where O is a composite object) are no different from the truth-conditions for a 
sentence ‘x, y, and z exist’ (where x, y, and z are the only proper parts of O). And these truth-
conditions are no different because e.g., ‘x exists’ is true iff there is an object in the world that is x. 
(2015, 6) Because ontological commitments can be seen as certain demands that we put on the 
world – such that we plausibly only make such commitments if we think they are supported by 
truth-conditions relevant to them, Smid asserts that “If the truth-conditions are the same, then—
given the demand-talk analysis—the ontological commitment of ‘O exists’ is the same as that of ‘x, 
y, and z exist’.” (2015, 6) In this way a commitment to any proper parts just is a commitment to any 
wholes which they are proper parts of, and vice versa. This is given that the truth-conditions for 
either ontological commitment are satisfied in the same way in that if a whole exists its proper parts 
exist, and that if some things exist which are proper parts, these are proper parts of at least some 
whole. 
 The way this is meant to mirror the scenario for categories and ontological commitment is 
that, in the case of a mereological Universe which is an all encompassing transcategorial sum, that 
                                                 
6 For our purposes the terms ‘kind’ and ‘category’ can be used interchangeably without issue. 
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the commitment to the mereological Universe entails a commitment to whatever its category may 
be, and also whatever categories its proper parts belong to. To be clear, Smid does not deny that 
mereology might commit us to entities belonging to different categories. Instead he seeks to show 
how we might not treat these different categories as further commitments. As he says “Cross-
categorial entities are probably different from pure kinds. However, the point is that these pure 
categories are not to be counted as additional commitments after accepting the cross-categorial 
entity that is their sum.” (2015, 12) 
 Here Smid explicitly seeks to deny L4 of the Argument from Qualitative Extravagance, that 
such a different ontological kind or category is an additional ontological commitment. Yet Smid 
also offers that one could instead deny L3, that these objects might be of a different ontological kind 
or category than the one’s originally in one’s ontology, on the grounds that “one could hold that 
fusions that have parts in different categories do not belong in any category; they belong partly to 
each category to which their parts belong.” (2015, 12) 
 On the face of it this looks to be both a contradiction in itself and a blend of the problems 
raised by both of Simons’s (iii) and (iv). Namely that something being in more than one of the 
categories occupied by its proper parts, and possibly in all of them, looks to be an ad hoc exception 
to the idea that categories are mutually exclusive. As well as the problem that the exemption of 
something being in no category at all is unfounded, as each thing is supposed to be able to be 
categorised in some manner. The apparent contradiction I see is that composites are being said to 
not belong in any category as well as to partly belong in some categories. This seems like a 
contradiction because belonging in a category appears to be a binary affair – something either 
belongs to a category or it does not, and if it belongs to a category, then it does not not belong to 
that category. 
 Here I’m reminded of Lewis talking about existence (which I previously referred to in 
Chapter 5), of which he says “existence cannot be a matter of degree. If you say there is something 
that exists to a diminished degree, once you’ve said ‘there is’ your game is up. Existence is not 
some special distinction that befalls some of the things there are. Existence just means being one of 
the things there are, nothing else.” (1991, 80-1) 
 My point here is that just as we cannot say that some transcategorial composite T somewhat 
‘faintly’ belongs to each of the categories which it’s proper parts belong to without the implication 
that T just simply belongs to each of the categories, we also cannot interpret Smid as meaning to 
say something more along the lines of ‘a proper part of the composite T belongs to category G’. 
This is because this says more about the category which the proper part of T belongs to than any 
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category which the composite T itself does. Besides this, because Smid allows that things which are 
composite are of the category ‘complex’ – in distinction to things which are mereologically atomic 
being of the category ‘simple’ – it is not plausible that he could treat transcategorial sums as not 
belonging to any category (2015, 12). So I’m more inclined to understand Smid as meaning to say 
that ‘fusions that have parts in different categories do not belong in any one category’. (Which also 
lessens the plausibility of the reading that such fusions are only ‘faintly’ belonging in any category.) 
 But now we appear squarely back at Simons’s objection (iii) to transcategorial sums, that 
occupying more than one category runs afoul of the notion that categories are mutually exclusive. 
To precisify this objection slightly, it is not the case that all categories are mutually exclusive, and 
this is both because not every way of devising them requires only that each category be an 
‘ultimate’ one, and also because categories which are mutually exclusive are usually only properly 
exclusive of another category which is their opposite pair, rather than any other variety of 
categories. 
 For instance, on E. J. Lowe’s (2006) system of four fundamental categories, one of them – 
objects – further divides into the non-fundamental categories of substances and non-substances; 
Ingvar Johansson (1989) has a main category of quality which subdivides into substance and 
property; Roderick Chisholm (1996) offers the main categories of contingent and necessary, which 
respectively divide into states (events) and individuals (boundaries; substances), and states and 
nonstates (attributes; substance); and Joshua Hoffman and Gary Rosenkrantz (1994) divide entities 
into the abstract and concrete, both of which have several subdivisions – the abstract: property, 
relation, proposition; and the concrete: event, time, place, substance, to name but a few (see 
Thomasson 2018 for a detailed overview). 
 So although the way in which Simons explicitly phrases his objection shows that he expects 
categories to be ultimate, saying “If the universe [as a transcategorial sum] is partly in one category 
and partly in another, what does this mean, and does it not undermine the very notion of a category 
as a system of mutually exclusive ultimate types of object?” (2003, 237-8) it may be clearer to state 
the objection for the generalised case in the following manner: transcategorial sums being in more 
than one of the different super- or subsidiary categories occupied by their proper parts, and possibly 
in all of them, is an ad hoc (and therefore unjustified) exception to the idea that different super- or 
subsidiary categories are mutually exclusive. 
 Gladly, this objection does not appear to be question-begging, because the assumption that 
different super- or subsidiary categories are mutually exclusive is actually not what is at issue. What 
is at issue is how something could plausibly straddle multiple categories simultaneously, in a way 
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that does not undermine our original expectation of the strict mutual exclusivity of belonging to 
certain pairs of categories. The very fact that something cannot do so without a contradiction of that 
original assumption is what makes that rhetorical objection, i.e., (iii), coherent. 
 While all of this means that Smid is wrong about denying L3 on the grounds that 
transcategorial composites need not be of a different ontological category to any of their parts, and 
can belong to the categories of each of them, how does his claim that premise L4 can be resisted 
fare? Unfortunately for our purposes here it is irrelevant. Recalling that I started off this section by 
saying that Smid’s discussion isn’t much help, I meant this specifically with regards to the question 
of how the category of a transcategorial composite is supposed to trump the category of at least one 
of its proper parts – and either by being in a completely different category to all of its proper parts, 
or by being in a completely different category to at least one of its proper parts. While Smid’s 
arguments may provide grounds for not treating certain ‘new’ categories7 as further ontological 
commitments, they do nothing to justify why such composites are able to belong to such different 
categories in the first place. Nor do Smid’s arguments justify why a transcategorial composite might 
belong to any one category which some one of its proper parts does, to the exclusion of a different 
category some one of its other proper parts belongs to. 
 To be fair, Smid’s arguments weren’t expressly supposed to provide these justifications. Yet 
his tendered grounds for denying L3 coupled with the general implication that such new or 
trumping categorial belongings are in some way acceptable (by at least not being extra ontological 
costs), suggest that he does not seem to have any quarrels with Simons’s objection (i) or (ii), 
although he could have encountered these objections in their original form.8 From what we have 
been given by both Varzi and Smid, then, I conjecture that it is inconclusive and still not in favour 
of overcoming the questions raised by Simons, as both Varzi and Smid seem to elide the rhetorical 
objections present in (i) and (ii) without actually showing the manner in which this avoidance is 
achieved, and with considerable additional problems incurred along the way. 
 I think that although Simons’s questions are also inconclusive as rejections of 
transcategorial sums, they still stand as plausible criteria to meet to make such sums more credible, 
and to help us understand some important obstacles to overcome if we are to accept that they 
somehow fit within our ontological frameworks. 
                                                 
7 ‘New’ as in newly recognised, not as in some sort of new creation. 
8 Smid (2015) does cite Simons (2003) after all. 
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 With this in mind, what I offer in the next section is an explanation of how I think some 
cases could be made which do meet Simons’s objections, even with mixed fusions representing 
some of the proposed transcategorial composites. 
6.5 Ontological division 
We are now back to the earlier concerns about transcategorial sums: how might categorial trumping 
from composite to parts be acceptable? And how would it be plausible? For these concerns it will 
be helpful to review the two remaining challenges which Simons’s generalised (i) and (ii) pose. 
Starting with (i) we can look towards mixed fusions as an example. In this instance we can consider 
a mixed fusion which has only two atomic parts – one which is a singleton, and thereby a class, and 
one which is an individual, and thereby a singulate. On the question of whether the mixed fusion is 
a class or a singulate we do not look to the natures of the parts for guidance but rather the formal 
systems and principles which have been said to entail and frame them. Imagine that I’m wrong 
about property inheritance with regards to what I argued for in Chapter 3, and that instead we 
simply insist that no mixed fusion can have members on pain of contradicting the set theoretic 
axiom of Extensionality. By that argument, mixed fusions are singulates, and either individuals or 
anti-members. (As I argued in Chapter 2 some mixed fusions are able to be members, but not all.) 
We therefore have a reason for why any mixed fusion belongs to the category singulate – if they 
exist, mixed fusions are necessarily singulates to avoid contradicting the set theory which jointly 
entails them. So we have an example of justified trumping in the sense of (i). 
 In the case of Simons’s (ii) we will look at a situation which can involve mixed fusions, but 
doesn’t necessarily need to. Here we look at how Lewis’s (1986) ontology of possible worlds gives 
grounds for plausible trumping claims. As we saw in Chapter 5, for Lewis possible worlds are 
concrete maximal sums, such that the mereological whole which any possible world is only has 
parts which are possible too (e.g., 1986, 211 inter alia). Lewis advances that there are an infinite 
multitude of possible worlds, with each possible world necessarily mereologically disjoint from 
every other one, none of them sharing any parts, and thereby none of them overlapping. 
 However, again as we saw in Chapter 5, because Lewis accepts infinite possible worlds and 
also accepts GEM, he admittedly also accepts that there are trans-world fusions, which have proper 
parts from multiple possible worlds (1986, 211). Lewis acknowledges that this commits him to the 
existence of impossible objects, as the fusion of things that exist in different possible worlds itself 
does not exist in any possible world. Even though ‘impossible’ has a special technical meaning 
here, as these fusions aren’t impossible in the sense that they cannot be formed, rather they are 
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impossible objects for not belonging to any possible world, they still allow for a category divide 
between the impossible and possible. 
 Because of trans-world fusion and also the existence of impossible objects, for Lewis there 
are actually three types of impossible objects in terms of their mereological structure. The first 
properly decompose only into proper parts which are not from possible worlds; the second properly 
decompose into both parts which are from possible worlds and parts which are not from possible 
worlds; and the last properly decompose only into parts which are from possible worlds. 
 I think it is from some of these cases that we can have examples of category trumping which 
are justified on the grounds that in this context being possible means existing as part of a possible 
world. On the first type of impossible object, though, as expected, fusions of impossibilia are also 
themselves impossible objects because they belong to no world. Why do they belong to no world? 
Because possible worlds only have possibilia as parts. So no category trumping here. 
 With the second type, however, because the impossible parts aren’t part of a possible world, 
their fusion with parts from possible worlds is an object that is not in a possible world either. Again 
this is because possible worlds only have possibilia as parts, which means that the impossible part 
cannot overlap a possible world entity without thereby being a part of a possible world. Therefore 
such fusions are impossible objects. (As we know, on Lewis’s account many mixed fusions are 
examples of this type of impossible object, with all singletons being impossibilia, and all the 
inhabitants of possible worlds being individuals.) In this second case we have the category of the 
composite trumping the category of one kind of its parts over another, and for logical reasons within 
the system of rules and conditions given. 
 The last type of impossible objects appears at first surprising, but it is understandable when 
we have trans-world fusions. Because trans-world fusions are fusions of things which are 
themselves possible, it appears counter-intuitive at first that they should compose objects which are 
impossible. But this is occasioned only because the possible worlds that each of the possible things 
are from are disjoint, such that there can be no fusion which overlaps both of them which is itself 
possible – as that would negate the possible worlds being disjoint. 
 We can see this is because each possible world is its own maximal sum. What this means is 
that any two possibilia which are each in their own distinct possible worlds belong to and are a part 
of their own maxima. By this reasoning, w1 (world 1) overlaps possible proper part 1 (p1) and 
world 2 (w2) overlaps possible proper part 2 (p2). As defined w1 does not overlap w2, and p1 does 
not overlap p2. If p1 overlapped p2 they would share a part, and as p1 is fully overlapped by w1, 
w1 would overlap p2. But w2 overlaps p2 and w1 and w2 do not overlap, so this cannot be the case. 
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The proposed impossible composite i3 which has p1 and p2 as parts overlaps them both, of course, 
just as they overlap it. For the same reasons that p1 and p2 do not overlap, if i3 was in a possible 
world, i3 could not overlap either p1 or p2. This would mean they could not be i3’s parts, which 
contradicts the assumption that they are. As it’s possible that p1 and p2 could be mereological 
atoms, here we have the category of the composite trumping the category of all of its parts, along 
the possible/impossible divide. So we have an example of justified trumping in the sense of (ii). 
 To answer Simons’s questions, then, asking how a transcategorial composite’s category 
either trumps the category of all of its parts or at least some its parts, the answer I give is: it depends 
on how the systems which harbour such composites are compatible with the trumping. Which is not 
to say that in every case of proposed transcategorial composition that the harbouring systems will 
actually be compatible. Far from it. It is just to say that we cannot outright dismiss the potential 
compatibility by assuming that an incompatibility is certain, solely on the grounds that the 
composition is transcategorial. 
 As I have shown in this section, it’s not like the composites which are compatible pose any 
problems for the categorial systems in which they have been placed – obviously, as this is some of 
what being compatible means. But I think that’s the point, that compatibility is something which is 
to be evaluated, rather than assumed. So this analysis actually cuts against Varzi’s claims as well, 
the ones which say that we shouldn’t have any reservations about transcategorial sums at all. How 
are we to know in advance that some proposed transcategorial composites aren’t incompatible? 
 The point to contrast here is that in Chapter 5 I explicitly rejected transcategorial fusions of 
abstracta and concreta in the case their fusion is supra-world, by variously arguing that such sums 
can be neither abstract nor concrete without contradicting theses supporting the categorical 
divisions. As the result back there and the recent result here endow us with both negative and 
positive instances of transcategorial sum category trumping, I make my case that category 
compatibility for mereological hybrids is something to be verified and not presumed, with a plea to 
play it safe and not assume that liberal forms of composition across categories are assured to have 
no troubling consequences. 
6.6 Conclusion 
Although I’ve shown that Simons’s challenge questions can be met in some cases, I still think they 
offer an important guide to the sorts of questions we should be willing to ask ourselves when faced 
with novel ontological considerations. Even though I find Simons’s line of questioning inconclusive 
towards whether there is a mereological Universe or not, I also find Varzi’s defence of a 
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mereological Universe wanting, on the same grounds that we just don’t know what is and what isn’t 
compatible until we take a good look. 
 I think the takeaway here is that categories come with compatibility issues built into the very 
premise of categories – naturally throwing up questions like ‘does what we already believe in fit 
them?’ and ‘can the things said to be from different categories harmoniously co-exist?’. Much of 
this chapter (and also this thesis) has been about a variant on these questions, one which asks ‘are 
mereological fusions of these legitimate?’ I hope to have shown that before we can make such 
determinations that we need to look at the proposed entities and their respective categories and 
make a proper case for whether they are compatible or not. As I have argued in this chapter, I think 
that in some cases they can be compatible, but as I argued in Chapter 5 (via the abstract/concrete 
distinction and across the boundaries of worlds) in some cases they are not. Following these 
variable results I further offer that we are not entitled to assume compatibility and that we therefore 
have to work to verify it. To me this means that we cannot assume that transcategorial sums exist in 
general, from which I think it follows that we are obliged not to commit to them, pending review. 
 As such, I think the answer to the question of whether or not there is a mereological 
Universe is – it depends. And what it looks to depend on is the wide array of other ontological 
infrastructure that it is supposed to sit upon. Because we cannot plausibly be certain in advance, the 
onus is on us to provide good reasons why our proposed entities truly fit the systems that we also 
expect to be in place. Further to this, I think our lack of knowing whether the compatibility will 
work until we check things out should make us hesitant to commit to the things which clearly need 
some analysis to verify their compatibility before we indeed perform such analyses. Which means 
that if I had to give a more decisive answer to the question of whether there is a mereological 
Universe, I would say no, because the work required to fulfil such analyses may never cease. After 
all, the mereological Universe is supposed to have everything else which exists as its proper parts, 
and if we’re not even clear on what all of these other things could be, or whether we should accept 
them on independent grounds, how can we plausibly infer that the mereological Universe exists, let 
alone accept it? 
 
 
...and I had hoped so much that everything would be orderly, all simple and neat. 
(Nabokov 1959) 
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Chapter 7 
Mixed fusions, classical mereology, 
and ontological innocence 
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7.0 Introduction 
In this chapter I offer an argument for why GEM is not ‘ontologically innocent’ (OI). While this is a 
concept which has been glanced at in previous chapters, it has not been directly addressed, and the 
issue presented here with regards to it is an important piece of my cumulative argument against 
unrestricted mereological hybridism, mainly as it is supported by unrestricted composition and 
GEM. 
 The notion of OI that is at stake is one which involves ontological commitment, wherein 
claims to the existence of certain entities or claims to the acceptability of certain theories are said to 
be OI insofar as the commitments one is obliged to hold in maintaining the theories or the existence 
claims are not to be counted as extra commitments (Smid 2015). The characterisation of a claim as 
OI is thereby one with regards to the cost of accepting that claim as true – a theory which is 
purported to be OI is one that is supposed to come at no additional costs to the ones which are 
already accepted up front, even if this may not at first glance appear to be the case. 
 In mereological debates, claims of OI often involve claims of innocence for composite 
entities. In his defence of GEM, David Lewis (1991) famously argues for its OI in the sense that 
when it comes to our ontological commitment to the number of entities that exist that we do not 
incur numerically more commitments by accepting mereological sums or fusions of the things that 
we are already committed to. As we have seen Lewis put it “given a prior commitment to cats, say, 
a commitment to cat-fusions is not a further commitment.” (1991, 81) The notion of OI on offer 
here, then, is mainly focused along quantitative lines – to the effect that if we are to count our 
commitments it would be redundant to count a fusion in addition to its parts, as this would be a 
form of double-counting (Varzi 2000). For Lewis, if we count the fusion we already ‘have’ the 
parts, and vice versa, so GEM should not be seen as permitting a form of ontological non-
parsimony for permitting unrestricted summation or composition of any two or more things. 
 I think Lewis is wrong about the OI of GEM. This is because it can be seen to permit 
composite wholes which are irreducible to their parts – specifically the mereological hybrids of 
mixed fusions – with these irreducible entities needing to be counted as additional ontological 
commitments to their parts insofar as they cannot be properly represented by anything else. The 
essence of my argument that GEM is not OI is that because it permits something which is not OI, 
viz. mixed fusions, it is not OI itself. 
 The argument I make here, however, depends on suppressing my claim in Chapter 3, namely 
the claim that property inheritance entails that mixed fusions have members. As Lewis rejects 
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mixed fusions having members anyway he should in some ways be supportive of this situation 
(modulo the property inheritance concerns), but what I will be arguing in this chapter is that mixed 
fusions not having members is precisely what leads to them being irreducible to their proper parts, 
and thereby being additional ontological commitments. 
 Because having less ontological commitments is seen as a theoretical virtue, and claims to 
the OI of GEM have played an important role in its defence, after this issue of irreducibility I am 
able to present the Lewisian with a difficult trilemma, to either accept: mixed fusions having 
members and violating Extensionality; mixed fusions being irreducible and thereby coming at an 
unjustified cost; or, rejecting unrestricted composition to avoid mixed fusions. As is usual, I opt for 
the rejection of unrestricted composition and GEM to avoid mixed fusions, and, in turn, the 
rejection of unrestricted mereological hybridism. 
7.1 Lewis’s depictions of mixed fusions as irreducible to their proper parts 
As has been the case throughout this thesis, my position in this chapter is framed against the 
background of the presentation of GEM and set theory given in Lewis (1991). Recall the variety of 
different characterisations I have made about mixed fusions over the course of this thesis when 
compared to those given by Lewis (as in Table 1.3 in Chapter 1). Although there is clearly a great 
disparity between what Lewis thinks of mixed fusions and what I think of them, we do have two 
key points of explicit agreement about what mixed fusions are like, one being that they are 
irreducible to their parts (7a) and the other being that they lack members (3). However, as these 
points of agreement are undermined by other claims which Lewis makes, it is not clear that we 
actually agree upon anything to do with mixed fusions at all. For our purposes in this chapter, the 
key point of disagreement between Lewis and I here is that Lewis thinks mixed fusions are OI, 
whereas I do not (7b). 
 As I think that Lewis upholding mixed fusions as irreducible is inconsistent with some of his 
other views, I need to spell out the details which show this. My claim is that although Lewis makes 
several explicit statements about the nature and character of mixed fusions which imply their 
irreducibility to their parts, it is in fact the case that many of these statements are undermined by 
Lewis’s other express commitment to CAI. Which is to say that, although the notion of CAI implies 
reducibility (as explained in 7.2), and Lewis explicitly endorses CAI, it is the case that he also 
makes explicit statements about mixed fusions which entail their irreducibility. I believe that this 
inconsistency is a great problem for Lewis’s view, and my focus in this section is to show that if 
mixed fusions are to be accepted at all, that they are indeed best seen as irreducible to their parts. 
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 To make the case that Lewis presents mixed fusions explicitly as entities which are 
irreducible to their parts we need to see what Lewis explicitly says about mixed fusions in this 
regard. To be clear, Lewis does not make any explicit claims to the irreducibility of mixed fusions. 
The situation I describe, however, is one which I believe is implied by his explicit statements on the 
characters of mixed fusions. 
 Recall that on the topic of whether mixed fusions can be members of classes, Lewis is 
dismissive (see Chapter 2 for my discussion and rejection of Lewis’s argument for this conclusion). 
The way in which Lewis’s view here entails that mixed fusions are irreducible, is that if mixed 
fusions cannot be members, yet in many cases their parts can be (such as all of their individual 
parts, and any of their class parts which are not proper classes for Lewis), then this not-a-member 
feature of mixed fusions is clearly not derived from the is-a-member feature of their parts. When 
compared with my view of mixed fusions being eligible for membership from Chapter 2, this 
irreducibility also looks to apply to at least some mixed fusions, namely the ones which cannot be 
members due to their size. However, perhaps this is not a very strong case of irreducibility, because 
something’s being a member could be seen as being an external relation, such that it may not be 
completely correct to suggest that this is a genuinely irreducible property, if these are not the sorts 
of properties which can ever be properly reduced to. 
 On the topic of whether mixed fusions are themselves abstract or concrete if at least some of 
their parts are abstract and some of their parts are concrete (as classes may be abstract and some 
individuals may be concrete), Lewis’s preferred view is clear, although not entirely explicit in the 
sense of a direct answer to such a question. As discussed earlier in Chapter 5, we can surmise that 
no mixed fusion for Lewis is explicitly a concrete entity, which only leaves them to be abstracta 
under the presumed dualism. 
 The way in which Lewis’s views entail that mixed fusions are irreducible here is that if 
mixed fusions have both abstract and concrete components, yet the composites are only one of 
these, and in this case abstracta, then the composites have a property that is not found in each of 
their proper parts, namely that of being abstract. So any mixed fusion with both abstract and 
concrete parts which is itself an abstractum cannot be reduced to its concrete parts, because the 
abstract property of the whole is not derived from such parts. Now, if there are some abstract 
entities which are not classes or mixed fusions, then there may be mixed fusions which have all and 
only parts which are abstracta. In this case a mixed fusion that is abstract would be fully reducible, 
in terms of its abstractness, to its proper parts. However, as there are plausibly many things which 
are non-abstracta, if there are mixed fusions in the way that Lewis proposes, at least some of them 
would be fusions of abstracta and concreta. 
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 If instead mixed fusions were to be claimed as neither abstract nor concrete, even while 
having both of those types of parts, then these as wholes would have a new type of property which 
is not found in their parts. This would make mixed fusions irreducible too, as the new type of 
property that the composite is would not reduce to the properties of its proper parts. As such, there 
appears to be no way of taking mixed fusions with both abstracta and concreta parts as one of either 
abstract or concrete or even a novel type and to maintain that they are reducible to a variety of types 
of parts – and this is because the abstractness property of an abstract entity with concrete 
components would not be reducible to those concrete components, just as the concreteness property 
of a concrete entity with abstract components would not be reducible to those abstract components, 
and the novel property of a novel type with both abstract and concrete components would not be 
reducible to those abstract and concrete components. 
 As I argued in Chapter 5 that such fusions of abstracta and concreta are best understood to 
be concreta, my claim to mixed fusions’ irreducibility here mostly rests on classes being abstracta. 
As I mentioned earlier in Chapter 2, Daniel Nolan (2002, Chapter 7; 2004) has shown how to resist 
this being a necessary situation, however, especially in the context of Lewis’s plenitudinous modal 
realism. He does this by building upon a form of structuralism about classes which only requires a 
sufficiently infinitely large amount (proper class many) of concrete individuals as parts of Lewisian 
possible worlds to serve as the structural basis for set theory – a strategy which serves to eliminate 
both pure-out impossibilia and classes as abstracta within Lewis’s system. (Arguably Lewis could 
accept this modification of his system, as he does propose going structuralist in both the Appendix 
of his 1991, as well as relatedly in 1998 – the works which Nolan himself builds upon to make the 
modification.) 
 While I think Nolan’s strategy is admirable for its elimination of pure-out impossibilia 
(insofar as classes are the only pure-out entities) I expect that it still faces some of the problems I 
describe in Chapter 5 for supra-world fusion, such as those in the case of trans-world sums. Which 
means I would still call for a restriction of composition in that context, even with the elimination of 
out-world abstracta. Although, if my objections in Chapter 5 are resisted, I believe there is still at 
least one further case which suggests the irreducibility of mixed fusions – their not having members 
(a conclusion I reach in Chapter 3). 
 On this topic of whether mixed fusions have members, Lewis’s presentation is more of an 
expectation that they do not have members, rather than any direct argument that they do not, as I 
discussed in section 3.1. Even still, there I acknowledged that Lewis’s Second Thesis, that no class 
has any part that is not a class, indirectly suffices to set Lewis as against mixed fusions having 
members, as any of these would be a class and would thereby contravene his Second Thesis. So, 
188 
even though Lewis (weakly) explicitly asserts that mixed fusions do not have members, his Second 
Thesis is a stronger indication that he accepts they should not. And I think that if it is the case that 
mixed fusions do not have members, then it is this that makes them irreducible to their class parts. 
 This is because any mixed fusion’s property of not having members is a property which is 
not reducible to any singleton’s (which are parts of mixed fusions) property of having members. 
Even where mixed fusions have parts which do not have members – which they must to be mixed 
fusions – a mixed fusion not having the property of having members is still not reducible to its 
singleton parts. This is because for the reduction to be plausible, it needs to be total, and not 
selective. 
 To recap, although none are entirely direct statements of mixed fusions being irreducible to 
their proper parts, there appear to be at least three ways that Lewis indirectly shows that many 
mixed fusions are irreducible to their proper parts. This is by Lewis denying that they are members, 
by denying that they have members, and by implying that they are abstracta even in the case they 
have some parts which are concrete (see Chapter 5 for further discussion of this last situation). As I 
have argued that mixed fusions cannot have their class parts’ members without violating the very 
class or set theory that they are caught up with in Chapter 3 – which is a consequence of CAI that I 
see arising from the notion of property inheritance which is embedded in it – I agree with Lewis that 
mixed fusions do not have members, and are therefore irreducible to their class parts. Yet as I 
mentioned earlier, I think that Lewis’s presentation of mixed fusions as irreducible to their proper 
parts is undermined by his commitment to CAI. In the next section we see how. 
7.2 How CAI precludes the irreducibility of composites 
The point of promoting a commitment to a theory or entity as one that is OI is to give a reason to 
not reject the theory or entity for the additional theoretical costs it brings. On the topic of claims to 
the OI of GEM, Hawley says “Other things being equal, a theory which involves fewer ontological 
commitments is preferable to one which involves more. If mereology is ontologically innocent, then 
accepting mereology does not add to our ontological commitments; this removes one obstacle to 
accepting mereology.” (2014, 72) 
 This idea of removing obstacles to the acceptance of GEM is indeed why Lewis makes the 
claim that GEM is OI. As he says in his classic statement of the idea, which also involves an 
argument for CAI, 
[Classical] Mereology is ontologically innocent. To be sure, if we accept 
mereology, we are committed to the existence of all manner of mereological 
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fusions. But given a prior commitment to cats, say, a commitment to cat-
fusions is not a further commitment. The fusion is nothing over and above the 
cats that compose it. It just is them. They just are it. Take them together or take 
them separately, the cats are the same portion of Reality either way. Commit 
yourself to their existence all together or one at a time, it’s the same 
commitment either way. If you draw up an inventory of Reality according to 
your scheme of things, it would be double counting to list the cats and then 
also list their fusion. In general, if you are already committed to some things, 
you incur no further commitment when you affirm the existence of their 
fusion. The new commitment is redundant, given the old one. [...] It is in virtue 
of [CAI] that mereology is ontologically innocent: it commits us only to things 
that are identical, so to speak, to what we were committed to before. (1991, 81-
2) 
There are a couple of things to unpack from this paragraph for the purpose of showing how CAI 
precludes irreducibility. The main ones for our purposes are the claim that prior commitments can 
preclude seemingly new commitments from being truly new, and the claim that fusions can be 
‘nothing over and above’ their composing parts. Both can be understood as claims to the 
reducibility of fusions to their composing parts. In the first case, the commitment to the fusion can 
be reduced to a commitment to the parts – in this way the commitment to the fusion is not an 
additional commitment, because it is only really a commitment to the parts after all. 
 In the second case, it is the interpretation of the phrase ‘nothing over and above’ which can 
be understood as endorsing the reducibility of fusions to their proper parts. Smid (2017) helpfully 
shows that the phrase ‘nothing over and above’ has at least 5 interpretations that are commonly 
involved in making arguments for and of understanding GEM, one of which directly refers to 
reducibility, or reduction. These interpretations include 
No Additional Commitment X is nothing‐over‐and‐aboveNAC the Ys:    
    X is not an additional ontological commitment relative to the 
    ontological commitment to the Ys. 
No Condition   X is nothing‐over‐and‐aboveNC the Ys:    
    The (mere) existence of the Ys is sufficient for the existence of X. 
No Other   X is nothing‐over‐and‐aboveNO the Ys:    
    X is the only object that is R‐related to the Ys. 
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Reduction   X is nothing‐over‐and‐aboveR the Ys:    
    X has no properties that are irreducible to the properties of the Ys. 
Identity   X is nothing‐over‐and‐aboveI the Ys:     
    X is identical with the Ys. 
Smid explains that although GEM does justify No Condition, in that if some things exist they have 
a fusion, and No Other, in the context of parthood extensionality or uniqueness (a notion discussed 
in Chapter 3), that it is only compatible with No Additional Commitment given the counting policy 
for ontological commitment which is in place (2017, 11). He further explains that in the literature 
there are at least two counting policies, the standard one, which holds that we should count 
ontological commitments using identity and non-identity, and Varzi’s ‘Minimalist View’ (2000) 
which instead advises to count via overlap and disjointness (2017, 11). 
 As Smid explains it, it is only via the Minimalist View which No Additional Commitment 
holds, because the standard view ensures that we increase our count of ontological commitments for 
each non-identical thing, whereas the Minimalist View permits that non-identical things are not 
counted as additional beings so long as one overlaps the other. For example, on the standard view I 
would count my shoe, my shoes sole and its lace as three separate commitments. Yet on the 
Minimalist view I could count just one commitment to my shoe, and as the sole and the lace are 
proper parts of it, and hence are fully overlapped by the shoe, I could see my commitment to these 
parts as non-additional. 
 It is in this way that we can understand Lewis’s claim to the OI of GEM for bringing no 
additional commitments via his use of the phrase ‘nothing over and above’. However, we can also 
understand Lewis’s phrasing as supporting Reduction, that a fusion has no properties which are 
irreducible to its proper parts. We can see this especially in Lewis’s earlier use of the phrase 
‘nothing over and above’ in his statement of support for GEM’s principle of unrestricted 
composition, where he says that because an unheard-of fusion “is nothing over and above its parts 
... to describe it you need only describe the parts.” (1991, 80; quoted fully in section 3.4) 
 Clearly, Lewis saying that to describe a fusion one needs only to describe its parts is a case 
of Reduction, because what would be described in any case is the properties each has. However, as 
Smid explains, Reduction is not a principle of GEM. “Mereology is silent on properties, reduction, 
and supervenience. Consequently, it does not force one to accept or deny [Reduction] in the context 
of parts and wholes. However, the extensionality of mereology is often associated with 
[Reduction].” (2017, 10) 
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 Of the five senses of ‘nothing over and above’ which Smid sets out, Lewis is explicitly 
committed to the first four. His commitment to CAI is not quite a commitment to Identity, and this 
is because of Lewis’s weakening of the identity claim to be not quite strict identity, but rather 
something which is analogous to it, as discussed in Chapter 3. (Recall that this is roughly the 
weakening that composition is not strictly 1-1 identity, but rather a form of many-1 identity.) In the 
context of this discussion, we might interpret Lewis as at least holding the following variation 
Analogous Identity  X is nothing‐over‐and‐aboveAI the Ys:    
    X is analogously identical with the Ys. 
Taking Analogous Identity as supported by the other four interpretations of the phrase ‘nothing over 
and above’, and all of these senses of the phrase as indicative of Lewis’s view of CAI and his claim 
to its OI, we have a pretty clear picture that Lewis explicitly holds that all composites are reducible 
to their proper parts – because the many parts are many-1 identical with the one composite – and 
that this reducibility is of a piece with his claim to GEM’s innocence via CAI. 
 This picture receives some support from Varzi (2014) in arguing for the OI of GEM via the 
CAI thesis, as if consonant with his Lewisian instincts (2014, 67). 
I am not saying that the argument above establishes the innocence of 
mereology. Obviously, one may still think that some composite wholes 
exemplify properties and relations that are not reducible to or grounded on the 
properties and relations exemplified by the things that compose them, in which 
case commitment to the former would be a significant ontological addition to 
commitment to the latter. Rather, the point of the argument is to clarify the idea 
that mereology can be innocent: that it is innocent on the assumption that there 
aren’t irreducible wholes like that, which is what Composition as Identity 
amounts to (even on the weak understanding of “as” that I have endorsed).” 
(2014, 63) 
Smid too says “Failure to reduce an entity can be a reason to count it as a further ontological 
commitment.” (2017, 6) It is this, along with Varzi’s last point, from which CAI amounts to the 
claim that there aren’t irreducible wholes, which supports the idea that CAI precludes composite 
irreducibility and instead promotes Reduction. 
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7.3 GEM’s loss of innocence 
Appropriating some of Lewis’s words above, we can see that with regards to claims to CAI, that it 
is a problem to describe a mixed fusion under those conditions. This is because a mixed fusion is 
something over and above its parts. It’s not that to describe it you need only describe the parts – 
because if you describe the character of the parts you have the description ‘has members’ for its 
class parts. Yet, as mixed fusions cannot have members, to describe their class parts we cannot have 
ipso facto described the fusion. Therefore a mixed fusion’s character is not exhausted by the 
character and relations of its parts. It is something more than them. 
 The trouble with Lewis’s presumption of OI for all composites, including mixed fusions, is 
that irreducibility is a hallmark of additional ontological commitment, and thereby any irreducible 
entity comes at a cost to one’s theory. Unfortunately for Lewis, I don’t think there is a viable 
strategy out of this predicament without forsaking theses and principles which are important to his 
views. For instance, in Chapter 3 I already argued that Lewis has to forego both CAI and property 
inheritance from parts to wholes to maintain the existence of mixed fusions, because otherwise class 
theory is violated. If this is done, however, my point in this chapter stands, that in the case of mixed 
fusions their subsequent irreducibility leads to their being additional ontological commitments, 
because without properly accounting for or describing their properties, mixed fusions would be 
missing from one’s ‘inventory of reality’. So, in this sense, GEM loses any claims to innocence in 
the case that it permits mixed fusions. As Lewis sought to justify GEM via both CAI and OI, with 
the loss of both of these supporting notions, such a defence of GEM is severely weakened. 
 As I argued in Chapter 3, with property inheritance being something we would rather hold 
on to, as otherwise many properties of wholes are something like emergent, my strategy here is to 
restrict composition and to thereby treat GEM as falsified by this case. I think the takeaway here is 
that any claims to GEM being OI is constrained by context – specifically the context of the kinds of 
entities that are fed into the system, as it were, and what they are supposed to be like according to 
our best theories. As is known, GEM itself makes no initial claims as to what exists to even initiate 
composite formation. Where it becomes powerful, and for some, unforgivable, is what it can permit 
when given a specific collection of entities. Usually this is in terms of the number of things it 
outputs, but from what I have argued here, it can also be in terms of the types of things that it 
outputs. While the former problem is one involving quantitative concerns – are there too many 
things? – the latter problem is one involving qualitative concerns – are there really things like that? 
 We have seen this sort of idea already in earlier chapters, where certain kinds of entities 
forming composites, such as mixed objects consisting of abstracta and concreta, look to confound 
the principles which support claims to the initial inputs. The blame, as it were, in such cases can 
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only be put on the blind operation of fusion which GEM asserts, much how just as in the significant 
quantitative cases GEM can be seen as the culprit for an excessive number of things in existence. 
What I want to suggest, then, is the sense in which GEM is not OI by dint of what it permits, and 
that is by its capacity to facilitate the formation of properly problematic entities, and not just ones 
which do not sit right with our intuitions (such as odd trout-turkey monsters), but ones which 
literally break our pre-established conventions. I think it is by being both blind to its inputs and 
mute regarding its outputs, as it were, that GEM is vulnerable to generating such confounding 
outputs from independently plausible and/or separate inputs, exactly because the initial inputs 
themselves host incompatible features. In this regard, I believe this makes GEM unable to be 
classified as OI precisely because it itself offers no protection from troubled entailments, where 
such entailments come at great cost. 
 I think what also may have been misleading about GEM applied in restricted domains, is 
that in these domains troubles similar to the ones I have ventured do not arise. I think that in these 
restricted cases although it may appear that GEM is innocent that rather this is just another example 
of how the system itself has no control over how the outputs compare to the inputs, and it caught a 
lucky break. To me, it appears that it is the automatic generation of composites itself, as in Smid’s 
No Condition, which makes the system of GEM non-innocent, and this is because the system can 
lead to problems, not that it necessarily always will, as there is no internal restriction to stop this. I 
think this means that GEM can only then be seen as contextually innocent, and not absolutely. 
Which thereby means that it is not simply innocent, but conditionally so, and this appears to be by 
fortune rather than anything fundamental to GEM itself. 
7.4 Conclusion 
With the previous general picture in mind, I wanted to show how vulnerable GEM really is in the 
case of mixed fusions, which requires that the mereological domain be one which includes both 
classes and non-classes. To really emphasise this vulnerability, I have shown how mixed fusions 
cannot be seen as reducible without themselves contravening the system of standard set or class 
theory, because for them to properly be reducible they need to have their class parts’ members after 
all. This demonstrates the vulnerability of GEM by showing that because it has no say in what its 
inputs and outputs are (in terms of their kinds of beings, beyond sums), it is rather just a conduit for 
making composites out of what it is given – even if these are troublemakers for the theoretical 
environment that they are posited in. 
 Because of GEM’s inherent vulnerability in this regard, and because mixed fusions provide 
an exemplary case of irreducibility which thwarts more traditional claims to the OI of GEM, I 
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assess that GEM is not itself OI. To avoid the costs that mixed fusions would bring in the sense of 
irreducibility I think it is best to restrict composition here, to prohibit mereological hybrids like 
them. In addition to this, it appears that we ought to remain wary that holding unrestricted 
composition principles are risky in any instance where we have not properly evaluated all candidate 
composites which may form in their presence. To further prevent GEM’s vulnerability from being 
inadvertently exploited by positing separately more-or-less harmless existents, then, I think it is 
best to restrict composition in general and avoid unrestricted mereological hybridism altogether. 
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Chapter 8 
Epilogue 
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8.0 The end of this whole story 
In this thesis I have argued against unrestricted mereological hybridism. This has been primarily 
within the context of there being singulates and classes, and with some of the kinds of entities that 
these might be recognised as (e.g., concreta and abstracta; possibilia and impossibilia) put forth as 
contrastively exemplifying categorical differences in a variety of ways. Specifically, I focused on 
mereological hybridism under the condition of unrestricted composition as it is found within 
classical mereology operating absolutely, and I have shown how several unfavourable consequences 
arise when classes and singulates are expected to form composite wholes – depending, of course, on 
just what the entities said to be fused together separately are. 
 The biggest general take away from the arguments that I have made, I think, is that any 
proposal of arbitrary mereological fusion needs to be reconsidered, because there could be more to 
it in terms of the resultant fusions than what may at first appear. In this sense, I have been 
advocating a strategy of mereological modesty, where instead of permitting widespread, 
unconstrained summation of any and every entity whatsoever from the outset, that we look towards 
only instances of composition across categories which we have properly defended, to first try and 
ensure that such transcategorial composites operate consistently within the framework in which we 
expect them to be deployed. 
 One of the subtle issues which I think has been lurking in the background of this study 
surrounds the fact that unrestricted composition alone (but within a mereological framework) is 
insufficient for making mereological hybrids. As a principle of generation which does not supply its 
own inputs, unrestricted composition needs independently provided ingredients to bind and 
combine to even begin to arrive at the sorts of odd and objectionable wholes that I have surveyed 
over the course of this work. And because our reasons for positing such ingredients are incredibly 
varied and contested throughout the entire philosophical corpus it becomes quite difficult to 
definitively pin down just what combinations should be most resisted, or whether some 
combinations work or not only in the presence of other kinds or under other conditions or 
conceptions. 
 So, although I have called for a restriction on composition, I have not made a positive 
assessment of how strictly minimal or maximal I think this restriction should be altogether. This is 
because the existence of problematic composites in the presence of unrestricted composition is 
highly conditional on the kinds of entities which are their proper parts, and the variety of options 
philosophers have claimed for kinds makes the explicit decisions for composition restriction need to 
operate on a case by case basis. While I do accept that unrestricted composition is independently 
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insufficient to beget mereological hybrids, I still think unrestricted composition (or, more properly, 
a composition principle strong enough to facilitate the sorts of mereological fusions under 
contention in this thesis, which unrestricted composition of course is) is necessary for their 
formation, to the effect that we can fairly point towards this composition principle as the primary 
‘culprit’ with regards to such objectionable entities. 
 So instead of proposing any explicitly positive principle of composition, I have pointed 
towards several problematic consequences involving the mereological combination of certain 
dominantly considered kinds that I think may arise given the prevalent ontological commitment to 
them (or at least instances of them). This is in the hope that it is recognised that much more needs to 
be said in the case that we posit certain kinds of entities that form novel wholes in the presence of 
certain composition principles. To me it seems that if we are lucky, the composites we might 
encounter as residual artefacts of the systems we propose and the primary entities that we commit to 
can themselves be harmless additions to our ontology, perhaps things that we only have to consider 
if we are quantifying broadly or speaking in an appropriately absolute manner as to cover all that 
there is, or may be. I don’t believe Lewis is so lucky in this regard, however. 
 As I have demonstrated, mixed fusions, given that they require a class-like membership 
system in play to even have the major parts which make them up, and a mereology to do their 
mixing, immediately throw up challenges to the systems in which they arise. This is by compelling 
questions like: how are they supposed to properly fit in? What role might they play in an ontology? 
What are their consequences? Why accept them after all? In response to these sorts of questions, a 
lot of what I have shown is that mixed fusions generally don’t seem to properly fit in without us 
making serious compromises in other areas of metaphysics which seem to me far more important 
(or at least, that are treated with more urgency and concern) than having an absolutely operating 
composition principle – and more important especially given that these compromises are to be made 
in light of the attitude that mixed fusion can just be ignored, even if not denied. 
 With my arguments over the course of this thesis regarded as a cumulative batch of 
problems facing the prospects of mixed fusions understood in a variety of ways with respect to the 
status of some of their proper parts, I would like to go further. I think that instead of ignoring mixed 
fusions – which I think has led to ignoring their potential consequences – we ought to deny them 
instead. If, in the manner of our rejecting mixed fusions here we only lose entities that we aren’t 
supposed to really care about anyway, it is clearly no loss on an entity front. The remaining 
problem, however, is that the hopeful general ontologist loses a formal system with pretensions to 
absolute coverage, following concerns over the consequences of its composition principle operating 
universally. 
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 From what I can tell, there are multiple strategies here to take in the face of the problems I 
have raised, each of which looks to remove mixed fusions from the ontological menu. The most 
direct, of course, is to reject unrestricted composition or any principle appropriately like it which is 
sufficient to permit mixed fusions in the manner given throughout this thesis. While I do not have a 
replacement restricted principle of composition in mind, it should be noticed that certain problems 
with mixed fusions that I have articulated do only arise insofar as composition is able to generate a 
mereological Universe (as in Chapter 2). That is, mixed fusions that aren’t the sum of all things can 
look more harmless when the focus is on troubles that the Universe brings. But if I’m right about 
mixed fusions inheriting the members of their class parts (as in Chapter 3), then there is a 
significant problem which affects all of them, and not just the totality whole, within the confines of 
the class theory that they partially stem from. 
 With this as a reason for an absolute restriction on the formation of mixed fusions the 
prospect of an abstract atomism (as in Chapter 4) which focuses solely on composition in an 
abstract domain of sets is ruined. This is because the situation would be such that with the null set 
being both an abstractum and a mereological simple it is thereby the sole singulate in that context, 
due to all the mixed fusions having members and by that violating the extensionality of class 
membership. 
 Even if member inheritance as a consequence is resisted, the prospects of a GEM-style 
mereological situation for abstracta qua sets is further challenged once the range of the composition 
relation employed for them expands to include concreta as well. Firstly, the prospective proper part 
foundationalism within the abstract atomism is thereafter less justified due to proper part 
foundationalism being less justifiable for concreta. This is following the possibility of concrete 
mereological gunk. Additionally, with oppositional foundational directions being impossible for a 
mereological Universe which has the proposed abstracta amalgam as a part, the most apparent 
options of either an implausible mixed fusion foundation or a rejection of foundations remain. 
Although I came to no determinate conclusion in this regard, I accept that future work could be 
done to figure out which foundation option is better here if this project were to be further pursued. I 
imagine it would also need to incorporate a response to the issue of loopwholes that I raised in 
Chapter 2. 
 Secondly, the additional problems that I argue arise with regards to the prospects of 
abstracta/concreta fusion in general (as in Chapter 5) also serve to undermine such a mereologising 
of classes qua abstracta. With the more general problems here opening up the scope of my criticism 
of mereological hybridism beyond issues involving membership, I still did not reach an absolute 
restriction in the case of cabs. Instead, once again, I argued for a restriction that was conditional, 
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and this time on the relational matrix surrounding abstracta, concreta and possible worlds. I 
definitely think it would be worth doing more work to further consider the prospects of notions like 
all abstracta and concreta being in a single, unified world, or if Concreta Homeomereity could be 
better justified to resist such a world. 
 The other strategies to avoid the formation of mixed fusions and some other mereological 
hybrids, besides directly restricting monistic universal composition, are: to restrict the field of the 
parthood relation (as in the domain of its applicability), to advance mereological pluralism, to reject 
parthood relations altogether, or to reject the existence of classes. The first of these can be done by 
restricting the field to a single minimal domain – such as only within a one-world view of concrete 
worlds, and it being a world which is class-free, perhaps leaving classes to be non-mereological 
entities. This is a strategy akin to that of Uzquiano (2006), who, although is not there addressing 
problems with mixed fusions or mereological hybrids, is still looking to avoid problems with set-
theoretical violations in a ZFCU domain under GEM. Because Uzquiano’s arguments show that 
there are significant incompatibilities with these two systems due to how membership is supposed 
to work in ZFCU, he suggests that “the burden of argument should be not on those who [do not] 
think that objects of a certain sort enter into the part–whole relation but rather on those who think 
that they do.” (2006, 162) 
 I have made a similar suggestion to this in the context of the proposals for a mereological 
Universe in general (in my Chapter 6), by offering that category system incompatibilities need to be 
shown to not arise, rather than assume that they do not, for us to be justified in asserting the 
existence of such a totality fusion. However, unlike Uzquiano, I don’t believe that the topic-
neutrality of parthood needs to be the condition to go. This is because, with such a rejection leading 
to a de facto restriction on composition anyway, there is still room here to instead just restrict the 
problematic composition principle directly, and not do it by limiting the entire field of composition. 
This allows for consideration of a range of different composition principles each restricted to 
particular domains, and principles which do not cross categorial boundaries that result in the kinds 
of problems noted. 
 In this way a mereology which has all of the same principles as GEM except for the 
universality of composition could still be in place, if desired, and one such mereology for multiple, 
mereologically disconnected domains. Consider here the case of single-world bound GEM systems, 
but with an equivalent mereological system for each of many worlds. Or separate systems of GEM-
concreta alongside GEM-abstracta (that aren’t classes), for example. I am aware that at least 
McDaniel (2017) is a proponent of a mereological pluralism which might be able to operate in this 
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manner, and so think it would also be worth pursuing questions of mereological hybridism further 
in the context of non-classical mereological systems like this in future work. 
 Beyond having a plurality of segregated composition relations, another option to explore 
may be one which has some domains which are compositional and some which are compositionally 
nihilistic, such as for a two-realm view which has composition relations in the one concrete world, 
and nihilism for abstract classes. A committed parthood generalist may at least prefer this, because 
all things are still mereological, although it would preclude all composition among classes in that 
domain. Although this option is unexplored in any detail in the literature as far as I know, it is one 
which Lewis acknowledges when he reflects upon the fact that in his earlier work he claimed that 
the part-whole relation applies to individuals and not classes, “I might at least have granted that the 
part-whole relation applies to classes in a trivial way: even if a class has no proper parts, as I then 
thought, at least it should have itself as an improper part.” (1991, 3) 
 Trivial or not, this option is still able to support the topic-neutrality of parthood, even in the 
cases that the generality of composition is either rejected or made domain specific. The remaining 
two options to avoid the formation of mixed fusions and their ilk are the strongest, and therefore 
likely to be more controversial than some compromising alterations or modifications which may 
still maintain less than maximal GEM systems, or other non-classical mereological frameworks. 
The first of these options is found in Cowling’s (2014) case for mereological anti-realism, wherein 
he presents an Eleatic argument against the existence of mereological relations – essentially 
offering that because mereological relations are not causally active, we ought to reject the existence 
of any of them. The second of these options also results in no mixed fusions, but does not 
necessarily preclude other mereological hybrids from forming, because this option is the denial of 
the existence of classes altogether, which concrete nominalists, for example, are willing to do. 
 While both of these options remove the possibility of at least one problematic entity from 
the landscape, in mixed fusions, they remove a lot else besides, and so any weighing up of these 
stronger, rejecting positions will need to be considered against the viability of more moderate 
options which look only to meet the problems posed in a minimal manner. And because these two 
positions are normally offered for their own merits anyway, their inclusion here is mainly to note 
that the avoidance of bad sums can be met in many ways. This further seems to leave the prospects 
for a definitive answer on how best to positively, rather than negatively, avoid mixed fusions and 
other transcategorial sums open-ended. 
 Ultimately, I think the worst problem that I have posed for mixed fusions is in Chapter 3, as 
it comes from something essential to their class parts, and so from a mereological hybridism arising 
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from entities being classes or singulates, a hybridism which leads to mixed fusions having members 
and contravening the very class theory their parts come from. This is the worst because it also 
follows mixed fusions wherever they go, in or out of worlds, and for whatever else they are in 
addition to their necessarily being sums of individuals and classes. Furthermore, it also affects all 
mixed fusions equally – rather than only something which affects however many mixed fusions 
have abstract and concrete parts under certain conditions, or if a mixed fusion is a mereological 
Universe, or whatever. What to me serves as a further decisive indictment against mixed fusions in 
this regard, is that even if the property inheritance of membership that I propose in Chapter 3 is 
resisted, mixed fusions are then clear instances of additional ontological commitments because they 
are therefore irreducible to their proper parts (as in Chapter 7). Which leads to them needing to be 
counted distinctly if included in one’s ontology, and thereby coming at an unjustified ontological 
cost. 
 With this lack of ontological innocence for mixed fusions receiving its justification due to 
the opposing option of mixed fusions as extensionality violating classes being resisted, the 
acceptance of mixed fusions looks to me to definitely come at too great a cost to bear. With options 
on the mereological horizon other than those which breed mixed fusions, I think that the many 
failures of mereological hybridism that I have presented in this thesis in the case of mixed fusions 
serve as a powerful motivation to look beyond the limits of the rejected classical mereology and 
unrestricted composition, and also beyond other views which could allow the same kinds of 
problems with entities, toward a more secure mereological point of view. 
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